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ABSTRACT 
 This study is mainly intended to determine quantitatively the economic effects of 
crawfish imports on the domestic crawfish industry. Inverse demand systems are used to 
estimate the price and scale flexibility as an indicator for the effects of imports on 
crawfish domestic price. 
 A variety of algebraic forms for empirical consumer allocation models have been 
developed. Economic theory, however, does not provide the necessary fundamental 
criteria to choose ex ante among the alternative specifications. Bartern (1993) and Brown, 
Lee, and Seale (1995) examined a family of inverse demand systems, showing that the 
integrated demand system, in its own right, has more parameters than any of the 
component systems, and is, therefore, more flexible. This study also finds that among the 
different type of inverse demand systems the generalized inverse demand model (GIDS) 
is a better fit for the data used in this study.  
As expected, the cross price flexibility of imported crawfish and scale flexibility 
in the domestic crawfish equation are shown to be negative, implying that crawfish 
imports have negative effect on domestic crawfish price and imports of aggregate fish 
also have a negative effect on the domestic crawfish price. At the same time, cross price 
flexibilities show either substitutability or complementarity. The Morishima elasticity of 
complementarity was used as a more adequate measure of interaction between 
commodities than the coefficients of the Antonelli matrix. The study showed that the 
elasticities of complementarity are all positive, implying both the tendency toward 
complementarity and the negativity of the own-quantity elasticities. 
 x
As the negativity of cross price flexibility of imported crawfish indicates, 
domestic crawfish producers will suffer economic losses from increased imports of 
crawfish, while the domestic crawfish consumer will be better off. Even though the 
economic loss to the domestic crawfish producers resulting from increases in the imports 
of crawfish is relatively small compared with the gains to domestic crawfish consumer 
welfare, the impact of imports is serious to the domestic crawfish industry because the 
loss is accrued to a small number of domestic crawfish processors. This study however, 
shows a net social welfare gain from increasing crawfish imports. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Louisiana leads the nation in the production of freshwater crawfish.1 In Louisiana, 
the commercial crawfish industry has a long, historical background. In the beginning, the 
supply of crawfish was large based on wild harvest. By the end of the 1960s, farm-raised 
crawfish had become a common supply source. However, some farmers still catch 
crawfish in the Atchafalaya Basin Swamp for the live and processed markets. 
 In 2004, total commercial crawfish production was 78 million pounds. Of this 
total, 70 million pounds (90% of the total) was farm-raised with the remaining 8 million 
pounds being harvested naturally. 
 
Table 1.1. Louisiana Crawfish Production in 2004 
 No. of Producers Acres Production (lb) Gross Farm Value ($) 
Farm-Raised 1,226 118,250 69,546,680 41,728,008 
Wild-Caught 1,481 - 8,267,173 4,808,939 
Source: Louisiana Ag. Summary. 
 
In 2004, 1,226 farmers produced crawfish in ponds thus ensuring the quality of the 
product with a total pond acreage of 118,250 (Table 1). Gross farm value of the harvest 
(farm-raised and wild-caught) was $46 million. 
 Crawfish aquaculture is an important complementary component of integrated 
farming systems in which rice is the principal crop. To use natural and economic 
resources efficiently, many rice producers double-crop crawfish in rice fields after the 
______________________________ 
1Other states such as Texas, California, and North Carolina produce minimal amounts of freshwater 
crawfish. 
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rice has been harvested. In the last ten years this co-cropping approach has progressed 
from an incidental practice to a vital economic component of many rice producers’ 
operations. In fact, most crawfish in Louisiana are now being cultured in rice fields. The 
species of crawfish commercially important in Louisiana are the red swamp crawfish 
(Procambarus clarki) and the white river crawfish (Procambarus zonangulus). 
 In the U.S. market, crawfish can be sold whole and live, or as tail meat. Tail meat, 
in turn, can be sold fresh (chilled) or frozen. Fresh tail meat does not keep more than a 
couple of weeks, so the U.S. market for fresh tail meat is dominated by U.S. producers. 
Frozen tail meat can keep for up to a year or more, and is the focus of Chinese imports. 
U.S. crawfish growers are the sole supply source for the live whole crawfish market, and 
each year also sell some of their product for peeling (i.e. processing whole crawfish into 
tail meat). Crawfish tail meat is then purchased by restaurants, distributors, and retail 
food stores. This processed crawfish tail meat is usually sold within Louisiana or to 
national distributor’s local outlets. 
 Since crawfish is a perishable product (even frozen tail meat has a limited shelf 
life) usage generally tracks production. Although the volume of crawfish consumed in 
other states is still comparatively insignificant, consumer recognition of crawfish and 
market acceptance has spread significantly over the past decade. U.S. per capita 
consumption of crawfish was approximately 0.25 pounds in 2002. However, in Louisiana 
per capita consumption of crawfish is approximately 10.4 pounds, as 70% of the crawfish 
produced in the state is consumed locally. 
Up to 1999, crawfish price was relatively stationary, fluctuating from $3.00 to 
$3.50 per pound. However, during the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 crawfish seasons, 
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extreme drought conditions considerably lowered crawfish production resulting in the 
soaring of domestic crawfish prices. Until 1994, domestically produced crawfish had not 
met market challenges from imported products. For the first time, domestic production 
from aquaculture and capture sources was supplemented by value-added tail meat from 
China. Within three years, the market share of tail meat from China had increased to 87 
percent (ITC, 1997). This increase caused that an antidumping petition (marketing at less 
than fair market value) was filed with the U.S. International Trade Commission. An 
investigation led to a finding of an industry being materially injured by reason of 
crawfish tail meat imports from China being sold in the U.S. at less than fair value. As a 
result, tariffs averaging 123% were established. The tariff remedy had limited impact. 
Severe domestic tail meat shortages resulted from two consecutive years of drought in 
producing areas (Kenneth, 2002). Chinese crawfish tail meat imports, heretofore under an 
antidumping duty, rebounded to meet domestic demand in 2000 and 2001.2 Even after 
recovering normal production of crawfish, Chinese crawfish tail meat imports did not 
recede to their previous, lower levels. On October 28, 2000, the U.S. Congress passed the 
agriculture spending bill.3 The Law instructs the U.S. Commissioner of Customs to 
collect certain antidumping and countervailing duties and place them in a clearing 
account. Once entries are liquidated, the money is transferred to a special account from 
which they are distributed to affected domestic producers who petition for qualifying 
expenditures (Schmitz and Seale, 2004).  
______________________________ 
2In September 1997, U.S. International Trade Commission determined that an industry in the United States 
was materially injured by reason of imports crawfish tail meat from China that were sold at less than fair 
value. On September 15, 1997, U.S. Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on subject imports of 
crawfish tail meat from China. 
3Public Law 106-387, which attached the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA) as 
amendment Title X by Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia as part of the Agricultural, Rural 
Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2001. 
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The so-called “Byrd Amendment” effectively empowers domestic producers and 
processors, who successfully petition the U.S. government to impose antidumping and 
countervailing duties on competing imports, to keep the proceeds of those tariffs. For a 
company to be eligible for payouts, it must prove that it successfully litigated an 
antidumping and countervailing duty case against a specific industry in a specific 
country. Companies that did not participate in the original antidumping duty case do not 
receive any of the collected funds. Table 1.2 and 1.3 show CDSOA disbursements for 
food products and for crawfish tail meat from China, respectively (Schmitz and Seale, 
2004). 
 On the basis of the record developed in the subject five-year review, the 
Commission determined in August 2002 that revocation of the antidumping duty order on 
crawfish tail meat from China would likely lead to the continuation or recurrence of 
material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time. 
1.1. Research Problem 
 Even though the crawfish industry in Louisiana has proven its’ economic 
potential, many challenges remain. Competition from imports associated with low market 
price and World Trade Organization (WTO) regulation are becoming increasingly 
important for the domestic crawfish industry.4 Although the imported products are 
flowing into the domestic market through different agents or market channels, 
_______________________ 
4U.S. trading partners react vigorously against the CDSOA. On July 21, 2001, Australia, Brazil, Chile, the 
European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand requested that the WTO form a panel 
to investigate the CDSOA with respect to U.S. obligations under Article 18.1 of the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement (AD) and Article 32.2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM). The panel found against the U.S. on the CDSOA payments and recommended that the CDSOA be 
repealed. On October 18, 2002, the U.S. appealed the ruling to the WTO Appellate Body, but on January 
16, 2003, the Appellate Body confirmed that the CDSOA was incompatible with WTO rules. In January 
2004, the EU and other nations asked for WTO permission to take retaliatory action against the U.S. 
because of its failure to repeal the amendment. 
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Table 1.2. CDSOA FY 2001-2003 Disbursements for Food Products ($1000) 
Case Number Case Name FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 Total 
A-475-818 
A-570-848 
A-549-813 
C-475-819 
A-533-813 
A-351-605 
A-560-802 
A-570-831 
A-337-803 
A-337-804 
A-403-801 
C-403-802 
C-507-601 
A-301-602 
A-570-851 
A-570-863 
C-408-046 
C-489-806 
A-489-805 
A-570-855 
A-507-502 
A-357-812 
C-357-813 
Pasta/Italy 
Crawfish tail meat/China 
Canned pineapple/Thailand 
Pasta/Italy 
Preserved mushrooms/India 
Frozen concentrated orange juice/Brazil 
Preserved mushrooms/Indonesia 
Fresh garlic/China 
Fresh Atlantic salmon/Chile 
Preserved mushrooms/Chile 
Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon/Norway 
Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon/Norway 
Roasted in-shell pistachios/Iran 
Fresh cut flowers/Columbia 
Preserved mushrooms/China 
Honey/China 
Sugar/EU 
Pasta/Turkey 
Pasta/Turkey 
Non-frozen apple juice concentrated/China 
Raw in-shell pistachios/Iran 
Honey/Argentina 
Honey/Argentina 
 
Food Total 
Grand Total 
17,533 
- 
1,792 
2,480 
171 
- 
83 
25 
- 
- 
46 
18 
- 
33 
- 
- 
8 
7 
11 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
22,209 
231,202 
4,674 
7,469 
531 
2,528 
2,155 
1,175 
443 
536 
173 
- 
59 
29 
- 
- 
20 
- 
17 
9 
4 
1 
- 
- 
- 
 
19,824 
329,871 
1,730 
9,764 
5,395 
379 
1,326 
0 
524 
342 
644 
170 
18 
7 
42 
- 
12 
29 
0 
8 
- 
6 
5 
0 
0 
 
20,402 
190,247 
23,938 
17,233 
7,718 
5,387 
3,652 
1,176 
1,050 
903 
817 
170 
123 
54 
42 
33 
32 
29 
26 
24 
15 
8 
5 
0 
0 
 
62,434 
751,320 
Source: U.S. Customs Service. 
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Table 1.3. CDSOA Disbursements for Crawfish Tail Meat from China, FY2002-2006 
                 Antidumping Case Number A-570-848 ($1000) 
Claimant Amount Paid 
 
 
Atchafalaya Crawfish Processors 
Seafood International Distributors 
Catahoula Crawfish 
Prairie Cajun Wholesale Seafood Dist. 
Bayou Land Seafood 
Basin Crawfish Processors 
Acadiana Fishermen’s Co-Op 
Crawfish Enterprises, Inc.* 
Bonanza Crawfish Farm 
Riceland Crawfish 
Cajun Seafood Distributors 
Randol’s Seafood & Restaurant* 
Choplin Seafood 
Carl’s Seafood 
Sylvester’s Processors 
Blanchard Seafood, Inc.* 
Harvey’s Seafood 
Louisiana Premium Seafoods 
Schexnider Crawfish 
Phillips Seafood 
C.J.’s Seafood & Purged Crawfish 
Arnaudville Seafood 
Teche Valley Seafood 
A&S Crawfish 
Clearwater Crawfish Farm 
L.T. West 
Louisiana Seafood 
Bellard’s Poultry & Crawfish 
Becnel’s Meat & Seafood 
Lawtell Crawfish Processors 
Brown Aubrey 
Dugas Allen J 
 
TOTAL for A-570-848 
2002 
 
793 
707 
620 
517 
420 
0 
318 
399 
313 
320 
319 
305 
211 
219 
219 
209 
165 
163 
0 
95 
374 
36 
48 
70 
0 
238 
200 
106 
68 
17 
0 
0 
 
7,469 
2003 
 
1,367 
1,051 
910 
734 
629 
593 
583 
487 
460 
411 
407 
349 
278 
255 
249 
217 
203 
150 
137 
109 
80 
46 
45 
15 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
9,764 
2004 
 
894 
637 
607 
461 
464 
277 
397 
837 
314`` 
330 
327 
260 
201 
161 
148 
210 
141 
70 
64 
57 
437 
41 
23 
0 
0 
215 
217 
24 
0 
0 
0 
369 
 
8,183 
2005 
 
256 
192 
171 
123 
130 
81 
113 
54 
92 
107 
98 
77 
62 
43 
37 
58 
40 
0 
14 
14 
140 
12 
5 
0 
0 
96 
63 
1 
0 
0 
119 
0 
 
2,198 
2006 
 
535 
373 
327 
245 
252 
171 
227 
117 
199 
271 
202 
163 
119 
82 
97 
113 
79 
26 
0 
31 
276 
21 
11 
0 
1 
224 
0 
2 
0 
0 
245 
136 
 
4,545 
Source: U.S. Customs Service. 
* Indicates member of the Crawfish Processors Alliance (CPA). 
 
 
 
 7 
 
all imported products are consumed indiscriminately with domestically produced goods. 
As a result of the massive imports of Chinese crawfish, major distortions occurred in the 
domestic market because price is the strongest motivation among many determining 
factors that influences a consumer’s willingness to purchase these goods. However, 
domestic prices of these goods are typically higher than those prices in major exporting 
countries due to the relatively high cost of production. The low-price imported goods 
force domestic producers to reduce production or go out of business. However, domestic 
crawfish consumption has increased constantly because of the relative health benefits 
related to Selenium and Vitamin B12 and/or low price of the product. Furthermore, 
aquaculture products, like crawfish, are increasing in importance as a source of protein 
along with red meat and chicken.  
Louisiana’s crawfish industry has high economic value. Many farmers and 
processors are producing not only crawfish meat but also value added products with 
crawfish as one of the main ingredients. Such economic activities are not only providing 
safe jobs and high quality foods for what people demand increasingly, they also serve to 
reinvigorate Louisiana’s rural communities. A number of consumers and producers of 
crawfish are clearly involved in these economic activities (Harrison et al, 2003). 
 As this discussion suggests, Louisiana’s crawfish industry is facing strong 
competition from low-priced imports and an increase in imports of these goods affects 
not only domestic consumers but also domestic producers and processors. As a result, in 
order to encourage the crawfish industry, it is necessary to assess the economic impacts 
these imports have had on the domestic crawfish industry in Louisiana. 
 
 8 
 
1.2. Justification 
Gorman’s study (1959) postulated that the price of fish depends, in part, on the 
quantity consumed (or supplied) of the own good and in part on the quantities available 
of the other related goods as well as real income. Since an increase in fish imports 
increases total supply, increased imports might affect domestic price by which domestic 
crawfish consumers and producers’ welfare could be affected. In fact, domestic crawfish 
prices are exhibiting instability especially after 2000 and 2001, along with varying 
imports of crawfish and other related fishery products. The purpose of this study is to 
focus on the downstream effects of crawfish imports and the other related fishery 
products such as catfish, shrimp, and oysters which are expected to compete with 
crawfish. This study will accomplish this goal by using a system of inverse demand 
equations in which price variations are explained by functions of quantity variations. 
The justification of the use of inverse demand systems for fish was well 
illustrated by Barten and Bettendorf (1989) as follows: 
“For certain goods, like fresh vegetables or fish, supply is very inelastic in the 
short run and the producers are virtually price takers. Price taking producers and price 
taking consumers are linked by traders who select a price which they expect clears the 
market. In practice this means that at the auction the wholesale traders offer prices for 
the fixed quantities which, after being augmented with a suitable margin, are sufficiently 
low to induce consumers to buy the available quantities. The traders set the prices as a 
function of the quantities. The causality goes from quantity to price.” 
 
In developing an inverse demand system for empirical price and welfare analysis, 
the system should meet the curvature conditions implied by microeconomic theory. Holt 
and Bishop (2002) summarized the curvature conditions required as follows: (1) the 
direct utility function should be quasi-concave in quantities; (2) the indirect utility 
function should be quasi-convex in prices; and (3) the expenditure function should be 
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concave in prices. If an inverse demand system sufficiently satisfies these curvature 
conditions, then the inverse demand system can be applied to welfare effect analysis 
associated with a price change.5 
In order to analyze the downstream effects of increased imports of crawfish, this 
study is conducted on the basis of the economic theory related to a theoretically 
consistent, inverse demand system in which the prerequisite curvature condition is 
sufficiently satisfied. In an inverse demand function, price is the endogenous variable as 
opposed to a traditional demand function, where quantity is the endogenous variable.6  
An inverse demand system is more desirable for analysis of demand for perishable 
fishery products because even though these products can be stored either in a frozen state 
or as processed goods, the life span of these products should be limited. 
1.3. Objectives 
1.3.1. General Objectives 
This study has the following main objectives: 
1. To provide a theoretical and practical way of determining the impacts on domestic 
price given a change in import volume; and, 
2. To obtain measurements of welfare changes in the inverse demand system and 
provide exact welfare measures associated with changes in imports. 
_________________________ 
5Many economists showed that in practice encountering situations where curvature conditions hold 
spontaneously and globally are rare. The result is that researchers have increasingly considered model 
specifications that allow these restrictions to be imposed either globally or locally during estimation. See, 
respectively, Barten and Geyskens (1975), Barnett (1983 and 1985), Gallant and Golub (1984), Barnett and 
Lee (1985), Barnett, Lee, and Wolfe (1987), Chalfant, Gray, and White (1991), Brenton (1994), Koop, 
Osiewalski, and Steel (1994), Ramajo (1994), Terrel (1996), Moschini (1998), Ryan and Wales (1999), 
Holt and Bishop (2002), and Wong and Mclaren (2005). 
6The inverse demand equation is defined as follows: )(qfip = . 
  The traditional demand equation is defined as follows: )( pgiq = . 
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1.3.2. Specific Objectives 
      The specific objectives of the study are as follows: 
1. To illustrate the theoretical basis of using price and scale flexibilities to describe 
how these concepts can be used as a measure of quantity’s impact on price; 
2. To estimate and compare empirical scale, compensated, and uncompensated 
flexibilities for crawfish by using Generalized Inverse Demand System (GIDS) 
and four different inverse demand systems, i.e., Differential Inverse Rotterdam 
Demand System (DIRDS), Differential  Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System 
(DIAIDS), Differential Inverse Demand of Central Bureau of Statistics (DICBS), 
and Differential Inverse Demand of National Bureau of Research (DINBR); 
3. To estimate empirical approximations versus exact measures of consumer welfare 
change in quantity space by using the estimated price and scale flexibilities; and, 
4. To develop a practical way in which to measure the crawfish producer welfare 
changes associated with variations in price and quantity. 
1.4. Research Procedure 
1.4.1. Objective One 
Like Hicksian decomposition in traditional demand systems, price change in an 
inverse demand system can be decomposed into two parts: 1) substitution effect and 2) 
scale effect in Antonelli’s decomposition.7 Since price change in Antonelli’s 
decomposition is explained by changes in not only quantity but also real purchasing 
power, the inverse demand system should be formulated to explain both effects. 
 
_________________________ 
7Kim (1997) showed the Antonelli decomposition of the price effect of a quantity change into the 
substitution and scale effects. 
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In an inverse demand system, compensated price flexibility describes the substitution 
effect and scale flexibility explains the income effect. The uncompensated price 
flexibility is the sum of compensated price and scale flexibilities. 
 The objective will be achieved by using a family of inverse demand systems: 
(1.1)     ∑+=
j
jijiii qdgQdgpdw lnlnln                                                                       (GIDS) 
(1.2)     ∑+=
j
jijiii qdhQdhpdw lnlnln                                                                     (DIRDS) 
(1.3)     ∑+=
j
jijii qdcQdcdw lnln                                                                           (DIAIDS) 
(1.4)     ∑+=
j
jiji
i
i qdhQdc
P
pdw lnlnln
*
                                                                    (DICBS) 
(1.5)     ∑+=−
j
jijiii qdcQdhQdwdw lnlnln                                                              (DINBR) 
where ip  is the normalized price of the ith good, *ip  is the nominal price of the ith good, 
iii qpw =  is the ith good’s budget share, Qd ln  is a differential Divisia quantity index, 
and Pd ln  is a differential Divisa price index.8,9 In equations (1.1) – (1.5), ig , ih , and ic  
represent the move from one difference surface to another, implying scale effect and that 
ijg , ijh , and ijc  represent a movement along the same indifference surface, implying 
substitution effect. 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
8A Differential Divisia quantity index: ∑=
i i
qdiwQd lnln . 
9A Differential Divisia price index: ∑=
i i
pdiwPd lnln . 
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1.4.2. Objective Two 
1.4.2.1. Consumer Welfare 
The use of the inverse demand systems is motivated by our interest in the price 
and welfare effects of imported crawfish products. Consumer welfare can be measured by 
consumer’s surplus of uncompensated inverse demand and compensating variation or 
equivalent variation calculated by compensated flexibility. As the uncompensated 
flexibility overestimates the quantity effect on price, in which the quantity effect includes 
both substitution and scale effects, consumer surplus is only an approximated 
measurement. However, compensated flexibility measures exactly the quantity effect in 
which the scale effect can be separated from the substitution effect. As a result, 
compensating variation will be used in this study to exactly measure the effect of imports 
on consumer welfare.  
1.4.2.2. Producer Welfare 
As the production and profit of domestic crawfish processors might be affected by 
imports of crawfish and/or other related fishery products, depending on positive or 
negative impacts of the imports on domestic crawfish price, the welfare effect of the 
domestic crawfish processor could be easily measured through dual cost and profit 
functions. To measure quantitatively the welfare impact of the domestic crawfish 
processor in quantity space, flexibilities will be used in the profit equation of domestic 
producer of jq .  For example, the change in crawfish imports can affect not only the 
domestic crawfish price but also the domestic production because domestic production 
can be affected by domestic price. The change then in profit represents producer’s 
welfare impact. 
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1.5. Data Requirement 
 The fish species represented are five types of commercial fish: domestic crawfish, 
imported crawfish, catfish, shrimp, and oysters. There are wide ranges in the supplied 
quantities of each type of fish. This is especially true with domestic crawfish. Combined, 
the captive and cultured harvests of domestic crawfish ranged from 27 to 56 thousand 
MT during the 1990’s. The wide range in such a short time period reflects the production 
swings in the capture fishery. During this period, the range for capture supply was 8 to 32 
thousand MT. Although varied, culture sources were more reliable, producing from 16 to 
28 thousand MT annually. While variation in the capture supply is mostly rooted in 
fluctuating water levels in rivers, the culture supply variation is more reflective of the 
producers response to prices and conditions in the rice industry (Kenneth, 2002). 
The data refers to the fish commercially available in the U.S. market through 
domestic supply and imports, from 1980 to 2005. The data are annual time series 
consisting of prices and quantities (see Appendix II). Let *iq  denote the quantity variable 
of ith fishery good. Conversion of *iq  into a normalized quantity, ,iq  which is the 
requisite form utilized in inverse demand systems, is calculated as: 
(1.6)     
meani
i
i
q
qq
,
*= , 
where 
N
q
q
n
i
i
meani
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
=
∑
=1
*
,  
           1>iq , if meanii qq ,*> ,  
           1=iq , if meanii qq ,*= , and 
           1<iq , if meanii qq ,*< . 
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Now, let *ip  denote the price variable of ith fishery good. Then, total expenditure 
on the products included in the analysis is calculated as follows: 
(1.7)     ∑
=
⋅=
n
i
ii qpm
1
* . 
To get the normalized price, ,ip  
*
ip  is divided by m  as follows: 
(1.8)     
m
pp ii
*= . 
Note that ip  is the same for wholesale, retail, and processor prices if the trader’s 
marginal is proportional to the price. Then, the budget share of each fish, ,iw  is obtained 
through multiplying ip  by iq  as follows: 
(1.9)     ,iii qpw ⋅=  where ∑
=
=
n
i
iw
1
1. 
1.6. Outline of Dissertation 
 This work accomplishes its’ two main objectives through a “traditional-style” 
dissertation. A comprehensive literature review is presented in chapter two. Chapter three 
will discuss the economic theory related to inverse demand systems. Chapter four will 
describe the econometric skills required, including a restricted system estimator, 
homogeneity, adding up, symmetry, singularity, autocorrelation, and endogeneity issues 
encountered in estimating price and scale flexibilities. Empirical results and discussion 
will be presented in chapter five, with chapter six serving as an overall summary. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Many theories are available to explain the benefits of free trade for both importing 
and exporting countries – see Krugman and Obstfeld (1991), Ohlin (1933), Ricardo 
(1817), and Smith (1776). While both nations can benefit from free trade as long as each 
nation has a comparative advantage in the production of one commodity, lower-priced 
imported goods often reduce the domestically produced goods’ price in the importing 
country so that the importing country’s producers could be negatively impacted with a 
reduction in profits. In the early 1990s, the crawfish processing business in Louisiana was 
a well-established and profitable component of the state’s economy. Domestic crawfish 
price was stable, hovering at around $3.50 per pound during that time. However, with the 
introduction of increased Chinese crawfish tail meat imports into the domestic market, 
domestic price for crawfish became more unstable. For example, the domestic monthly 
price of crawfish has fluctuated from $1.92/lb. to $6.06/lb. during 2001-2004. As a result, 
Louisiana crawfish processors have suffered from price instability attributed to the 
increased imports of lower-priced Chinese crawfish tail meat. 
The use of econometric models to analyze fish markets provides a quantitative 
approach for structural, forecasting, and policy evaluation. Given that theoretical 
concepts of fish price formation, inverse demand system, compensating and equivalent 
variation, and price and scale flexibilities are closely related to construct structural 
econometric model for the U.S. crawfish market, the relevant literature review needs to 
include studies that model inverse demand systems, that measure welfare in quantity 
space, and that examine developments in econometric methods applied to these problems. 
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2.1. Fish Price Formation  
 Gorman (1959) proposed that the price of fish partially depends on specific 
factors, stipulating that price is a function of quantity consumed and income, and in part 
on the shadow prices of basic characteristics shared by all types of fish. The biological 
nature of the production process of fish results in many fishery products being produced 
annually or only at regular time intervals. Some of these products are perishable or semi-
perishable, and cannot be stored for long periods. The products must be consumed within 
a certain period of time. Hence the situation results in fixed supply and a given of 
demand for a specific time period. In the short term, the level of production cannot be 
changed. For such goods, the causality is from quantity to price. 
 Elasticities long have been used as the basic conceptual tools both in demand 
theory and in estimation. However, agricultural economists often find that price 
flexibility is more useful and easier to measure, especially in whole market situations. 
Price flexibility is the percentage of change in the price of a commodity, associated with 
an isolated one percent change in the quantity or in a related variable. This term, used in 
this way, was introduced in 1919 by H. L. Moore in his pioneering article, “Empirical 
Laws of Demand and Supply and the Flexibility of Prices.” Moore drew attention to price 
flexibility in order (1) to focus on price phenomena from the producers’ viewpoint and 
(2) to provide analytic content to his cotton-demand-curve estimates. The concept’s 
usefulness grew out of Moore’s observation that, although individuals make quantity 
decisions based on given prices, market supplies of many agricultural products are so 
fixed in the short run that prices must bear the entire adjustment burden. Consequently, 
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the amount by which market prices change in response to output changes between 
production periods is particularly important in the farm sector (Houck, 1966). 
 Houck (1966) explained the relationship of direct price flexibilities to direct price 
elasticities. He showed that it is frequently easier to estimate direct and cross price 
flexibilities rather than price elasticities in agricultural economics research. However, 
elasticity estimates may be needed or wanted. His paper showed that, under rather 
general conditions, the reciprocal of the direct price flexibility is the lower absolute limit 
of the direct price elasticity. The departure of the true price elasticity from the flexibility 
reciprocal depends on the strength of the cross effects of substitution and 
complementarity with other commodities. 
 Huang (1994) examined the relationships between price elasticities and price 
flexibilities with emphasis on comparing differences between a directly estimated 
demand matrix and an inverted demand matrix. He concluded that since the common 
practice of inverting an elasticity matrix to obtain measures of flexibilities or vice versa 
can cause sizable measurement errors, only directly estimated flexibilities should be used 
to evaluate price effects of quantity changes. 
 Eales (1996) disagreed with Huang’s recommendation for three reasons. First, 
Huang inverted matrices from separable subsystems. This, in general, can be expected to 
be misleading because the conditional and unconditional elasticities derived from a 
separable ordinary demand system are not equal. Second, inversion of sensitivity 
matrices from conditional demand may or may not produce good estimates of 
unconditional sensitivities. That is, if one estimates an ordinary meat demand system and 
inverts the elasticity matrix, it cannot, in general, be expected to produce good estimates 
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of the unconditional meat flexibilities and vice versa. Finally, expenditures cannot be 
viewed as predetermined in conditional demand systems. He argued that one should not 
employ directly estimated elasticities unless one is willing to believe that those estimates 
are consistent, i.e., prices and expenditure are predetermined. 
 However, according to Huang’s reply to Eales’ comment, there are at least two 
drawbacks in obtaining a matrix of demand elasticities by inverting a directly estimated 
price flexibility matrix or vice versa. He indicated that in the process of inversion, the 
point estimates must be treated as pure numbers representing the true parameters, 
ignoring the stochastic properties of the estimates. Another drawback is that the inverted 
results are quite sensitive to the numerical structure (for example, existence of a 
singularity problem) of a demand matrix being inverted, and that could cause unstable 
results. Due to the stochastic properties in estimating elasticities or flexibilities by 
adopting time series data, the consistency between direct and indirect flexibilities is not 
guaranteed. 
 The difference between the estimations of both stochastic parameters can be seen 
in the following examples. Assume that there are two goods, 1q  and ,2q  and their 
respective prices, 1p  and ,2p  as well as income, .m  One can estimate both linear 
regression models for the inverse and direct demand equations. First, the inverse demand 
statistical equations are shown as follows: 
(2.1)     113212111101 lnlnlnln εββββ ++++= mqqp  
(2.2)     223222121202 lnlnlnln εββββ ++++= mqqp  
where iε  is the random error term. According to the assumption of statistical regression 
procedure, 0)( =εE  and q  and ε  are independent, such that 0)( =⋅εqE  where q  
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represents the set of quantities 1(q  and ).2q  Second, the direct demand statistical 
equations are shown as follows: 
(2.3)     113212111101 lnlnlnln emppq ++++= αααα  
(2.4)     223222121202 lnlnlnln emppq ++++= αααα  
where e  is the random error term. According to the assumption of statistical regression 
procedure, 0)( =eE  and p  and e  are independent, such that 0)( =⋅ epE  where p  
represents the set of prices 1( p  and ).2p  Using the four different equations, the 
relationships among parameters can be estimated, representing direct flexibilities in (2.1) 
and (2.2) and direct elasticities in (2.3) and (2.4). Furthermore, it can be shown that 
1
1
1
αβ ≠  and .
1
2
2 αβ ≠  
 In addition to this, assume that .' εβ += qp  p and q are vectors of prices and 
quantities. We can then rewrite this equation as ,' epq += α  where ,1βα =  and 
.1εβ
−=u  Further manipulation allows the following to be obtained: 
(2.5)     qppp ')'( 1−=α  
(2.6)     )'()'( 1 epppp += − αα  
(2.7)     eppppppp ')'(')'( 11 −− += αα  
(2.8)     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛= −− εββα
1')'(1')'( 11 ppppppp  
(2.9)     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛−= − εββα
1')'(1 1 ppp  
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If p and ε  are correlated, then ;1βα ≠  however, if p and ε  are not correlated, the direct 
price flexibility is equal to the reciprocal of the direct price elasticity. 
 In empirical modeling, direct price flexibility is derived from the inverse demand 
function in which price is a function of the quantity supplied of own commodity, related 
commodities, and a shift variable. In contrast, indirect price flexibility is acquired 
utilizing the ordinary demand function, in which quantity is a function of the price of the 
commodities and income. As shown in equations (2.1) to (2.9), the reciprocal of the 
flexibility (elasticity) estimated in an empirical model is not always a good 
approximation of the elasticity (flexibility) since different variables are held constant in 
the two different estimations. Even though the critical issue of price flexibility is 
unresolved, Houck (1966), Huang (1994), and Eales (1996) ascertained the benefits of 
using price flexibilities to empirically evaluate price effects of quantity. 
 Price flexibility is the percentage change in price resulting from a particular 
change in quantity with all other factors held constant.10 If demand is inelastic, then the 
absolute value of the indirect price flexibility coefficient is likely to be greater than one. 
A flexible price is consistent with an inelastic demand. In other words, a small change in 
quantity has a relatively large impact on price. If demand is elastic, then the absolute 
value of the price flexibility coefficient is likely to be less than one. An inflexible price is 
consistent with an elastic demand. 
 
 
________________________ 
10The price flexibility coefficient (f) is defined as follows: 
p
q
dq
dpf ⋅= . 
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 The cross flexibility of i  with respect to j  is the percentage change in the price 
of commodity i  in response to an one percent change in the quantity of commodity ,j  
other factors remaining constant.11 
The cross flexibility based on the quantity variable of a substitute is expected to 
be negative. This is in contrast to cross elasticities for substitutes that usually are positive. 
A larger supply of a substitute results in a lower price for the substitute, which in turn 
results in a decline in demand for the first commodity. The lower demand implies a 
reduction in price. Hence, a larger supply of the substitute (commodity j) reduces the 
price of the commodity under consideration (commodity i). 
The price flexibility of income is the percentage change in price in response to an 
one percent change in income, other factors remaining constant.12 The flexibility of 
income is typically expected to be positive. Price moves directly with the shift in demand. 
A higher income implies a larger demand, in turn, suggesting a higher price for any given 
level of quantity. 
2.2. Modeling Inverse Demand System 
 In recent years, there has been increasing interest in inverse demand systems 
based on different objectives. Key objectives are (1) the specification of inverse demand 
system for which curvature conditions implied by economic theory are maintained, (2) 
the quantitative estimation of price effects of quantity change, and (3) quantity-based 
welfare measures. Most inverse demand systems use normalized price as a function of 
_________________________ 
11The algebraic relationship of cross price flexibility is as follows: 
i
j
j
i
ij p
q
dq
dpf ⋅= . 
12The algebraic relationship of income flexibility is as follows: 
i
i
im p
m
dm
dpf ⋅= . 
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quantities demanded in inverse demand systems. 
 The curvature conditions require that (1) the direct utility function should be 
quasi-concave in quantities, (2) the indirect utility function should be quasi-convex in 
prices, or (3) the expenditure function should be concave in prices. The curvature 
conditions of inverse demand systems are required to consistently satisfy microeconomic 
theory of demand system. Like in the direct demand systems, however, in practice 
encountering situations where curvature conditions hold spontaneously and globally are 
rare, which is one reason about why the empirical estimation is not consistent with what 
we expect under microeconomic theory of demand system. 
 In the seminal stages of inverse demand systems development, economists 
adopted the theoretically well-developed direct demand system from which the inverse 
demand system is derived, basing their reasoning on the same theoretical conditions of 
adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry. The contribution of this effort was to 
parameterize both direct and inverse demand systems such that comparisons between the 
two systems could be made.  
Anderson (1980) established some theoretical properties of inverse demand 
systems which aid in their interpretation and facilitate calculations related to them. He 
introduced the notion of scale elasticity, which is shown to play for inverse demand 
systems much the same role that income elasticity does for direct demand systems. It is 
used in a decomposition of Antonelli effects which is analogous to the Slutsky equation 
for direct demand systems. He explained the duality process for uncompensated elasticity, 
expenditure elasticity, compensated elasticity, quantity elasticity (price flexibility), and 
scale elasticity simply given utility maximization and the knowledge of budget share. 
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Barten and Bettendorf (1989) developed differential inverse demand systems to 
parameterize eight different fishery quantity variables. Specifically, they developed (1) 
the Inverse Rotterdam Demand System (IRDS) from the Rotterdam Demand System (as 
developed by Barten (1964) and Theil (1965), (2) the Inverse Almost Ideal Demand 
System (IAIDS) from the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) (as developed by Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980)), and (3) the Inverse Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) from the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) which was first proposed by Laitinen and Theil (1979). 
Through using these three different inverse demand systems in application for a fishery 
demand system, they provided insight into the interpretation of the coefficients. 
Neves (1994) proposed the National Bureau of Research (NBR) direct demand 
system, which has an inverse National Bureau of Research (INBR). The INBR combines 
IAIDS quantity effects with an IRDS scale effect. 
Brown, Lee, and Seale (1995) developed a generalized inverse demand system, 
which combined the features of the IRDS and IAIDS. The synthetic inverse demand 
system nests the inverse analogs of all of the models nested within the generalized 
ordinary demand system. 
Moschini and Vissa (1993) showed the alternative of using a direct approximation 
to mixed demands, in which prices of some goods are predetermined such that the 
respective quantities demanded adjust to clear the market, whereas for the remaining set 
of goods quantities supplied are predetermined and prices must adjust to clear the market. 
The proposed mixed demand system was illustrated with an application to the Canadian 
meat market. The fact that Canada has virtually free trade in beef and pork, whereas the 
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supply of chicken is restricted, indicates that a mixed demand approach is more appealing 
in this case. 
Eales, Durham, and Wessells (1997) modeled Japanese fish demand using both 
ordinary and inverse demand systems, each of which nests a number of competing 
specifications. Results indicated that the inverse demand systems dominate the ordinary 
demand systems in forecasting performance and in non-nested tests. 
Park and Thurman (1999) showed that scale flexibilities in inverse demand 
systems describe how marginal valuations change with expansions in the consumption 
bundle. Such effects clearly are related to income elasticities in direct demand systems. 
However, the connection is not so close as it first appears. They argued that the link 
between scale flexibilities and income elasticities is tight only if preferences are 
homothetic, a situation where neither measure is interesting, or if all elasticities of 
substitution are unitary. They illustrated the relationship between the two measures in a 
coordinate system focusing on how marginal rates of substitution change with 
consumption scale and proportion. 
Beach and Holt (2001) introduced inverse demand systems that include quadratic 
scale terms. These systems are similar to regular quadratic demand systems introduced by 
Howe, Pollak, and Wales (1979). The models developed were used to estimate inverse 
demand equations for finfish landed commercially in the South Atlantic from 1980-1996. 
Overall, they showed that including quadratic terms in inverse demand specifications 
offers an improvement in modeling systems in which quantities are taken as exogenous. 
Holt and Bishop (2002) proposed the normalized quadratic distance function, 
which is similar to the normalized quadratic expenditure function of Diewert and Wales 
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(1988a) as a new inverse demand system. Aside from being able to maintain concavity in 
quantities globally, the resulting specification is also flexible. In addition, to obtain more 
parsimonious specifications, they applied the rank reduction procedures of Diewert and 
Wales (1988b) to the model’s Antonelli matrix. They illustrated the techniques by 
estimating a system of inverse demands for bi-monthly fish landings, 1971-1991, for U.S. 
Great Lakes ports. To illustrate the model’s usefulness, exact welfare measures 
associated with catch restrictions are derived. 
Park, Thurman, and Easley Jr.(2004) used the combined inverse demand systems 
from IRDS, IAIDS, ICBS, and INBR to measure the welfare loss of fish catch restrictions. 
Unlike single equation models, the system-wide approach does not exclude substitution 
possibilities and includes interactions that are potentially important for understanding fish 
consumption patterns and price determination. They applied the estimated system by 
analyzing welfare measures of quantity restrictions: catch restrictions in the grouper and 
snapper complex off the southeast coast of the U.S. 
Wong and Mclaren (2005) proposed a new approach, a distance function 
approach, to the specification of inverse demand systems for empirical estimation of 
fishery products that is directly and weakly separable from other commodities. The 
separability assumption needs to be held with an aim of keeping the estimation process 
manageable by merely dealing with certain aspects of the static demand model. They 
advocated a more general use of the distance function in specifying regular and estimable 
inverse demand systems. Note that they only focus on the type of distance functions for 
which it is not necessary to have closed functional forms for the inverse uncompensated 
demand functions, nor for the direct utility function. Their results indicated that the 
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distance function approach is a promising tool of empirical analysis of inverse demand 
systems subject to tight theoretical conditions. This opens up a further avenue for 
ultimately obtaining systems of inverse demand functions. 
Matsuda (2005) provided a new interpretation of the scale effects in differential 
inverse demand systems. A scale curve is defined as a curve that shows how the 
expenditure share of a good or service changes as the consumption level changes. It was 
shown that Brown, Lee, and Seale’s synthetic model has the same scale effects as do the 
Box-Cox scale curves. In this light, their model is not a mere composite but a model in its 
own right. The empirical illustration given for fresh food demand in Japan has suggested 
that none of the four nested models, IRDS, IAIDS, ICBS, and INBR is adequate and that 
there are some nontrivial differences between their elasticity estimates and those in the 
synthetic model. The data have preferred the synthetic model and not supported either 
linear or logarithmic linear scale curves.  
2.3. Welfare Measurements 
Most welfare analyses are concerned with the welfare effects of price changes. 
There are, however, many situations in which policy options are directly related to 
quantity changes. The welfare effects of price changes are analyzed with the direct 
demand system in which commodity quantities are determined as functions of their prices. 
The welfare effects of quantity changes, on the other hand, are associated with the inverse 
demand system in which commodity prices are dependent on their quantities. In 
conventional welfare analysis of price change, prices are taken to be exogenous or 
predetermined, while quantities are endogenous. In contrast, in welfare analysis of 
quantity changes, quantities are exogenous, while prices are endogenous. Price-based or 
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dual welfare measures are relevant when there are well-functioning competitive markets 
and quantities are fully adjusted to changes in prices; on the other hand, quantity-based or 
primal welfare measures are useful in situations where there are constraints on 
commodity quantities, or when transaction costs impede consumers from fully adjusting 
to changes in prices (Kim, 1997). 
The choice between price- and quantity-based welfare measures is empirical, and 
proper measurement of welfare effects requires the knowledge as to which variable – 
price or quantity – is exogenous. For individual consumers, it may be reasonable to 
assume that the supply of commodities is perfectly elastic, and therefore prices can be 
taken as exogenous. But this assumption may not be tenable for consumers in the 
aggregate or if highly aggregated economy-wide data are used to estimate demand 
relations. At the aggregate level, quantities (rather than prices) are viewed more properly 
as being exogenous. Although individual consumers make their consumption decisions 
based on given prices, the quantities of commodities are predetermined by production at 
the market level and prices must adjust so that the available quantities are consumed 
(Kim, 1997).13,14 This implies that although price-based measures are useful for analyzing 
the welfare of individual consumers, quantity-based measures may be more appropriate at 
the aggregate level.15 Given the fact that most of the consumer demand studies based on 
time-series data involve the estimation of aggregate demand functions, there is a clear 
need for the inverse demand system and hence welfare analysis of quantity changes in 
empirical analysis. Moreover, while these results hinge on competitive behavior, 
quantity-based measures are essential for analyzing the welfare effects for non-
competitive firm or industry behavior (Kim, 1997). 
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 Quantity-based welfare measures are not totally new. Indeed, consumer surplus is 
often discussed for changes in price or quantity for a single commodity, and the 
Marshallian surplus measure (together with producer surplus) for quantity changes is 
used to analyze social welfare (or deadweight loss) or the welfare properties of market 
equilibrium. There are some limited empirical studies on consumer welfare for quantity 
changes using the Marshallian surplus. Rucker, Thurman, and Sumner (1980) estimate 
the inverse demand function for tobacco which is subject to quantity restrictions (quotas) 
and investigate the welfare effect associated with changes in quotas. Bailey and Liu 
(1995) estimate an inverse demand for airline services in which air fares are specified as 
a function of network scale and examine consumer welfare for changes in network scale.  
However, the Marshallian surplus is an approximate welfare measure for quantity 
changes, and there is no formal analysis of exact welfare measures pertinent to the 
inverse demand system for quantity changes.16 This is in stark contrast to the literature on 
price-based welfare measures which provides well-established welfare measures for price  
change. 
_________________________ 
13According to Hicks, “When we are studying the behavior of the individual consumer, it is natural to 
regard the former (‘price into quantity,’ i.e., direct demand) approach as primary, for the consumer is 
concerned with given prices on the market, and he chooses how much to purchase at a given price. But 
when we are studying market demand, the demand from the whole group of consumers of the commodity, 
the latter (‘quantity into price,’ i.e., inverse demand) approach becomes at least as important. For we then 
very commonly begin with a given supply, and what we require to know is the price at which that supply 
can be sold” (Hicks, 1957 and Kim, 1997). Katzner (1970) argues that the inverse demand system may be 
useful to the economic planner since he may be interested in the prices required to clear the market of 
planned commodities. 
14Bronsard and Lise (1984) examine whether a direct or inverse demand system is appropriate in empirical 
analysis and find that the level of commodity aggregation is important. In particular, their test rejects the 
exogeneity of prices in three-commodity models, but prices are often considered as exogenous at a more 
disaggregate level. In addition, see Huang (1988), Barten and Betterdorf (1989), and Eales and Unnevehr 
(1994) for the rationale of the use of the inverse demand system in food demands. 
15This is true in a general equilibrium view of the economy where total supply is fixed for the economy, 
while it is not fixed for individual consumers. 
changes (Kim, 1997). 
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Kim (1997) fundamentally established the theoretical procedure for measurement 
of welfare changes for the inverse demand system and provided exact welfare measures 
associated with quantity changes through using compensating and equivalent variation. 
He explained many circumstances that warrant the use of quantity-based welfare 
measures, in contrast to the conventional price-based measures. He employed the 
distance function as a useful tool to develop compensating and equivalent variations for 
quantity changes, which are contrasted to the Marshallian surplus. He also showed that 
many results derived for quantity changes are parallel to those of welfare measures for 
price changes. In view of the increased usage of inverse demand systems and distance 
functions, welfare measures of quantity changes are of great importance in policy 
analysis. Moreover, quantity-based welfare measures can also deal with the welfare 
effects of price changes when there are well-functioning competitive markets. 
Beach and Holt (2001) developed the models which were used to estimate inverse 
demands for finfish landed commercially in the South Atlantic. These models were used 
to obtain compensating and equivalent variation estimates associated with a 10% 
reduction in the quantity landed for individual species. Overall, it appears that including 
quadratic terms in inverse demand specifications offers an improvement in modeling 
systems in which quantities are taken as exogenous and may prove beneficial in future 
applications to inverse demand models. 
_________________________ 
16There is a growing literature on quantity-based welfare measures for the restricted or partial demand 
system in which some subset of commodities are subject to quantity restrictions. Hicks (1956) originally 
introduced so-called compensating and equivalent surplus measures for this situation. Mäler (1974) shows 
that Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations defined for price changes can be readily adapted to 
welfare measures of quantity changes for a partial demand system. Randall and Stoll (1980) demonstrate 
that with appropriate modifications, Willig’s (1976) formulas for bounds on compensating and equivalent 
variations for price changes carry over to welfare measures of quantity changes. For more, see Bockstael 
and McConnell (1993), Brslaw and Smith (1995), Lankford (1988), and Haneman’s (1991). 
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 Holt and Bishop (2002) developed normalized quadratic inverse demand systems 
to examine the welfare implications associated with reductions in fish landings. Because 
state and regional managers of the Great Lakes fishery must balance the competing 
interests of commercial and recreational fisherman in the face of diminished fish stocks, 
such an exercise has meaning in a larger policy context. An oft-used policy instrument in 
this regard is a commercial catch quota (restriction). It is therefore desirable to have a 
theoretically consistent money-metric measure of the welfare loss to fish consumers 
associated with the imposition of harvest restrictions. The results showed considerable 
variations in the magnitudes and relative importance of the compensating and equivalent 
variation estimates across species and over time. 
Park, Thurman, and Easley (2004) used a recently developed synthetic inverse 
demand system to measure the welfare loss of fish catch restriction. Unlike single 
equation models, the system-wide approach does not exclude substitution possibilities 
and includes interactions that are potentially important for understanding fish 
consumption patterns and price determination. They applied the estimated system by 
analyzing welfare measures of quantity restrictions: catch restrictions in the grouper and 
snapper complex off the southeast coast of the U.S. They found the own- and cross-
quantity elasticities of inverse demand to be small, implying that prices themselves are 
good estimates of the average value of restricted catches. Because the quantities, and not 
the prices, of fish closely related in demand are held constant, these quantity elasticities 
have the proper general equilibrium interpretation for welfare analysis. 
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2.4. Econometric Methodology 
 A large number of econometric studies have focused on the estimation of 
parameters in singular equation systems (i.e. systems in which the sum of the regressands 
at each observation is equal to a linear combination of certain regressors). In the context 
of consumer demand systems, many previous studies have reported results in which the 
sum of the regressands (typically expenditure on various commodities) at each 
observation is equal to the value of a regressor (typically total expenditures). Share 
studies especially constitute one group of empirical studies with singular equation 
systems, e.g., budget shares, factor shares, and market shares. 
In a variety of share studies, the sum of the regressands (shares) at each 
observation is equal to the unit, regressor. In both the expenditure and share context, 
singularity of the equation system implies that the contemporaneous disturbance 
covariance matrix is also singular. 
 Barten (1969) has shown that when disturbances are serially independent, 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the parameters in the complete n-equation system 
can be derived from ML estimation of n-1 equations; moreover, these ML estimates are 
invariant to the equation deleted. 
Aigner (1973) and Parks (1969) specified that the disturbance vector in the 
singular equation system follows a first order autoregressive process by using Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR). The problem with application of SUR estimation technique 
to the system of equations is that the assumption of no time dependence among the 
disturbances is clearly untenable for the time series data. Parks (1967) has generalized 
Zellner’s SUR estimation technique to the case where the disturbances exhibit not only 
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contemporaneous correlation, but n autocorrelated pattern as well. The technique 
involves estimating the parameters for the pattern of serial correlation in the separate 
equations, then transforming the data to eliminate the serial pattern. The transformed 
equations then satisfy the Zellner’s assumptions; and the estimates are obtained in the 
usual way. In the presence of serially correlated disturbances the Parks estimation 
technique can be shown to be consistent and asymptotically more efficient than the 
Zellner’s SUR method. 
 Berndt and Savin (1975) analyzed what singularity implies for the estimation and 
hypothesis testing of systems of equations with autoregressive disturbances. Although the 
study restricted the attention to singular equation systems employing shares as 
regressands, the results carried over to the expenditure specifications. They found in the 
study that the adding up property of the shares imposes restrictions on the parameters of 
the autoregressive process. These restrictions generally have not been taken into account 
in the Parks’ study. When these restrictions are not imposed the specification of the 
model is conditional on the deleted equation. As a result, the system estimates of the 
parameters and the likelihood ratio (LR) tests are no longer invariant to the equation 
deleted. Furthermore, singularity of the contemporaneous disturbance covariance matrix 
raises issues concerning the identification of parameters of the autoregressive process. 
This identification problem complicates the interpretation of the LR tests. In order to 
preserve adding up, the autocorrelation coefficients are constrained to be the same in all 
equations.17  
________________________ 
17Berndt and Savin showed that the adding up property imposes the diagonals of the unknown parameter 
vector of covariance matrix of error terms to be same. The estimation of misspecified diagonal will provide 
consistent, but asymptotically inefficient estimates. Even more important, however, the estimate based on 
the misspecified diagonal will vary with the equation deleted. 
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Thus, the feasible generalized least square (FGLS) procedure has three steps: (1) estimate 
the system equations by Zellner’s SUR; (2) estimate ρ  in the equations with adding up 
restrictions from the residuals; and (3) use the estimated parameters to transform the 
model according to the autoregressive FGLS formula and apply SUR to the transformed 
model. 
2.5. Fish Consumption 
Katharine (1992) detected a variety of factors affecting on aquaculture products. 
The study indicated that changes in lifestyle in the U.S., including an increased 
preoccupation with healthy behaviour leading to a shift away from red meat to other 
sources of protein and increased away-from-home eating, may explain the recent growth 
in seafood consumption. Shifts in fish consumption patterns may also be explained by 
technological improvements in preparing and marketing of processed fishery products, 
including convenience products such as breaded shrimp and seafood dinners. 
As more and more women enter the work force, increase in opportunity cost of 
the household meal preparer’s time made processed fishery products popular. 
Improvements in distribution and merchandising techniques by seafood producers and 
retailers of seafood products, ensure that quality standards meet consumers’ expectations. 
At the same time, national and state-supported consumer education campaigns, 
attempting to raise the average American’s knowledge about the advantages of eating a 
broader range of seafood products may have had a significant impact on seafood demand. 
Adams et. al. (1987) assessed causal relationships by using Haugh-Pierce, Sims, 
and Granger methods. Price models at three different market levels were estimated. 
Economic factors analyzed were income, prices of competing products, landings and 
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imports of raw headless shrimp, total retail supply, beginning stocks, and marketing 
costs. 
Monthly prices generally exhibited unidirectional causality from ex-vessel to 
retail price. Quarterly prices were determined interdependently among market levels. 
Price responses between market levels were found to be symmetric with beginning 
stocks, landings, and imports of own-size shrimp the most important determinants of 
prices. The study recognized that several factors are suspected to have contributed to 
price volatility, such as limited domestic shrimp supplies, increasing dependency on 
tariff-free imports of wild catch and increasing amounts of maricultured product, 
disproportionate increases in costs of production (i.e., fuel, financing, and marine 
insurance), and fluctuation domestic economic conditions. 
Carel et. al. (1996) evaluated the effects of increased exports from NAFTA 
member countries on the U.S. domestic catfish industry. The study showed that the 
quantity of catfish imported will fall if the domestic price of catfish falls relative to the 
import price. Past imports have no effect on present imports. The income elasticity was 
negative indicating that imported catfish may be an inferior good. This study also showed 
that doubling present levels of imports from NAFTA member countries is not a threat to 
the U.S. catfish industry. 
Keefe (2001) provided an in-depth analysis of shrimp price flexibility and the 
impact of decreases in quantity supplied of shrimp on world price. Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression is utilized to determine price flexibility of shrimp and changes in quantity 
supplied on world shrimp price. The key objective of this paper is to use Huang’s direct 
procedure and Eales’ indirect technique for calculating price flexibilities to evaluate the 
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effects of a reduction in quantity supplied from shrimp aquaculture sources on world 
price. Estimated price flexibility for the quantity supplied of aquaculture shrimp was  
-0.32. The results indicate that if world supply should plummet, due to deteriorating 
environmental conditions, such as disease or pollution, world shrimp price would 
increase substantially. 
 Jolly (1998) forecasted catfish industry prices by using linear and nonlinear 
methods. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) models and the generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH) are employed with ordinary least 
squares (OLS), unconditional least squares (ULS), and maximum likelihood (ML) 
models to forecast prices. These forecasts are compared to traditional OLS model 
forecasts. All models had comparable statistics (RSME, MAE, R2), but ULS and the ML 
produced forecasts with less deviation from the observed values. The nonlinear models 
showed an improvement in price forecasts over the ordinary least squares (OLS) medels 
for prices of whole and frozen catfish. 
 Schmitz and Seale (2004) analyzed the effect that offset payments under the 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA also known as the “Byrd 
Amendment”) have on tariff levels that are lobbied for by U.S. producer groups. The 
study derived the optimum antidumping tariff that would maximize the welfare of 
producers receiving CDSOA offset payments. They compared and contrasted this newly 
derived “optimal antidumping tariff” (that maximizes the sum of producer surplus and 
tariff revenue) with the optimal revenue tariff (that maximizes tariff revenue alone) and 
the optimal welfare tariff (that maximizes the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, 
and tariff revenue). Prior to the CDSOA, U.S. producers would always lobby for 
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prohibitive tariffs that maximize producer surplus. However, under the CDSOA, 
producers will, in most cases, lobby for a tariff that is not prohibitive but is still higher 
than the optimal revenue or optimal welfare tariffs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
 Since inverse demand systems provide the theoretical basis for empirical 
applications related to analysis of quantity effects for price adjustable products, the 
studies of inverse demand systems have been focused on by many economists. For 
example, due to biological lag of the production process and perishability of fish, price 
should be adjusted based on quantity supplied to clear the market, for which the inverse 
demand system provides theoretical basis. 
 Gossen, who earlier introduced the concept of diminishing marginal utility, 
described a consumer’s equilibrium as the proportionality between the vector of prices 
and that of the consumer’s marginal utilities.  This concept became commonly known 
later as Gossen’s Second Law.18 The consumer’s marginal utilities are functions of the 
quantities of commodities. This function can be derived from maximizing the utility 
condition of given income as follows: 
(3.1)     )(qUMax
q
  subject to 1' =qp . 
Under the regularity condition, this equilibrium implies a relation between price 
variations and quantity variations.19 
_________________________ 
18Gossen’s Second Law was his most original contribution and presaged the Marginalist Revolution of 
1871-74. For example, Walras (1874) stated as that “In fact, the whole world may be looked upon as a vast 
general market made up of diverse special markets where social wealth is bought and sold. Our task then is 
to discover the law to which these purchases and sales tend to confirm automatically. To this end, we shall 
suppose that the market is perfectly competitive, just as in pure mechanics we suppose to start with, that 
machines are perfectly frictionless.” Moor (1914) followed this same train of thought when he made the 
statement: “In the closing quarter of the last century, great hopes were entertained by economists with 
regard to the capacity of economics to be made an “exact science”. According to the view of the foremost 
theorists, the development of the doctrine of utility and value had laid the foundation of scientific 
economics in exact concepts, and it would soon be possible to erect upon this new foundation a firm 
structure of interrelated parts which, in definiteness and cogency, would be suggestive of the severe beauty 
of the mathematico-physical sciences. But this expectation has not been realized.” 
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If one writes this relation with the quantities expressed as a function of the prices, then 
one has a direct consumer demand system, ).( phq =  From a theoretical point of view 
one could just as well express the prices as a function of the quantity. One then has what 
is known as an inverse demand system, ).(qbp =  
 From an empirical point of view, however, direct and inverse demand systems are 
not equivalent as has been shown previously in Chapter II. To avoid statistical 
inconsistencies, the right-hand side variables in such systems of random decision rules 
should be the ones which are not controlled by the decision maker, i.e., ( ) 0=⋅ epE  in 
equations (2.3) and (2.4) for direct demand systems and ( ) 0=⋅ εqE  in equations (2.1) 
and (2.2) for inverse demand systems, respectively. If the consumer is a price taker and a 
quantity adjuster for most of the products and services usually purchased, the direct 
demand system is desirable for the case. However, due to biological lag in the production 
process for certain goods like fresh vegetables or fish, supply is very inelastic in the short 
run and producers are virtually price takers. These price taking producers and price taking 
consumers are linked by traders who select a price which they expect will clear the 
market. This means, in practice, that at auction, wholesale traders offer prices for the 
fixed quantities which, after being augmented with a suitable margin, are sufficiently low 
enough to induce consumers to buy the available quantities. In that case, traders set the 
prices as a function of the quantities so that the inverse demand system can be obtained. 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
19The regularity condition assumes that the direct utility function, ),(qUu =  is to be twice-continuously 
differentiable, increasing, and quasi-concave in q, a vector of commodities.  
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 There has been in recent years an increasing interest in the systems of inverse 
demand functions in which normalized prices are functions of normalized quantities 
demanded.20 These systems are particularly useful in markets for agricultural and natural 
resource commodities like fish and vegetables. Such inverse demand systems have been 
developed according to two different approaches. The first one utilizes the Rotterdam 
methodology, which is a direct approximation of the conceptual inverse demand 
relationships without imposing the rigid structure that is implied by utility maximization 
– see Barten and Bettendorf (1989),  Eales, Durhan, and Wessells (1997), Park, Thurman, 
and Easley (2004), and Matsuda (2005). Even though the Rotterdam method is difficult 
to incorporate into the demand systems without having an idea about the structure of 
preferences, the Rotterdam method can obtain the inverse demand systems which explain 
well the quantity effect on price in terms of the substitution effect and the scale effect.  
An alternative method to the Rotterdam method is based on a dual representation 
of preferences, which, in turn, is based on a specified functional form of the direct utility 
or distance function – see Kim (1997), Beach and Holt (2001), Holt and Bishop (2002), 
and Wong and McLaren (2005). 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
20Normalized price of commodity i is obtained as follows: 
 ,
*
m
pp ii =  where *ip  is nominal price of commodity i and .
1
*∑
=
=
n
i
ii qpm  
Normalized quantity is obtained as follows: 
,
,
*
meani
i
i q
qq =   where *iq  is quantity of commodity i and meaniq ,  is mean of quantity of commodity i. 
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Since the Rotterdam method starts initially from the relationship between price 
and quantity to derive the targeted inverse demand system, this methodology does not 
need the specific functional form of consumer preference.21 The Rotterdam method is 
initially constructed by Barten and Bettendorf (1989) and subsequently by Brown, Lee, 
and Seal (1995), Park (1996), and Eales, Durhan, and Wessels (1997). With assumptions 
of weak separability of the total commodity bundle into eight fishery products and 
collective consumer behavior as a rational representative consumer, Barten and 
Bettendorf (1989) initiated the four different types of inverse demand systems, 
Differential Inverse Rotterdam Demand System (DIRDS), Differential Inverse Almost 
Ideal Demand System (DIAIDS), Differential Inverse Central Bureau of Statistics 
(DICBS), and Differential Inverse National Bureau of Research (DINBR). Since the 
appearance of the inverse demand systems, Brown, Lee, and Seale (1995) have 
developed the inverse demand systems into the generalized inverse demand system, 
nesting these four inverse demand systems. Since then, economists have used the 
generalized inverse demand systems for empirical analysis. For example, Eales, Durham, 
and Wessells (1997) developed generalized inverse demand systems of Japanese demand 
for fish from the inverse demand systems. Park, Thurman, and Easley (2004) modeled 
inverse synthetic demand systems for empirical welfare measurement in Gulf and South 
Atlantic fisheries. 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
21Wong and McLaren (2005) indicated the weakness of the Rotterdam methodology as follows: “It may be 
inconvenient to incorporate prior idea about the structure of preferences, which is always required when 
working with highly disaggregated inverse demand systems, noting that such information (which must be 
matched to the aggregation level at which estimation is to proceed) often takes the form of statements about 
relative substitutability among items within different commodity groups." 
 41 
 
 An alternative methodology to the Rotterdam method based on a dual 
representation of preference is typified by Kim (1997), who theoretically derived the 
targeted inverse demand system from the distance function, which is derived from a 
given direct utility function. This inverse demand system was also used for welfare 
measurement in quantity space. 
 In this chapter, this study will discuss 1) the two different economic approaches to 
derive inverse demand systems, 2) consumer’s economic welfare measurement in 
quantity space, and 3) producer welfare measurement using price and cost flexibilities. 
3.1. Inverse Demand System 
3.1.1. Rotterdam Methodology 
 From here the study will use the same quantity and price variables defined in 
equations (1.6) and (1.8). According to basic demand theory, the market demand can be 
defined by a system of Marshallian demand as follows: 
(3.2)     ),( * mpfq=  
where q  is the n-vector of normalized quantity, *p  is the n-vector of corresponding 
nominal price, and m  is total expenditure on the sub-bundle of commodities, .'* qpm =  
This specification is more convenient to derive the inverse demand systems whenever we 
can easily recognize what type of functional form of regular demand in the light of 
relationship between price and quantity than that of the distance function methodology, 
which requires the specific form of the utility or distance function rather than that of the 
demand function. In view of homogeneity of degree zero in m  and ,*p  the equation 
(3.2) can be normalized without losing any of the following demand function properties: 
(3.3)     )( phq=  
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where 
m
pp
*
=  is the normalized price vector. Here, ip  would be interpreted as the 
fraction of total expenditure paid for one unit of good .i  It should be noted that the 
normalized price, p,  is the same for the producer, wholesale, and retail prices if the 
seller’s margin is proportional to the price. The traders will select p  such that the given 
quantities q  are bought. The prices they offer to the fish producers result in the inverse 
demand system from inverting equation (3.3) as follows: 
(3.4)     )()(1 qbqhp == −  
which does not lose any property held by equations (3.2) and (3.3). Now, in order to 
derive more flexible inverse demand systems, we should carefully review the properties 
of inverse demand systems and an adequate parameterization. Recalling that the 
properties of the inverse demand system depends on the properties of equations (3.2) and 
(3.3), the properties of equation (3.4) can be deduced directly from the following 
conditions: 
(3.5)     ,puq λ=    1' =qp  
where dqqdUuq /)(=  is the vector of marginal utilities and quq'=λ  is a Lagrange 
multiplier. puq λ=  describes consumer equilibrium as the proportionality between the 
vector of prices and that of the consumer’s marginal utilities indicated by Gossen. Now, 
these systems for p  should be solved to define the inverse demand systems as a function 
of quantities. Therefore, p  is expressed as follows: 
(3.6)    qqq uuqup )'/1()/1( == λ  
which is another mathematical expression for (3.4). However, equation (3.6) gives a clue 
on how to derive more useful information regarding consumer preference and price 
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behavior related to a change in quantity. In order to study the relation between quantity,  
price, and utility in more detail, it should be considered that a small change in q  results 
in a shift in ,p  noting that a change in marginal utility can be calculated by using the 
Hessian matrix of the utility function because dqudu qqq =  where ]/)([ 2 dqdqqUduqq =  
is the Hessian matrix of the utility function. This relation would be studied by total 
differentiation of equation (3.6). The total differential equation is as follows: 
(3.7)     qqqqqqq duuuqduuqdquuqdp )'/1()'/1()/1( 22 −+−=  
                   ]')()['/1( ' qqq dupqIdqpuuq −+−=  
                   dquuqpqIdqpp qqq )'/1')((' −+−=  
                   VdqpqIdqpp ')(' −+−=  
where qqq uuqV )'/1(=  is a symmetric matrix because the Hessian matrix, qqu , is 
symmetry. Equation (3.7) can be rearranged to be more efficient form as follows: 
(3.8)     dqqpIVpqIdqpVqpqIpdp )'()'('])'([ −−+−−−=  
Gdqdqgp += '  
where ])'([ VqpqIpg −−−=  and ).'()'( qpIVpqIG −−=  
With equation (3.8), we can describe the change in p  caused by a change in q. The 
change in p would be interpreted by the effect of two shifts in q. The first one, ,'dqgp  
can be described as a scale effect, which is equivalent to the second part of right hand 
side of equation (3.79) in the distance function methodology. Since a proportionate 
increase in q means ,kqdq =  with k  being a positive scalar, it follows from equation 
(3.5) then that kqkpdqp == '' . Simultaneously, we also know 0=Gq  because 
0)'( =− pqI . As a result,  the second effect in equation (3.8) will be zero, 
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,0== kGqGdq  for a proportionate increase in .q  Therefore, the change in scale can 
only be explained by dqgp'  whenever a proportionate increase in q  occurs. The change 
in scale is monotonically related to a change in utility. Let du  be such a change. One has, 
using equation (3.5), kqkpdqpdqudu q λλλ ==== '''  with .0>λ  This means that Gdq  
is the (utility or real income) compensated for substitution effect of quantity changes, 
which is equivalent to the first part of the right hand side of equation (3.79) in distance 
function methodology. Also, G  is the counterpart of the Slutsky matrix for regular 
demand systems and known as the Antonelli (substitution) matrix – Antonelli (1886), 
Salvas-Bronsard et al. (1977), Laitinen and Theil (1979), Anderson (1980), and Barten 
and Bettendorf (1989). Gdp  represents the move along an indifference surface, while 
dqgp'  is the move from one difference surface to another.  
Substitution effect, Gdq , and scale effect, dqgp' , can be shown under different 
relationships between commodities. Figure 3.1 shows the substitution effect and scale 
effect for q-complements of qj and qi, in which an increase in qj increases ip . An increase 
in ip  causes the demand of qi to decrease by dqi shown in Figure 3.1. In contrast, Figure 
3.2 shows the substitution effect and scale effect for q-substitutes of qj and qi, in which an 
increase in qj decreases ip . A decrease in ip  causes the demand of qi to increase by dqi 
shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 shows substitution effect and scale effect for the case of 
an inferior good of qj, in which substitution effect is positive but scale effect is negative 
so that the total effect is the substitution effect minus the scale effect. 
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Figure 3.1. Substitution Effect and Scale Effect for q-Complements. 
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Figure 3.2. Substitution Effect and Scale Effect for q-Substitutes. 
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Figure 3.3. Substitution Effect and Scale Effect for Inferior Good of qj 
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 dqp'  in equation (3.8) can be manipulated to have the form of scale measure as 
follows: 
(3.9)     ∑ ∑∑ ====
i i
iiiii
i
ii Qdqdwqdqpdqpdqp lnlnln'  
where mqpqpw iiiii /
*==  is the share of expenditure on good i  in total expenditure. 
We may thus consider dqp'  also as the change in the Divisia quantity index. Now, 
equation (3.8) would be modified by the Divisia quantity index as follows: 
(3.10)    GdqQgddp += ln  
A further property follows from the differential form of ,1' =qp  namely 
0'' =+ dpqdqp ,  yielding .ln'' Qddqpdpq −=−=  
 From this property and from the definitions of g  and G  we can derive the 
adding-up conditions as follows: 
(3.11)    dpqdqp '' +  
            
0
)'1('
)'(''
)''('
=
++=
++=
++=
qGdqgqdqp
qGdqdqpgqdqp
Gdqdqgpqdqp
 
As a result, the adding up conditions will be defined by 1' −=gq  and .0' =Gq  The 
property 0=Gq  can be named homogeneity condition because it ensures that a 
proportionate increase in q  is neutralized as far as this substitution effect is concerned. 
The matrix G  is obviously symmetric. It is moreover negative semi-definite of rank one 
less than its order. This last property follows from the strictly quasi-concavity condition 
of the underlying utility function, which implies that 0' <xux qq  for all 0≠x  such that 
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0' =xuq  - see Barten and Böhm (1982). This condition is equivalent to 0' <Vxx  for all 
0≠x  such that .0' =xp  Then, we can write for zqpIy )'( −=  as follows: 
(3.12)    VyyzqpIVpqIzzGz '')(')'( =−−=  
This equation will be zero if and only if z  is proportional to q , because then 0=y . 
Otherwise it is negative, since .0)'('' =−= zqpIpyp  One consequence of this property 
is the negativity of the diagonal elements of Antonelli matrix G . 
 The adding-up )1'( −=gq  and homogeneity )0( =Gq conditions for the vector g  
and the Antonelli matrix G  involve the vector of the variable quantities. It should be 
noted that “Using the g  and G  as constants is then not very attractive, at least if one 
wants to use these conditions as constraints on the parameter estimation” as Barten and 
Bettendorf indicated.22  
In differential inverse demand systems, the individual equation of equation (3.10), 
∑+=
j
jijii dqgQdgdp ln , would be multiplied through by iq  to obtain the following 
equation: 
(3.13)    ∑+=
j
jjijiii qdqhQdhdpq /ln  
with ,iii gqh =  and jijiij qgqh =  as constants. For the variable on the left-hand side we 
have .lnln iiiii
i
i
iiii pdwpdpqp
dppqdpq ==⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=  Equation (3.13) can then be written as 
follows: 
(3.14)    ∑+=
j
jijiii qdhQdhpdw lnlnln  
_________________________ 
22A similar situation occurs for a regular demand system in differentials. Theil (1965) proposed to multiply 
the ith regular demand equation through by ip  to arrive, after some rearrangements, at a choice of 
constants which satisfy the usual conditions in a natural way. The resulting system is known as the 
Rotterdam system. 
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Equation (3.14) is the inverse analogue of the regular Rotterdam demand system. It is 
named the differential inverse Rotterdam demand system (DIRDS). 
In equation (3.14), we can define adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry of ih  and ijh  
with negativity condition as follows: 
(3.15)     1−=∑
i
ih                                                                                                (Adding up) 
(3.16)     0=∑
i
ijh                                                                                                 (Adding up) 
(3.17)     0=∑
j
ijh                                                                                            (Homogeneity) 
(3.18)    jiij hh =                                                                                                  (Symmetry) 
(3.19)    ∑∑ <
i j
iiji xhx 0   ,lx θ≠∀  ℜ∈θ                                                             (Negativity) 
Actually, the differential inverse demand system of Laitinen and Theil (1979) is 
somewhat different.23 It can be obtained by adding to both sides of equation (3.14) 
Qdwi ln  and treating the iii whc +=  as constants. The variable on the left-hand side is 
then modified as follows: 
(3.20)    )lnln( Qdpdw ii +  
             
)/ln(
)lnln(
)lnlnln(
*
*
*
Ppdw
Pdpdw
Qdmdpdw
ii
ii
ii
=
−=
+−=
 
with ∑∑ ==−=−
i
ii
i
ii PdpdwqdwmdQdmd lnlnlnlnlnln * ,  Divisia price index. We then 
have another differential inverse demand system called the differential inverse CBS 
demand system (DICBS) as follows: 
 
_________________________ 
23Laitinen and Theil (1979) showed that the inverse demand models can be formulated by means of the 
Antonelli matrix or the reciprocal Slutsky matrix. The two approaches differ with respect to the price 
deflator and the role of the Divisa quantity index.  
 51 
 
(3.21)    ∑+=
j
jijiii qdhQdcPpdw lnln)/ln(
*                  nji ,...,1, =  
In equation (3.21), the dependent variable now involves the relative price of commodity 
i  rather than the normalized prices. Equation (3.21) relates to equation (3.14) as the 
Central Bureau of Statistics regular demand system of Keller and Van Driel (1985) does 
to the regular Rotterdam system.24 In equation (3.21), adding up, homogeneity, and 
symmetry of ic  and ijh  can be defined similarly with in DIRDS as follows: 
(3.22)     ∑ ∑ =+=
i i
iii whc 0)(                                                                        (Adding up) 
(3.23)     ∑ =
i
ijh 0                                                                                              (Adding up) 
(3.24)     ∑ =
j
ijh 0                                                                                         (Homogeneity) 
(3.25)    jiij hh =                                                                                                  (Symmetry) 
Another variant is possible by adding )lnln( Qdqdw ii − to both sides of equation 
(3.21). On the left-hand side we then have, in view of equation (3.20), 
.ln)lnlnlnln( * iiiiii dwwdwQdPdqdpdw ==−−+  
Consequently, we can get another type of inverse demand systems as follows: 
(3.26)    ∑+=
j
jijii qdcQdcdw lnln  
with the jiijiijij wwwhc −+= δ  (where ijδ  is a Kronecker delta) now treated as constants. 
This is the differential inverse almost ideal demand system (DIAIDS), which is the 
 
_________________________ 
24Keller and Driel (1985) derived the CBS model, which combines the preferred Engel curve with the 
simplicity of Slutsky matrix, including the ease of implementing concavity and other restrictions. The 
model is based on the PIGLOG Engel curve and constant Slutsky coefficients. 
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inverse analogue of the linear version of the regular differential Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS) of Deaton and Mullbauer (1980).25 
In equation (3.26), the adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry conditions of ic  and 
ijc can be defined as follows: 
(3.27)     ∑ ∑ =+=
i i
iii whc 0)(                                                                        (Adding up) 
(3.28)     ∑ ∑ =−+=
i i
jiijiijij wwwhc 0)( δ                                                       (Adding up) 
(3.29)     ∑ ∑ =−+=
j j
jiijiijij wwwhc 0)( δ                                                  (Homogeneity) 
(3.30)     ,jiij cc =  or )()( ijjijjijiijiij wwwhwwwh −+=−+ δδ                       (Symmetry) 
 Another variant is possible by subtracting Qdwi ln  from both sides of equation 
(3.26), which will lead to another type of differential inverse demand system which is as 
follows: 
(3.31)    ∑+=−
j
jijiii qdcQdhQdwdw lnlnln  
This is the differential inverse NBR demand system (DINBR), which is the inverse 
analogue of the linear version of the regular differential NBR demand system of Neves 
(1994).26 In equation (3.31), the adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry conditions of  ih  
and ijc  can be defined as follows: 
 
 
_______________________ 
25Deaton and Mullbauer (1980) introduced the AIDS model, in which the budget shares of the various 
commodities are linearly related to the logarithm of real total expenditure and the logarithms of relative 
prices. The model is shown to possess most of the properties usually thought desirable in conventional 
demand analysis, and to do so in a way not matched by any single competing system. 
26Neves (1994) showed that the Rotterdam, AIDS, CBS, and NBR models constitute a class of differential 
regular demand system. 
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(3.32)     ∑ −=
i
ih 1                                                                                               (Adding up) 
(3.33)     ∑ ∑ =−+=
i i
jiijiijij wwwhc 0)( δ                                                       (Adding up) 
(3.34)     ∑ ∑ =−+=
j j
jiijiijij wwwhc 0)( δ                                                  (Homogeneity) 
(3.35)     ,jiij cc =  or )()( ijjijjijiijiij wwwhwwwh −+=−+ δδ                       (Symmetry) 
There is not a parallel to the negativity condition in this case, however. Clearly, 
DICBS and DINBR are crosses between DIRDS and DIAIDS (Barten and Battendorf, 
1989). With these four inverse demand systems, economists have constructed a more 
flexible inverse demand system wherein others are nested. The development follows, in 
the inverse demand context, a suggestion by Barten (1993). The extension of Bartern’s 
method to inverse demand systems was recorded independently by Brown, Lee, and 
Seale (1995) and by Park (1996). An application can be found in Eales, Durham, and 
Wessells (1997). Barten’s motivation for combining models is that, empirically, a 
particular coefficient in one model may perform better than its counterpart in other 
models. This motivates interest in combinations of models that allow the data to choose 
the forms for specific effects. 
 As just seen in equation (3.14), (3.21), (3.26), and (3.31), the left-hand sides in the 
four differential inverse demand systems are different, while the right-hand sides are 
linear in the same variables. This allows the four systems to be written as follows: 
(3.36)    DIRDS:       Ri
R
i
R
i Xy ε+Π= '  
              DICBS:       Ci
C
i
C
i Xy ε+Π= '  
              DIAIDS:     Ai
A
i
A
i Xy ε+Π= '  
              DINBR:      Ni
N
i
N
i Xy ε+Π= '  
A linear combination of the four systems can be written as follows: 
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(3.37)    iiNiNAiACiCRiR Xyayayaya ε+Π=+++ '  
where NiN
A
iA
C
iC
R
iR aaaa Π+Π+Π+Π=Π  and iε  is a composite error. Normalizing the 
sum of the ka  weights to equal one yields: 
(3.38)    )()()(' NiRiNAiRiACiRiCiRi yyayyayyaXy −+−+−+Π=  
Finally, note that the right-hand side differences in equation (3.25) are (i) exogenous and 
(ii) collinear, which can be seen as follows: 
(3.39)    QdwMpdwPpdwyy iiiii
R
i
C
i ln)/ln()/ln(
** =−=−  
              )/ln()/ln()/ln( ** QqdwPpdwmqpdwyy iiiiiii
C
i
A
i =−=−  
              QdwdwQdwdwyy iiiiAiNi ln)ln( −=−−=−  
Equation (3.39) allows the hybrid system to be written in estimation form as follows: 
(3.40)    )()(' 21 NiRiCiRiiRi yyyyXy −+−+= θθπ  
where AC aa +=1θ  and .2 AN aa +=θ  In terms of the underlying variables: 
(3.41)    ∑ −−+=
j
iiiijijii QqdwQdwQdqdpdw )/ln(lnlnlnln 21 θθππ  
                           ∑ −++−=
j
iijjiijiij Qdwqdwww ln)(ln)( 122 θπθδθπ  
where ijijij ch 22 )1( θθπ +−≡  and iii ch 11 )1( θθπ +−≡ . 
This basic nesting system of equations will be called the Generalized Inverse 
Demand System (GIDS). The 1θ  and 2θ  parameters can be thought of as indicators of 
DIAIDS scale and substitution effects.  If ,021 == θθ  the DIAIDS effects are zero and 
the GIDS reduces to the DIRDS. If ,121 == θθ  both DIAIDS effects are present and the 
system becomes DIAIDS. If 11 =θ  and ,02 =θ  the GIDS becomes the hybrid DICBS. If 
01 =θ  and ,12 =θ  the GIDS becomes the complementary hybrid, the DINBR. 
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 There are two sets of restrictions on the parameters of equation (3.41). As in 
DIRDS, DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR, the restrictions of adding up, homogeneity, and 
symmetry can be imposed for equation (3.41) as follows: 
(3.42)    ∑ −=−
i
iij w 1)( 1θπ                                                                                   (Adding up) 
(3.43)    ∑ ∑ ==+−
i i
ijjiijiij www 0)( 22 πθδθπ                                                        (Adding up) 
(3.44)    ∑ ∑ ==+−
j j
ijjiijiij www 0)( 22 πθδθπ                                                   (Homogeneity) 
(3.45)    jiij ππ =                                                                                                   (Symmetry) 
 In the Rotterdam methodology, monotonicity and concavity cannot be easily 
imposed. However, these restrictions can be easily reflected in the inverse demand 
system whenever we can define the distance function as linear homogeneity and 
concavity (see the distance function methodology). The scale and price flexibilities can 
be derived easily from equation (3.41). The scale flexibility can be described as follows: 
(3.46)    1/ θπ −= iii wf                                                                                 (Scale flexibility) 
The price flexibilities can be described as follows: 
(3.47)    jiijij wwf 2* / θπ +=                                           (Compensated cross-price flexibility) 
(3.48)    iiiiii wwf 22* / θθπ +−=                                       (Compensated own-price flexibility) 
(3.49)    ijijij fwff += *                                                   (Uncompensated price flexibility) 
In equation (3.46) to (3.48), if ,021 == θθ  the DIRDS’s scale and price 
flexibilities are turned on as follows: 
(3.50)    iii whf /=                                                                      (DIRDS’s scale flexibility) 
The DIRDS’s price flexibilities can be described as follows: 
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(3.51)    iijij whf /
* =                                    (DIRDS’s compensated cross-price flexibility) 
(3.52)    iiiii whf /
* =                                      (DIRDS’s compensated own-price flexibility) 
(3.53)    ijijij fwff += *                                    (DIRDS’s uncompensated price flexibility) 
If ,121 == θθ  the DIAIDS’s scale and price flexibilities are turned on as follows: 
(3.54)    1/ −= iii wcf                                                                   (DIAIDS’s scale flexibility) 
The DIAIDS’s price flexibilities can be described as follows: 
(3.55)    jiijij wwcf += /*                               (DIAIDS’s compensated cross-price flexibility) 
(3.56)    iiiiii wwcf +−= 1/*                              (DIAIDS’s compensated own-price flexibility) 
(3.57)    ijijij fwff += *                                   (DIAIDS’s uncompensated price flexibility) 
If 11 =θ  and ,02 =θ  the hybrid DICBS’s scale and price flexibilities are turned 
on as follows: 
(3.58)    1/ −= iii wcf                                                                     (DICBS’s scale flexibility) 
The DICBS’s price flexibilities can be described as follows: 
(3.59)    iijij whf /
* =                                    (DICBS’s compensated cross-price flexibility) 
(3.60)    iiiii whf /
* =                                      (DICBS’s compensated own-price flexibility) 
(3.61)    ijijij fwff += *                                     (DICBS’s uncompensated price flexibility) 
If 01 =θ  and ,12 =θ  the DINBR are turned on as follows: 
(3.62)    iii whf /=                                                                     (DINBR’s scale flexibility) 
The DINBR’s price flexibilities can be described as follows: 
(3.63)    jiijij wwcf += /*                                (DINBR’s compensated cross-price flexibility) 
(3.64)    iiiiii wwcf +−= 1/*                               (DINBR’s compensated own-price flexibility) 
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(3.65)    ijijij fwff += *                                    (DINBR’s uncompensated price flexibility) 
 In order to confirm the availability for estimation of price flexibility and scale 
flexibility for the nine types of fish used in this study, this study will not only utilize the 
four individual inverse demand systems but will also employ the generalized inverse 
demand system developed from the four inverse demand systems. 
3.1.2. Distance Function Methodology 
 Even though the Rotterdam methodology is a convenient tool to generate a system 
of inverse demand equations, the curvature conditions implied by economic theory 
should be maintained to generate a theoretically consistent inverse demand system. In 
view of such restrictions, it is useful to specify a distance function with a given level of 
utility, .u  Due to the relative ease with which curvature can be related to the properties of 
the Antonelli matrix, the distance function is a convenient vehicle for generating inverse 
demand systems incorporating structural features required for most welfare analysis 
applications. Furthermore, since concavity (the curvature property of the distance 
function) and monotonicity are preserved under addition and the nesting of increasing 
concave functions, a straightforward way of generating wider classes of regular distance 
functions is readily available (Wong and McLaren, 2005).  
According to Shephard’s lemma, duality theory indicates that the compensated 
inverse demand systems can be derived from the distance function via simple 
differentiation. While these functions are conditioned on an unobservable variable 
(utility), in most cases they do not have an explicit closed form representation as the 
uncompensated inverse demand functions, that is, in terms of the observable variables 
such as quantities.27 As McLaren, Rossiter, and Powell (2000) showed in the context of 
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the expenditure function, the unobservability of utility need not hinder estimation.28 A 
simple one-dimensional numerical inversion allows estimation of the parameters of a 
particular distance function via the parameters of the implied inverse uncompensated 
demand functions. 
Like in the Rotterdam methodology, we can suppose that there exists a direct 
utility function related to consuming a bundle of commodities, )(qUu = , which is 
assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable, increasing, and quasi-concave in .q  
Assuming that consumers are price takers, consider the following optimization problem: 
(3.66)    )(qUMax    s.t. 1' =qp  
The Hotelling-Wold identity gives the normalized uncompensated inverse demand 
system )(qb . The result is as follows: 
(3.67)    )()/)((/}/)({ qbqdqqdUdqqdUp
i
iiu ≡⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧= ∑  
Equation (3.67) is equivalent to equation (3.4). Inverse demands measure 
marginal utility or marginal willingness to pay for commodities by consumers. In 
equilibrium, marginal utility or marginal willingness to pay for a commodity equals its 
market price.  
 
_________________________ 
27Compensated inverse demand system: 
),(),( qua
dq
qudDpc ≡= , where ),( qua  is conditioned on an unobservable utility. 
Uncompensated inverse demand system: 
)()( qb
dq
qdUpu ≡= , where )(qb  has an explicit closed form in terms of the observable quantity variable. 
28McLaren, Rossitter, and Powell (2000) describes a way to overcome the limitations in incorporating prior 
ideas about the structure of preferences by using the cost function to generate Marshallian demand systems. 
 59 
 
Solving equation (3.67) for q  gives the uncompensated direct demand system: 
).( phq = Equivalently, it can be obtained explicitly from the normalized indirect utility 
function )( pV : 
(3.68)    }1':)({)( =≡ qpqUpV max
q
 
by using Roy’s identity. The result is as follows: 
(3.69)    ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧== ∑
i
ipdppdVdppdVphq )/)((/}/)({)(  
Equation (3.69) is equivalent to equation (3.3). 
The indirect utility function is continuous, decreasing, linearly homogeneous, and 
quasi-convex in .p  Equations (3.67) and (3.69) show that the uncompensated inverse and 
direct demand systems have similar structures. However, while the inverse demand 
system takes quantities as exogenous, the direct demand system treats prices as 
exogenous. The duality between the direct and indirect utility functions suggests that the 
direct utility function can be recovered from the indirect utility function. That is, 
(3.70)    }1':)({)( =≡ qppVqU min
p
 
Given the direct utility function, the distance function ),( quD  is defined as 
follows: 
(3.71)    })/(:0{),( utqUtquD max
t
=>≡  
which gives the maximum amount by which commodity quantities must be deflated or 
inflated to reach the indifference surface (Shephard, 1970). The utility function exists if 
and only if .1/)(),( == uqUquD  The distance function is continuous, increasing, 
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linearly homogenous, and concave with respect to ,q  and decreasing in .u  Given the 
distance function (3.71), the expenditure function ),( puE  can be described as follows: 
(3.72)    }1),(:'{),( =≡ quDqppuE min
q
 
if and only if the distance function is defined as follows: 
(3.73)    }1),(:'{),( =≡ puEqpquD min
p
 
(Shephard, 1970). The expenditure function is continuous, increasing, linearly 
homogeneous, and concave with respect to ,p  and increasing in .u  These results imply 
that the distance function can be interpreted as a normalized expenditure function and 
that the two functions are dual to each other. 
 Application of Shephard’s lemma to the distance function yields the compensated 
inverse demand system ),( qua : 
(3.74)    ),(/),( quadqqudDpc ≡=  
dp  in equation (3.7) could be also derived from equation (3.74). 
Unlike uncompensated inverse demands, compensated inverse demands are 
defined with the level of utility held constant. Linear homogeneity of ),( quD  implies that 
),( qua  is homogeneous of degree zero in q , which condition is equivalent to 0=Gq  in 
the Rotterdam methodology. The concavity implies that ),( qua  is negative and 
symmetric, i.e., 0/),( <dqquda  and ijji dqqudadqquda /),(/),( =  ).( ji ≠  Zero 
homogeneity of cp  implies 
(3.75)   0=∑
i
c
ijη  
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where ,ln/),(ln ji
c
ij qdquad≡η  compensated price flexibility , with 0<ciiη  and sign 
)( cijη  = sign )( cjiη  ).( ji ≠  Two goods i and j are net q-complements if 0>cijη  and net q-
substitutes if 0<cijη . cijη  is corresponding to ijπ  (or ijh , ijc ) which is the substitution 
effect estimated by the Rotterdam methodology. 
 In addition, solving equation (3.74) for q  implicitly gives the compensated direct 
demand system ),,( puhqc =  which is equivalently obtained explicitly by applying 
Shephard’s lemma to the expenditure function. The result is as follows: 
(3.76)    dppudEpuhqc /),(),( ==  
Thus the compensated inverse and direct demand systems have similar structures, the 
difference being whether prices or quantities are exogenous. 
 To derive the relationship between compensated and uncompensated inverse 
demands, equate )(qbpu =  and ),( quapc =  and substitute )(qUu =  into equation 
(3.74) to obtain 
(3.77)    )),((),()( qqUaquaqb =≡  
Individual equation of equation (3.77) for commodity i can be expressed as follows: 
(3.78)    )),((),()( qqUaquaqb iii =≡  
Now, partial differentiation of both sides of equation (3.78) with respect to jq  
yields the Antonelli matrix of the price effect of a quantity change into the substitution 
and scale effects as follows: 
(3.79)   )/)()(/),((/),(/)( jijiji qqUuquaqquaqqb ∂∂∂∂+∂=∂∂∂  
In elasticity form, equation (3.79) becomes 
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(3.80) )ln/)(ln)(ln/),(ln(ln/),(lnln/)(ln jijiji qqUuquaqquaqqb ∂∂∂∂+∂=∂∂∂   
            )ln/)(ln)(ln/),(ln(ln/)(lnln/),(ln jijiji qqUuquaqqbqqua ∂∂∂∂−∂=∂∂∂  
            ijijcij S μηη −=  
where jiij qqb ln/)(ln ∂∂≡η  is uncompensated price flexibility, and 
∑ ∂∂∂∂≡ i iii qqUuqua )ln/)(ln)(ln/),(ln(μ  is a scale flexibility, with jS (expenditure 
share of the jth goods) = .)ln/)(ln/()ln/)(ln( ∑ ∂∂∂∂= j jjjj qqUqqUqp  Two goods i 
and j are gross q-complements if 0>ijη  and gross q-substitutes if .0<ijη  For a normal 
good, a change in quantities has a negative scale effect, i.e., ,0<iμ  with 1−=iμ  for 
homothetic preferences. This implies that the uncompensated inverse demand is more 
quantity-elastic than the compensated inverse demand. 
 Since ,1)(∑ ∑ ==
i i
iiii qqbqp  this implies the restriction on ijη : 
(3.81)    j
i
iij SS −=∑η  
Summing equation (3.80) over j to satisfy equation (3.75) and noting that ∑ =
j
jS ,1  we 
obtain the restriction on iμ : 
(3.82)    ∑=
j
iji ημ  
which shows that the scale flexibility is obtained as the sum of the uncompensated price 
flexibilities. Moreover, summing equation (3.81) over j, we obtain the restriction on 
equation (3.82): 
(3.83)    ∑ −=
i
iiS 1μ  
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which says that the weighted sum of the scale flexibilities (with the weights given by the 
expenditure shares) is equal to -1. Equation (3.83) is equivalent to equation (3.15) and 
(3.32), ∑ −=
i
ih 1 , equation (3.22) and (3.27), ∑ =
i
ic 0 , and equation (3.42), 
∑ −=−
i
ii w 1)( 1θπ  in the Rotterdam methodology. 
 Equation (3.80) shows that when the expenditure share of a good is small or when 
a change in quantities has no scale effects, i.e., ,0=iμ  the uncompensated and 
compensated inverse demands coincide. An issue of great concern is under what 
condition a change in quantities has no scale effects. This occurs when the indirect utility 
function is quasi-linear. In the case of two goods, the quasi-linear indirect utility function 
is of the form: 
(3.84)    221121 )(),( ppfppV αα +=  
where indirect utility is linear in 2p  but nonlinear with respect to ,1p  which implies that 
the (price) indifference curves are vertical translates of each other with respect to the 2p  
axis.29 Following equation (3.70), minimization of equation (3.84) with respect to 1p  and 
2p  subject to 12211 =+ qpqp  yields .//)( 211211 qqppf αα=∂∂  This implies that the 
inverse demand for 1q  is independent of the scale of the quantities of 1q  and ,2q  in 
which case the uncompensated and compensated inverse demands for 1q  coincide. 
 
 
 
___________________ 
29A quasi-linear indirect utility function does not imply, nor is it implied by, the quasi-linear direct utility 
function which produces a zero income effect for the direct demand function. 
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3.2. Consumer Welfare Measurement 
 When quantity changes, consumers may be made better off or worse off 
depending on price and scale flexibilities which are estimated by one of either the 
Rotterdam methodology or distance function methodology. The classical economic 
measure of welfare change examined is consumer’s surplus. However, consumer surplus 
can be an exact measure of welfare change only in special circumstances in which the 
utility function of consumers is quasilinear as the study previously discussed in equation 
(3.84). Therefore, more general methods for measuring welfare change are required. 
These general methods will include consumer’s surplus as a special case.  
If we can derive the inverse demand systems through using one of either the 
Rotterdam methodology or distance function methodology, it can provide the general 
method to exactly measure the change in consumer welfare. The theoretical review of the 
inverse demand systems in the previous section is motivated by our interest in the price 
and welfare effects of imports in fishery products. Typically, consumer welfare can be 
measured by consumer’s surplus (CS) for which uncompensated flexibility is used, and 
compensating variation (CV) or equivalent variation (EV) for which compensated 
flexibility is used. As uncompensated flexibility overestimates the quantity effect on 
price, in which the quantity effect includes both substitution and scale effects, the 
consumer surplus is only an approximated measure. However, compensated flexibility 
exactly measures the quantity effect in which the scale effect can be separated from the 
substitution effect. As a result, compensating or equivalent variation can be used in this 
study to exactly measure the effect of imports on consumer welfare. Figure 3.4 shows CV 
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and EV in quantity space. Furthermore, the difference between CS and CV or EV can be 
shown in Figure 3.5. 
The flexibility estimated by the Rotterdam methodology or distance function 
methodology provides a useful method to measure not only new price but also consumer 
welfare resulted from change in quantity. For example, the new price resulting from a 
change in quantity can be calculated as follows: 
(3.85)    ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ×+=Δ+= 0001 )(1 q
qyflexibilitpppp  
where 01 qqq −=Δ  is the change in quantity. 
CV is associated with a change in quantity from 0q  to 1q . CV is calculated as follows:  
(3.86)    ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ Δ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ×+Δ= q
q
p
yflexibilitcomppqCV
0
0
0 .5.0  
The area (a+b+c+d) in Figure 3.5 is CV. CV is the amount of additional (normalized) 
expenditure required for the consumer to reach the initial utility level, 0u , while facing 
the new quantity of 1q . When 1q  > ,0q  CV measures the willingness to accept. The 
consumer is clearly better off while facing quantity 1q  if CV is greater than zero. In 
contrast, when 1q  < ,0q  CV measures the willingness to pay. The consumer is clearly 
worse off with facing quantity 1q  of CV is less than zero. 
The equivalent variation (EV) of a change in the quantity from 0q  to 1q  is 
calculated as follows: 
(3.87)    ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ Δ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ×−Δ= q
q
p
yflexibilitcomppqEV 0
0
1 .5.0  
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The area (a+b) in Figure 3.5 is EV. EV is the amount of additional (normalized) 
expenditure that would enable the consumer to maintain the new utility level u1 while 
facing the initial quantity of .0q  When 1q  > ,0q  EV measures the willingness to pay. 
The consumer is clearly worse off with facing quantity 1q  if EV is greater than zero. In 
contrast, when 1q  < ,0q  EV measures the willingness to accept. The consumer is clearly 
better off with facing quantity 1q  if EV is less than zero. CV and EV are exact 
(normalized) measures of welfare change. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the CV and EV associated with an increase in the quantity of 
one good jq . The indifference curve is defined over price space characterized by the 
indirect utility function (3.68). The slope of the budget line is the ratio of the commodity 
quantities- ./ ij qq  From Roy’s identity, in equilibrium the slope of the (price) 
indifference curve is equal to the ratio of the quantities. The initial equilibrium is at A. 
With an increase in ,jq  the new equilibrium occurs at B. Note that CV is conditional 
upon the utility level ,0u  while EV is associated with the utility level .1u  When a change 
in quantities has no scale effects, the two welfare measures coincide. In general, the 
relationship between CV and EV cannot be ascertained. 
Equations (3.85) and (3.86) suggest that CV and EV can be measured by the area 
under the compensated inverse demand curve from 0q  to 1q  with the old and new utility 
levels, respectively. For an increase in the quantity of one good, j, the compensated 
inverse demand curve ),( 1 quap j
c
j =  lies below the compensated inverse demand curve 
),( 0 quap j
c
j =  because of the negative scale effect when the good in question is a normal 
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good. This implies that EV is smaller than CV for an increase in the quantity of one good. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3.5.  
 In contrast to CV and EV which can be described by the compensated inverse 
demand function, consumer’s surplus is expressed in terms of the uncompensated inverse 
demand functions. The quantity-based change in consumer surplus (CS) area (a+b+c), is 
bounded by CV and EV and is calculated as follows: 
(3.88)    ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ Δ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ×+Δ= q
q
p
yflexibilituncomppqCS 0
0
0 .5.0  
For a normal good, the uncompensated inverse demand curve is steeper than that 
of the compensated curve, implying that the CS associated with a change in quantities 
from 0q to 1q  is bounded from below by the CV and from above by the EV - see Figure 
3.5. When the scale flexibility is zero, CS coincides with CV and EV, i.e., CS = CV = EV. 
When a change in quantity has a scale effect, however, CS will bias the true welfare 
change. For a normal good, the uncompensated inverse demand curve is steeper than the 
compensated curve implying that the CS associated with a change in quantities is 
bounded from below by the EV and from above by the CV so that (EV < CS < CV). Figure 
3.5. portrays CS in relation to CV and EV, using the inverse demand curves. The price 
axis pertains to a range of implicit prices corresponding to the domain of quantities being 
considered. ),( 0 qua j  and ),(
1 qua j  are the two compensated inverse demand curves 
corresponding to initial and new utility levels 0u  and 1u , while )(qb j  is the 
uncompensated inverse demand curve. The initial situation is at A, given by 0p  and .0q  
The final situation is at B, given by 1p  and .1q  CV is shown by the area abcd under the 
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compensated inverse demand curve ).,( 0 qua j  EV is the area ab under the compensated 
inverse demand curve ).,( 1 qua j  CS is the area abc under the uncompensated inverse 
demand curve ),(qb j  which is bounded by CV and EV. 
 The CS is a relevant welfare measure for quantity changes when preferences are 
homothetic or when a quantity change has no scale effects. Homothetic preferences are, 
however, unrealistic, and commodity demands are found to have pronounced scale 
effects. Moreover, when many goods are considered, CS is not independent of the path of 
quantities chosen for integration since the associated uncompensated inverse demands are 
not symmetric in contrast to the compensated inverse demand functions associated with 
CV and EV. This implies that CS is approximate welfare measure for quantity changes 
relative to CV or EV. Nevertheless, CS is employed as the relevant measure for quantity 
changes, especially in analysis of social welfare or welfare properties of market 
equilibrium.30 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
30Hoteling (1938), in his pioneering study on welfare, addresses the relevance of total surplus defined as the 
sum of consumer and producer surpluses as a social welfare measure, and shows that the required condition 
is that the inverse demand and supply functions be integrable. The inverse supply or marginal cost 
functions are integrable because they are symmetric. In the case of demand, the integrability conditions 
hold only for the compensated inverse demand functions because they are symmetric. Hoteling, however, 
does not consider the compensated inverse demand functions. An implication of this discussion is that the 
conventional measure of total surplus based on the Marshallian consumer surplus derived from the 
uncompensated inverse demand function is biased in relation to the exact measure derived from the 
compensated inverse demand function. 
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Figure 3.4. Compensating Variation and Equivalent Variation in Quantity Space. 
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Figure 3.5. Welfare Measures of Change in Quantity. 
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3.3. Producer Welfare Measurement 
As the producer’s profit might be affected by a change in price caused by a 
change in quantity, producer welfare can be a critical issue related to the inverse demand 
systems. The welfare of the producer could be measured through dual cost and profit 
functions. For example, if there exists a production function assuming twice-continuously 
differentiable, increasing, and quasi-concave in x , a vector of inputs whose elements are 
ix  ),...,1( ni =  and producer as price taker, the general form of the cost minimization 
equation can be defined as follows: 
(3.89)    Min ii xr        s.t. )( ij xFq =   
where ir  is a vector of input prices and ix  is a vector of inputs. 
Its solution, as summarized by the Lagrangian first order condition, gives the dual cost 
function,  
(3.90)    ),( ji qrCc =  
By using the given cost function, the cost flexibility, jψ  can be obtained as follows: 
(3.91)     
),(
),(
ji
j
j
ji
j
qrC
q
q
qrC ⋅∂
∂=ψ  
Cost flexibility determines how a change in output level affects cost. That is, given 
constant input prices, the cost of the domestic producer would vary according to the level 
of production of jq . To measure quantitatively the impact of producer profit caused by a 
change in quantity,  a profit function is exemplified as follows: 
(3.92)    ),( jijjj qrCqpv −⋅=  
In terms of short run, the profit will depend on the sign and size of price flexibility 
because the producer cannot respond to a change in price in the short run. Therefore, 
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when jp  changes from 
0
jp  to 
1
jp , the change in producer’s profit can be calculated as 
follows: 
(3.93)    ( )[ ] ( )[ ] 00000000101 ,, jjjijjjijjjjj qdpqrCqpqrCqpvvdv =−⋅−−⋅=−=  
Consequently, if jdp  > 0, the producer will be better off, while if jdp  < 0, the producer 
will be worse off. 
In the long run, however, the price shock will be reflected in the production 
process. When jp  changes from 
0
jp  to 
1
jp , the change then in profit can be calculated as 
follows: 
(3.94)    ( )[ ] ( )[ ] jjjjijjjjijjjjjj dqdcdpqrCqpqrCqpvvdv )(,, 0000111101 −=−⋅−−⋅=−=  
As we see in equation (3.94), the change in profit will depend on the sign and magnitude 
of price flexibility along with cost flexibility. In general, cost flexibility is positive 
because an increase in output requires more labor and/or capital. For the case of dpj > 0, 
the producer will increase the profit by increasing production whenever dpj > dcj. 
However, whenever dpj < dcj, the producer will reduce the profit by increasing 
production. For the case of dpj < 0, the producer will reduce the profit by increasing 
production, while the producer will be better off by decreasing production. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 Prior to quantitative estimation of inverse demand systems as developed in the 
previous chapter, it is necessary to consider the stochastic properties of relevant 
econometric models in selecting a desirable model, in which the estimated, unknown 
parameters should be unbiased, consistent, and efficient. Especially as it is related to 
estimating the parameters of quantity variables in the inverse demand systems, the 
econometric model specification should be formed to reflect the features of stochastic 
procedure and the data used in the study. This includes contemporaneous correlation of 
disturbance terms in the equations of the system, singularity related to the adding up 
condition in the budget share equations, the autoregressive process in the time series data, 
and endogeneity in the inverse demand systems. In order to describe the stochastic 
process of an econometric model, a disturbance term is added to each budget share 
equation of the system. There is either an implicit or explicit correlation between the 
disturbances in individual budget share equations of the system because of the 
substitutability/complementarity of the fishery products used in the study. If the 
disturbances are correlated with each other, then any one of the single equation 
econometric models is not at least efficient.  
Owing to this drawback, single OLS or even GLS is not the best method to 
estimate the parameters. Therefore, this study will basically use Zellner’s SUR because it 
allows more flexible estimation than the single equation model. However, in using a SUR 
model, many other stochastic issues should be solved to get a consistent and efficient 
estimation. Related to the adding up condition in budget share equations, singularity is a 
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critical problem because in that if the covariance matrix of disturbance terms is also 
singular it is not possible to use a SUR model to estimate the unknown parameters in the 
system of equations. In a later sub-section, the study will discuss that issue more in detail. 
Serial correlation should also be considered when specifying the econometric model 
because time series data of quantity and price for the fish were used in the study. 
Furthermore, autocorrelation will create difficulty in estimating the unknown parameters 
with singularity of the covariance matrix of disturbance terms of the system equations. 
Fortunately, Berndt and Savin (1975) thoroughly explained this issue. The study will 
discuss this in more detail using as a basis of Berndt and Savin’s paper. 
One of the distinguishing features of inverse demand systems is that quantity is 
predetermined. However, fish imports and domestic landings are presumed to respond to 
price incentives so that the tests for endogeneity would be in order to confirm whether or 
not the inverse demand system is more desirable than the regular demand system. 
Endogeneity can be tested utilizing the Wu-Hauseman test. Other related issues will also 
be discussed in the future. 
4.1. Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
 Given a set of regression equations, the problem of efficiently estimating 
regression coefficients should be considered. For each equation in the set, the classical 
ordinary least-squares method (applied equation-by-equation) yields the most efficient 
coefficient estimators. However, if the disturbance in each equation is correlated with 
each other, system of estimation procedure yields coefficient estimators, at least 
asymptotically, more efficient than single-equation least-squares estimators. In this sub-
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chapter, the study will discuss the stochastic description of the system estimator implying 
that the regression coefficients in all equations are estimated simultaneously. 
 In order to construct such estimators, the study will employ a restricted Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR). As Zellner (1962) described, SUR can be applied in the 
analysis of data provided by budget share study when regressions for several 
commodities are to be estimated. Further, we can restrict the parameters of variables used 
in the equations. For example, as we discussed in the previous chapter, adding-up, 
symmetry, and homogeneity conditions can also be imposed on SUR. 
 As a vehicle for introducing Zellner’s SUR, let us define SUR as follows: 
(4.1)     itititit Xy εβ +=  
where ,,...,2,1 Mi =  and .,...,2,1 Tt =  Therefore, ity  is a 1×MT  vector of observations 
on the dependent variables, itX  is a MKMT ×  matrix with rank K of observation on K 
independent nonstochastic variables, itβ  is a 1×MK  vector of regression coefficients, 
and itε  is a 1×MT  vector of random error terms. Equation (4.1) may be written in matrix 
form as follows: 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
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⎤
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We can compactly describe the system equation at time t as follows: 
(4.2)     
⎥⎥
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Now, we write more briefly as follows: 
(4.3)     εβ += Xy  
where [ ]'''2'1 ,...,, Myyyy= , [ ]'''2'1 ,...,, Mββββ= , [ ]'''2'1 ,...,, Mεεεε= , and X  represents the 
block-diagonal matrix on the r.h.s. of (4.2). The disturbance vector in (4.1) and (4.3) is 
assumed to have the following variance covariance matrix: 
(4.4)     )( iV ε =
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
II
III
III
MMMM
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M
δδδ
δδδ
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22221
11211
= I
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⊗
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⎥⎥
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⎢⎢
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⎣
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L
L
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22221
11211
=∑⊗c I = Ω  
where I  is a unit matrix of order TT ×  and )( '' ititii E εεδ =  for Tt ,...,2,1=  and i ,  'i  
M,...,2,1= . In a temporal, cross-section regression, t  represents time and equation (4.3) 
implies constant variances and covariances from period to period as well as the absence 
of any auto or serial correlation of disturbance terms. The 'iiδ  with 'ii =  are then the 
variances (and with 'ii ≠  the contemporaneous covariances of the disturbance terms (or 
dependent variables) for any time period. 
In a single cross section budget share equation of each commodity where t  
represents the t’th budget share of each commodity, and individual share equation 
explains expenditure share on a particular commodity, iiδ  is the covariance between the 
disturbance term in the share equations for commodity i  and that in the share equations 
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for commodity 'i  while iiδ  is the variance of the disturbance term in the share equation 
for expenditure on commodity .i  
The form of (4.4) implies that the iiδ ’s are the same for all budget shares and that 
there is no correlation between different budget shares’ disturbances. The assumption is a 
very critical one related to singular equation and autoregressive process in using time 
series data in the budget share equations. If this assumption not satisfied, we will 
encounter problems in estimating the parameter vector for the budget share equations. 
Later, we will discuss this in more detail. Lastly, t stands for the particular point of time 
and the form of (4.3) is such that there is correlation between disturbances or dependent 
variables related to a particular point of time, t  but not to a different point of time, s 
).( st ≠  It is referred to as the “contemporaneous covariance matrix.” The 
contemporaneous covariance might come from either the substitutability or 
complementarity of fish used in the study. Also disturbance variances and covariance are 
assumed to be constant from period to period. 
4.2. SUR with Cross Equation Restrictions 
 We have discussed in the previous section, an unrestricted SUR framework under 
the assumption that the iβ ’s are unrelated across equations. When systems of equations 
are used in economics, especially for modeling budget share equations, there are often 
cross equation restrictions on the parameters. Such models can still be written in the 
general form covered in (4.3) and so they can either be estimated by system OLS or 
FGLS. We still refer to such systems as SUR systems, even though the equations are now 
obviously related, and system OLS is no longer OLS equation-by-equation. For example, 
consider the two-equation population model as follows: 
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(4.5)     114213112121111101 εββγγγ +++++= xxxxy  
            224242322212121202 εγββγγ +++++= xxxxy  
where we have imposed cross equation restrictions on the parameters in the two 
equations because 1β  and 2β  show up in each equation. We can put this model into the 
form of equation (4.2 or 4.3) by defining X  and β  appropriately. For example, define 
[ ]24212021121110 ,,,,,,, γγγββγγγβ= ’ which we know must be an 18×  vector because there 
are 8 parameters in this system. The order in which these elements appear in β  is up to 
us, but once β  is defined, X  must be chosen accordingly. For each observation i , define 
the 82×  matrix as follows: 
(4.6)     ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
24212322
14131211
1000
0001
iiii
iiii
xxxx
xxxx
X  
Multiplying X  by β  gives equation (4.5). 
 In applications such as the previous example, it is fairly straightforward to test the 
cross equation restrictions, especially using the sum of squared residuals statistics. To 
obtain the statistic, we would use the unrestricted estimates to obtain Ωˆ , and then obtain 
the restricted estimates using Ωˆ . The statistic is calculated as follows: 
(4.7)     2'
1
1'
1
1
~ˆˆ~~ ˆˆ Q
a
i
M
i
ii
M
i
i χεεεε ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∑∑
=
−
=
−
ΩΩ  
where iε~  denote the residuals from restricted system OLS (with Q restrictions imposed 
on β ), iεˆ  is the residuals from unrestricted model, respectively. The statistic in (4.7) is 
the difference between the sum of squared residuals from the restricted and unrestricted 
models, but it is just as easy to calculate (4.7) directly. Gallant (1987) has found that an F 
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statistic has better finite sample properties. The F statistic in this context is defined as 
follows: 
(4.8)     [ ] QKTMF iM
i
ii
M
i
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i
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4.3. Singular Variance Matrices in SUR System 
 In the discussion so far we have assumed that the variance-covariance matrix,Ω , 
of iε  is nonsingular. In budget share applications this assumption is not always true in the 
original structural equations because of the adding up condition. For example, let us 
suppose that there are three fishery products. Because of different prices and quantities 
consumed of each product, the individual budget share will be different. Now, define one 
particular set of the individual budget share equations in terms of the quantity as follows: 
(4.9)     1313212111101 lnlnln εββββ ++++= qqqw  
             2323222112202 lnlnln εββββ ++++= qqqw  
             3333223113303 lnlnln εββββ ++++= qqqw  
where the symmetry restrictions (from consumption theory) have been imposed. For a 
SUR analysis we would assume that 
(4.10)    0)|( =ii qE ε  
where )',,( 321 εεεε ≡i  and )'.,,( 321 qqqqi ≡  Because the budget shares must sum to 
unity for each ,i  ,1302010 =++ βββ  ,0131211 =++ βββ  ,0231221 =++ βββ  
,0333231 =++ βββ  and .0321 =++ εεε  This last restriction implies that )Var(εi≡Ω  
has rank two. Therefore, we can drop the last equation and analyze the equations for 1w  
and 2w . We can describe the restrictions on β  in these first two equations as follows: 
(4.11)    121113 βββ −−=  
             222123 βββ −−=  
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Using the algebraic fact that ),ln()ln()/ln( baba −=  we can plug (4.11) into (4.9) to get 
(4.12)    132123111101 )/ln()/ln( εβββ +++= qqqqw  
              232223112202 )/ln()/ln( εβββ +++= qqqqw  
We now have a two-equation system with variance matrix of full rank, with unknown 
parameters ,,,, 12112010 ββββ  and .22β  To write this in the form (4.3), redefine )',( 21 εεε=  
and )'.,( 21 www=  Take )',,,,( 2220121110 ββββββ =  and then X  must be 
(4.13)    ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
3231
3231
/ln(1)/ln(00
00)/ln()/ln(1
qqqq
qqqq
X  
This formulation imposes all the conditions implied by inverse demand theory. 
 This model could be extended in several ways. The simplest of them would be to 
allow the intercepts to depend on commodity characteristics such as seasonality. For each 
commodity ,i  let iz  be a J×1  vector of observable commodity characteristics, where 
.11 ≡iz  Then we can extend the model to  
(4.14)    13212311111 )/ln()/ln( εββ +++= qqqqzw iδ  
              23222311222 )/ln()/ln( εββ +++= qqqqzw iδ  
where 0),,,|( 321 =qqqzE iiε . 
Because we have already reduced the system down to two equations, theory implies no 
restrictions on 1δ  and 2δ . However, in equation (4.9), we need additional restrictions on 
parameters, iδ  like 0=++ 321 δδδ . 
4.4. Singular Equation Systems with Autoregressive Disturbances 
 In the previous section, the study showed that when disturbances are serially 
independent, SUR estimates of the parameters in the complete n-equation system can be 
derived from SUR estimation of n-1 equations: moreover, these SUR estimates are 
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invariant to the equation deleted. However, Berndt and Savin (1975) found that the 
adding up property of shares imposes restrictions on the parameters of the autoregressive 
process. When these restrictions are not imposed, the specification of the model is 
conditional on the deleted equation. As a result, the SUR estimates of the parameters are 
no longer invariant to the deleted equation. Furthermore, singularity of the 
contemporaneous covariance matrix raises issues concerning the identification of 
parameters of the autoregressive process. 
For example, let us suppose that the disturbance of (4.3) is a sample from a 
stationary vector stochastic process which satisfies the stochastic difference equation and 
each dependent variable has the same independent variables as follows: 
(4.15)    ttt Xy εβ+=  
(4.16)    ttt eR += −1εε                             Tt ,...,2=  
where ty  is an 1×M  vector of dependent variables, tX  is a 1×K  vector of exogenous 
variables with unity as the first element, β  is an KM×  matrix of unknown parameters, 
and  the sequence ,...,, 32 ee  consists of independently identically distributed normal 
random vectors with mean vector zero and covariance matrix Ω  and where [ ]ijRR=  is an 
MM×  matrix of unknown parameters. 
 Here it is assumed that ty  satisfies the adding up condition 
(4.17)     1' =tyi        ),...,1( Tt =  
where i  is an 1×M  vector with all elements equal to unity. (4.15) and (4.17) imply 
(4.18)     [ ]0001' L=βi  
and 
 82 
 
(4.19)     0' =ti ε  
Since 1−tε  and te  are statistically independent, it follows from (4.16) and (4.19) that 
(4.20)     '' kRi =  
and  
(4.21)     0' =tei       ),...,1( Tt =  
Hence in the context of an autoregressive model the adding up condition (4.17) implies 
that each column of R must sum to the same unknown constant k and that 0=iΩ  which 
means that Ω  is singular. Furthermore, if R is specified to be diagonal, then the 
restriction of (4.20) requires that all diagonal elements be equal. 
 Now we delete the last equation from (4.15) and (4.16) gives 
(4.22)     MttMMt Xy εβ +=         ),...,2( Tt =  
and 
(4.23)     MttMMt eR += −1εε         ),...,2( Tt =  
where Mty  and Mtε  are the vectors ty  and tε  with the last element deleted and Mβ  and 
MR  are the parameter matrices β  and R  with the last row deleted. Since MR  is not a 
square matrix (it has order )1 MM ×− , the SUR estimation procedure are not applicable to 
(4.22) and (4.23). However, this difficulty can easily be remedied. Since ,0' =ti ε  we can 
rewrite the stochastic difference equation (4.16) as follows: 
(4.24)    
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or more compactly, 
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(4.25)    tMtt eR += −1εε         ),...,2( Tt =  
where 
⎥⎥
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 (it has order )1−×MM  and ijijij RRR −=  
).1,...,1;,...,1( −== MjMi  
From (4.20) and (4.25) it follows that all columns of R  sum to zero, i.e., 
(4.26)    0...21 =+++ Mjjj RRR  
Now it is readily apparent that (4.22) combined with 
(4.27)    MtMtMMt eR += −1εε        ),...,2( Tt =  
where MR  is the matrix R  with the last row deleted, can be estimated using SUR 
procedure. Hence the parameter matrices Mβ , MR , and MΩ  have a unique SUR estimate 
and using these estimates we can obtain SUR estimates of the full parameter matrices ,β  
R  and Ω . To obtain invariant SUR estimates to the equation deleted, the R in (4.16) 
should be diagonal and MMRRR === ...2211 . If the R is diagonal and MMRRR ≠≠≠ ...2211 , then 
the SUR estimates will vary with the equation deleted. 
4.5. Endogeneity in Supply and Demand Framework 
4.5.1. Demand Normalization and the Consistency of Least Squares 
 In models where demand adjusts to current price shocks but supply does not, the 
choice of the dependent variable is crucial for estimation and for economic interpretation. 
For example, the main motivation behind estimating an inverse demand system is that 
imports of fish are naturally taken to be predetermined. While fish supply is presumed to 
respond to price incentives, actual imports are not likely to be influenced by random 
 84 
 
disturbance in the short run price. However, one might question this assumption. 
Therefore, consider a model where price and quantity are determined simultaneously, in 
which it matters little whether either price or quantity is placed on the left-hand side in 
the demand equation. And then define the system of the demand and supply as follows: 
(4.28)    tttt eXpq +=+ βϑϑ '21 :                 Demand 
(4.29)    tttt uZpq +=+ αϕϕ '21 :                 Supply 
(4.30)    0][]'[ '' =tttt ueZXE  
(4.31)    0][ =ttueE  
tX  and tZ  are column vectors of predetermined variables while β  and α  are 
conformable coefficient vectors. All other variables and coefficients are scalars. The 
demand shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with the supply shocks. 
 There are two alternative restrictions on the system of equations (4.28) and (4.29) 
which predetermine supply. Each of the two implies its own normalization of demand. 
We have (i) direct demand equation and (ii) inverse demand equation as follows: 
[Direct Demand Equation] 
01=ϕ  
(4.32)       )/()/(')/1( 1121 ϑϑϑβϑ tttt epXq +−=  
                 tttt eXpq 11' ++= βϑ  
[Inverse Demand Equation] 
02=ϕ  
(4.33)       )/()/(')/1( 2212 ϑϑϑβϑ tttt eqXp +−=  
                 tttt eXqp 22')/1( ++= βϑ  
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  tq  is predetermined in the inverse demand equation; it is decomposed by the 
supply equation into a function of observable predetermined variables and an 
unobservable variable which is uncorrelated with the demand disturbance. Similarly, the 
supply equation predetermines tp  in the direct demand equation. 
 The quantity-dependent equation (4.32) and the price-dependent equation (4.33) 
can be consistently estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS). If an estimate of ϑ  is 
desired and the true structure is the inverse demand equation then the inverse of the OLS 
slope coefficient from the price-dependent equation is consistent forϑ . Under the same 
circumstance, namely the truth of the inverse demand equation, OLS applied to a 
quantity-dependent demand equation is inconsistent for both ϑ  and 1−ϑ , in which a more 
consistent technique would be to use an instrumental variables (IV) estimator on the 
quantity-dependent demand equation. This is inferior to the inverted, price-dependent 
OLS coefficient, on asymptotic variance grounds. Symmetric arguments hold if the 
inverse demand equation is true. Consistent estimators of ϑ  are obtained from OLS on 
the price-dependent demand equation or from inverting the IV estimator from the 
quantity-dependent demand equation. OLS applied to the quantity-dependent demand 
equation is inconsistent for ϑ  and for 1−ϑ . 
4.5.2. Wu-Hausman Test 
 Consider a price-dependent demand equation wherein the endogeneity of the 
quantity variable is at issue. The null hypothesis is stated as the inverse demand equation 
restriction on the system of equations (4.28) – (4.31) as follows: 
(4.34)       tttt eXqp 22')/1( ++= βϑ  
                0),(: 20 =tt eqCovH  or 02=ϕ  in (4.29) 
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 The Wu-Hausman test indicates the consistency of the restricted SUR, but the 
inconsistency of IV, under the null hypothesis. Specifically, the test measures the distance 
between the SUR and IV estimators standardized by a variance estimator that is consistent 
under the null hypothesis being tested. If the distance measured in this manner is large, 
the estimators are judged to have different probability limits and H0 is deemed to be false. 
If the distance is small, one concludes that the SUR and IV estimators are converging to 
the same parameter and that H0 is true – see Thurman (1986).  
In order to describe the test’s construction, let ϑˆ  be the estimator of ϑ  from the 
restricted SUR regression and *ϑ  be an IV estimator of ϑ  in the same inverse demand 
equation specification. Let *ˆ ϑϑ−=q . The Wu-Hausman statistic is defined as follows: 
(4.35)    2*1* ~)ˆ()](ˆ[)'ˆ( q
a
qVT χϑϑϑϑ −−= −  
If )(ˆ qV  is a consistent estimator of Var(q) under H0 the T is asymptotically chi-square.31 
The expression for T generalizes the demand equation example in that there could be 
more than one variable whose predeterminedness is questionable. 
4.5.3. Interpreting Wu-Hausman Test Results in a Demand Equation 
 The test of the inverse demand equation is seen to be a comparison of two 
estimators of ϑ  in (4.34). A large value for T rejects the null hypothesis of predetermined 
quantity and, in the present context, rejects predetermined supply. Notice that the 
particular notion of predetermined supply (direct demand equation or inverse demand 
equation from the previous section) is fixed by the normalization of the demand.  
 
_________________________ 
31Construction of the test is made simple by noting that, asymptotically, )()()( * ϑϑ VarVarqVar −=  
under H0. See Hausman (1978) for a discussion. 
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A Wu-Hausman test in a price-dependent demand equation can only test for 
predetermined quantity, while in a quantity-dependent equation a Wu-Hausman test can 
only test for predetermined price. The difference in the two null hypotheses is the 
difference between a horizontal and a vertical supply curve. Consider the effects of 
performing the test in equation (4.34) if supply truly is predetermined, but predetermined 
in the sense of quantity supplied being unresponsive to current price. That is, assume the 
true structure to be the inverse demand equation. 
 The Wu-Hausman test in this instance involves a comparison between two 
estimators: the first being consistent and efficient under the null hypothesis of 
predetermined quantities, but inconsistent under the alternate hypothesis of endogenous 
quantities (the restricted SUR estimator) and the second being consistent under both null 
and alternate hypotheses (restricted three-stage least squares or 3SLS). To implement the 
3SLS estimator requires instrumental variables not already included in the right-hand 
sides of the inverse demand equations and should be at least equal, in number, to the 
number of variables in question. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 The inverse demand system approach is particularly useful in markets for fishery 
and natural resource commodities where quantities available are regarded as being 
predetermined rather than as being adjusted in the short run. In order to conduct empirical 
analyses, the raw data on quantities and nominal prices were collected from the different 
sources for each type of fish. The data for crawfish, shrimp, and oysters was obtained 
from the National Marine Fisheries Service while the catfish data came from the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service. The plots of quantity and nominal price are shown in 
Figures 5.1 to 5.10. As shown in Figure 5.1, the wide range in domestic crawfish tail 
meat supply in the 1990’s is attributed to the variation in the captive and cultured 
harvests of live crawfish during this period.  As Figure 5.2 shows, crawfish tail meat 
imports have contantly increased with slight fluctuations since 1990. Figure 5.3 and 5.4 
show that there appears overall an upword trend in total supplies (domestic plus imported 
supplies) of both catfish and shrimp, respectively from 1980 to 2005. After peaking out in 
1985, the total supply of oysters started decreasing and continued decreasing until 1992. 
However, since 1992 total oyster supply has increased. Domestic crawfish price tended to 
decrease between 1980 and 1995, then began increasing to levels that were generally 
above those of 1980 and continued increasing until 2001. However, crawfish domestic 
price decreased to 1980 level after 2001 (see Figure 5.6). Figure 5.7 shows the unit price 
for imported crawfish tail meat from 1989 to 2005. The unit price for imported crawfish 
tail meat was calculated by dividing the total value of imports by the total amount of 
imports. In particular, the unit prices of imported crawfish tail meat after 2001 include 
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antidumping tariffs because of the high tariffs rate during these periods. Figure 5.8, 5.9, 
and 5.10 show the domestic prices of catfish, shrimp, and oysters, which are shown to 
more relatively stable than the domestic crawfish tail meat price. The price data were 
normalized before being used in the logarithmic equations of inverse demand systems. 
Quantities are divided by their sample mean before the logarithmic transformation. As a 
result, flexibilities will be estimated at quantity mean value. 
 Because estimation of a differential inverse demand system requires converting 
the differential terms to finite changes, logarithmic differences are computed between 
two consecutive years, and the averages of shares are taken for those same years. For 
instance, ipd ln  is approximated to be 1,, lnlnln −−≡ titii pppd  and the approximation of 
iw  is 2/)( 1, −+≡ tiiti www , where subscript t indexes time. Furthermore, it is interesting to 
note that, unlike in continuous space, where ∑ −==
t
ii Qddpqpdw ln'ln  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ==∑ ∑
i i
iii dwwdw 0lnQ , the left-hand sides of the finitely approximated equations do 
not add up to exactly the same value as the right-hand sides, because ∑ ≠Δ
i
ii ww 0ln . To 
maintain the adding up restriction, therefore, Qd ln  are replaced with ∑ Δ
i
ii pw ln  instead 
of QlnΔ  in the finite approximation. 
To estimate the parameters of the GIDS, specifications must be modified to 
reflect the discrete-time nature of the data and to accommodate for serial correlation in 
the system’s disturbances. Equation (3.41) takes the following form: 
(5.1) GIDS:        ∑
=
+Δ−Δ−Δ+Δ+=Δ 5
1
21 )/ln(lnlnlnln
j
ittitititijijiitit QqwQwQqpw εθθππα , 
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where ∑
=
Δ=Δ
5
1
lnln
j
jtjt qwQ  and 2
1−+= ititit www .  
Depending on the values of 1θ  and 2θ  in equation (5.1), equation (5.1) will be 
turned into DIRDS, DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR as follows: 
(5.2) DIRDS:        ∑
=
+Δ+Δ+=Δ 5
1
lnlnln
j
itijijiitit Qhqhpw εα                                   )0( 21 ==θθ  
(5.3) DIAIDS:       ∑
=
+Δ+Δ+=Δ 5
1
lnln
j
itijijiit Qcqcw εα                                           )1( 21 ==θθ  
(5.4) DICBS:         ∑
=
+Δ+Δ+=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛Δ 5
1
*
lnlnln
j
itijiji
i
it Qcqh
P
pw εα                            )0,1( 21 == θθ   
(5.5) DINBR:         ∑
=
+Δ+Δ+=Δ−Δ 5
1
lnlnln
j
itijijiitit QhqcQww εα                        )1,0( 21 == θθ  
 For estimation, the quantities are treated as exogenous, their covariance with 
current and lagged disturbance terms taken to be zero. Under these assumptions, the 
GIDS and the four other nested models can be estimated consistently using the 
generalized least squares estimator, or equivalently, SUR estimator. The assumption of 
predetermined quantities will be tested later using the Wu-Hauseman endogeneity test. 
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Figure 5.1. Domestic Crawfish Tail Meat Supply: 1980 – 2005. 
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Figure 5.2. Imported Crawfish Tail Meat Supply: 1980 – 2005. 
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Figure 5.3. Catfish Supply: 1980 – 2005. 
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Figure 5.4. Shrimp Supply: 1980 – 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
10
00
kg
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Oysters Supply: 1980 – 2005. 
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Figure 5.6. Domestic Crawfish Tail Meat Price: 1980 – 2005. 
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Figure 5.7. Imported Crawfish Tail Meat Price: 1980 – 2005. 
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Figure 5.8. Domestic Catfish Price: 1980 – 2005. 
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Figure 5.9. Domestic Shrimp Price: 1980 – 2005. 
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Figure 5.10. Domestic Oyster Price: 1980 – 2005. 
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 The demand theory restrictions of the adding up, homogeneity, and symmetry 
conditions are imposed. Adding up implies singularity of the error variance-covariance 
matrix, Ω , because ∑= =5 1 0i itε . This can be imposed by dropping one of the equations as 
discussed in Chapter IV. Further, adding up implies the following parametric restrictions: 
∑
=
=5
1
0
i
iα . 
Symmetry and homogeneity of the ijπ , ijh , and ijc  coefficients are also imposed. 
 Note that restricted SUR estimates of equation (5.1) to (5.5) are consistent and 
efficient if the disturbances are serially independent. However, if the disturbances are 
autocorrelated, SUR will not be efficient and the estimated standard errors will be 
inconsistent as discussed in Chapter IV. Thus, a transformed model is estimated by a 
FGLS procedure. Specifically, let the disturbances follow: 
(5.6)     ititit u+= −1ρεε          5,...,1=i  
In order to preserve the adding up condition, the autocorrelation coefficients are 
constrained to be the same in all equations (see Berndt and Savin, p.954, 1975). Thus, if 
the model detects serial correlation, then the FGLS procedure has three steps: (1) estimate 
equation (5.1) to (5.5) by SUR; (2) estimate ρ  in equation (5.6) with the adding up 
restrictions from the SUR residuals; and (3) use the estimated parameters to transform the 
model according to the autoregressive FGLS formula and apply SUR to the transformed 
model. 
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5.1. Empirical Data 
5.1.1. Preview of Empirical Data Properties 
 Table 5.1 shows the fish types, the average shares of total expenditure and 
quantity, and variations in expenditure and quantity over the sample periods, from 1980 
to 2005.  
 
Table 5.1. Fish Types, Shares and Variation in Total Expenditure and Quantity 
Budget Share (wi) Qunatity (qi) 
Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum Type of fish 
% $1,000  $1,000  $1,000  % 1000kg 1000kg 1000kg 
1. Crawfish (D)a 0.41  13,655 1,902 41,661 0.26 1,586 121  4,500 
2. Crawfish (I)b 0.52  17,028 0 123,131 0.25 1,538 0  7,101 
3. Catfish 11.84  390,784 55,688 649,938 28.76 177,872 27844  302,516 
4. Shrimp 84.55  2,790,824 1,120,757 4,448,097 68.11 421,259 252917  661,732 
5. Oysters 2.68  88,549 51,325 143,615 2.63 16,246 9399  24,086 
a Indicates Domestic Crawfish Tail Meat 
b Indicates Imported Crawfish Tail Meat 
 
 From Table 5.1 we see that shrimp is associated with the highest average share in 
total expenditure, at 84.55 percent. Catfish ranks second at 11.84 percent while other fish 
take only a relatively small portion of total expenditure ranging between 2.68 percent for 
oysters to 0.41 percent for domestic crawfish.  
Average supplies by species, in 1000kg, are also reported in Table 5.1. Shrimp is 
associated with the highest average supply, at 421,259 thousand kg. Catfish ranks second 
at 177,872 thousand kg. Average supplies of domestic and imported crawfish are 1,586 
and 1,538 thousand kg, respectively. Again there is considerable variation in quantity 
supplied and price. In all, there appears to be sufficient variation in the data so that it 
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should be possible to determine what systematic relationships exist among the demand 
for these various fish products. 
5.2. Testing Autocorrelation in a System Perspective 
Table 5.2 contains the results of the system-wide specification test to assess the 
adequacy of the fitted AR1 residual serial correlation model for the five different inverse 
demand models used in the study. Edgerton and Shukur (1999) describe the Rao 
generalization to systems of the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation (see Edgerton 
and Shukur, 1999, p346). Under the null hypothesis that an AR1 is an adequate 
specification, the Breush-Godfrey statistic is distributed as an F(p,q) distribution,  in 
which p is the number of restrictions and q is degrees of freedom of denominator (n - k). 
This study tested AR1 residual serial correlation for the five different inverse models 
using systemwise Breusch-Godfrey tests.  
 
Table 5.2. Test Statistics of Serial Correlation for Inverse Demand Models 
Model Estimated Null F P-value 
GIDS -0.03830    0ˆ:0 =ρH   0.02 0.8879 
DIRDS 0.34778 0ˆ:0 =ρH  1.61 0.2254 
DIAIDS -0.37567 0ˆ:0 =ρH  2.20  0.1601 
DICBS 0.06689 0ˆ:0 =ρH  0.06 0.8054 
DINBR -0.11533 0ˆ:0 =ρH   0.20  0.6609 
 
Table 5.2 shows the results of the test statistic for the models. All models do not 
reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Therefore, the coefficients will be 
estimated by SUR rather than FGLS. 
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5.3. Nested Tests of the Generalized Inverse Demand Model 
It is important to determine which of the nested inverse demand systems, if any, 
fits the data. Thus, the study reports in Table 5.3, the estimated parameters 1θ  and 2θ  
from equation (5.1). The parameters 1θ  and 2θ  are DIAIDS scale and substitution 
indicators. If 121 ==θθ , the GIDS reduces to the DIAIDS model. If 021 ==θθ  , the GIDS 
reduces to DIRDS. As seen in Table 5.3, 1θ  and 2θ  are close to one, implying a DIAIDS 
form. Note, however, that 1θ  and 2θ  are both statistically distinguishable from the 
DIAIDS values of ones with showing relatively small standard errors of both 1θ  and 2θ . 
           
                      Table 5.3. Estimated Mixing Parameters 
Mixing Parameter     Standard Error 
θ1 = 1.04315   (0.0245) 
θ2 = 0.85708     (0.0448) 
 
 The study conducted joint likelihood ratio tests of the four hypotheses to confirm 
whether the estimated 1θ  and 2θ  are statistically different from one. As can be seen in 
Table 5.4, the results of joint likelihood ratio tests of the four hypotheses that restrict the 
GIDS to its constituent models reject the null hypotheses. Even though the estimated 
values of 1θ  and 2θ  suggest something like the DIAIDS model, the test restricting 1θ  and 
2θ   to one in DIAIDS has a p-value of only 0.0033. These results are similar to those 
found by other recent works in quite different empirical applications. For example, 
Matsuda (2005) studied monthly Japanese fresh fish, meat, vegetables, and fruit 
consumption data, fitting data utilizing inverse demand systems. In this study it is 
indicated that the results of the Wald tests for nested models are adequate. Among the 
null hypotheses of 1θ  and 2θ  tested against the synthetic model. All four nested models, 
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where both 1θ  and 2θ  are fixed, are strongly rejected. Park, Thurman, and Easley (2004) 
studied monthly fish consumption in the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic regions, 
inducing movements along inverse demand curves. They found that even though the 
estimated values of 1θ  and 2θ  suggest the DICBS model, the test results strongly rejected 
the null hypothesis. 
 
                       Table 5.4. Test Statistics for Nested Models 
Null     F 
θ1=0   758 
   (0.0001) 
θ1=1   1.30 
   (0.2593) 
θ2=0   153 
   (0.0001) 
θ2=1   4.24 
   (0.0438) 
DIRDS   390 
(θ1=0, θ2=0)   (0.0001) 
DIAIDS   6.29 
(θ1=1, θ2=1)   (0.0033) 
DICBS   104 
(θ1=1, θ2=0)   (0.0001) 
DINBR   390 
(θ1=0, θ2=1)     (0.0001) 
 
Eales, Durham, and Wessells (1997) and Brown, Lee, and Seale (1995) showed 
additional examples. They fit the GIDS model and, like this study, can reject the sub-
models such as DIRDS, DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR. But the mixing parameters 
estimated in this study are similar to those that result in the DIAIDS model, which is a 
different result from that of the other mentioned studies. 
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5.4. System Estimates 
 The main motivation for estimating an inverse demand system is that the supply 
of fishery products is naturally taken to be predetermined. While fish supply is presumed 
to respond to price incentives, actual imports and domestic supply are not likely to be 
influenced by random perturbations in that price. Still, one might question this 
assumption. Therefore, this study investigated the predeterminedness of quantities 
supplied with a pair of Wu-Hausamn tests. The Wu-Hausman test in this instance 
involves a comparison between two estimators: the first being consistent and efficient 
under the null hypothesis of predetermined quantities, but inconsistent under the alternate 
hypothesis of endogenous quantities (the restricted SUR estimator) and the second being 
consistent under both null and alternate hypotheses (restricted three-stage least squares or 
3SLS). The Wu-Hausman test statistic based on this structural model had a value of 
16.19, which is less than the 10% critical value in the chi-square (16) distribution of 
23.54. In sum, neither test of the predeterminedness of quantities could reject the null 
hypothesis. The restricted SUR estimates reported in following tables are supported by 
this evidence. 
In order to estimate quantity effects on price, the study estimates scale and 
Antonelli substitution coefficients by using the GIDS model as well as nested models 
such as DIRDS, DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR. As the results of these nested tests shows, 
the GIDS model is statistically fitted for these fish. However, this study estimates the 
scale and substitution coefficients of the four nested models as for reference. 
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5.4.1. Estimation of Scale Flexibility 
Table 5.5.1 shows the results of the GIDS model. The last column of Table 5.5.1 
gives the coefficients of determination (R2) as an indicator for model fit and Durbin-
Watson statistics as an indicator of first-order autocorrelation. The R2-estimates are 
higher in the GIDS model than in any other of the nested models and none of the 
equations appear to have first-order autocorrelation in the GIDS model.  
Look first at the estimated scale flexibilities in Table 5.5.1, which have all been 
estimated and are negative in sign. As the aggregate quantity increases, the normalized 
price goes down. This is to be expected. As Barten and Bettendorf (1989) explained, 
under the *ip , absolute prices stay constant, an increase in the aggregated quantity means 
an increase of total expenditure m, hence a decrease in mpp ii /*= . The scale coefficients, 
iπ , can be converted into scale flexibilities by using equation (3.46). A value of -1 for 
the scale flexibility means that the relative price and the sales share are constant. If 
preferences are homothetic, all scale flexibilities would equal -1. The estimated values for 
the scale flexibilities of the considered products are given in Table 5.5.1 together with 
their approximate standard errors (in parentheses). The estimated scale flexibilities of 
domestic crawfish and oysters are insignificantly different from -1, suggesting 
homotheticity. However, the estimated scale flexibilities of imported crawfish, catfish, 
and shrimp are significantly different from -1, implying the underlying scale curves differ 
significantly from both linear and linear logarithmic forms. 
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5.4.2. Estimation of Compensated Price Flexibility 
5.4.2.1. Own Compensated Price Flexibility 
 Now consider the estimated Antonelli substitution or Quantity effects of Table 
5.5.1. The own price flexibilities have all been estimated negatively. One observes that 
these price flexibilities are relatively lower than that of Park, Thurman, and Easley 
(2004), Holt and Bishop (2002), Eales, Durham, and Wessells (1997), and Barten and 
Bettendorf (1989) but are about unit value except for catfish and shrimp. For example, a 
1% increase in domestic crawfish quantity is associated with a 0.769% decline in 
domestic crawfish price. The negative sign of own price flexibilities is closely related to 
the negativity condition of Antonelli matrix. The estimated matrix is a negative 
semidefinite matrix. The absolute value of the own price flexibility of oysters is the 
largest among the five own price flexibilities, implying that the domestic oysters price is 
more sensitive to a change in own good than the other fishery products. For example, a 
1% increase in the quantity of oysters is associated with a 1.085% decline in the domestic 
oysters price while 0.967% for imported crawfish, 0.554% for catfish, 0.102% for 
shrimp, declined, respectively. However, the estimated own compensated coefficients of 
domestic crawfish, imported crawfish, catfish, and shrimp are insignificantly different 
from zero at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
5.4.2.2. Cross Compensated Price Flexibility 
 For the Antonelli matrix off-diagonal elements, representing between-species 
substitution, 2 of the 10 cross effects are negative. A negative cross effect implies that the 
increase in quantity of one good reduces the marginal valuation of another good and 
induces consumers to consume less of that good. Notably, we see that imported crawfish 
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is a substitute for domestic crawfish. A positive cross effect implies that the increase in 
quantity of one good raises the marginal valuation of another good and induces to 
consume more of that good. In this study, we see that the cross compensated price 
flexibilities of catfish, shrimp, and oysters are positive, implying catfish, shrimp, and 
oysters are complements to domestic crawfish. Among 10 cross effects, 5 cross effects 
are statistically significant at least at 1.0=α . In particular, the cross effect of imported 
crawfish for domestic crawfish is statistically significant at 05.0=α .  
In order to precisely quantify the impacts of imported crawfish, catfish, shrimp, 
and oysters on the domestic crawfish price, we can use the cross compensated price 
flexibilities of these products. For example, the cross compensated price flexibility of 
imported crawfish, -0.378, indicates that a 1% increase in quantity of imported crawfish 
decreases the domestic crawfish price by 0.378%. The cross compensated price flexibility 
of catfish, 0.986, indicates that a 1% increase in quantity of catfish increases the domestic 
crawfish price by 0.986%. The cross compensated price flexibility of shrimp, 0.002, 
indicates that a 1% increase in quantity of shrimp increases the domestic crawfish price 
by 0.002%. The cross compensated price flexibility of oysters, 0.158, indicates that a 1% 
increase in quantity of oysters increases the domestic crawfish price by 0.158%.  
The study confirms the negative impacts of imported crawfish on the domestic 
crawfish price. Furthermore, the scale flexibility of domestic crawfish, -1.24, indicates 
that a 1% increase in quantities of domestic and imported crawfish, catfish, shrimp, and 
oysters simultaneously decreases the domestic crawfish price by 1.24%. Although Table 
5.5.1 shows that an increase in quantities of catfish, shrimp, and oysters has a positive 
relationship with the domestic price of crawfish, it can be deduced that an increase in 
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aggregated fish supply has a strong negative impact on the domestic crawfish price from 
the result of scale flexibility. 
5.4.3. Morishima Elasticity of Complementarity 
 As Barten and Bettendorf (1989) pointed out, interpreting similar results, “the 
small number of negative cross effects, of which in this study 2 cross effects are negative 
and 8 cross effects are positive, does not agree with the notion that most types of fish are 
mutual substitutes.” However, the cross effects in the Antonelli matrix are biased toward 
complementarity. That is, each row of the Antonelli matrix must average to zero because 
of the property of homogeneity in the system of budget share equations and a good, being 
a “substitute for itself,” has a negative own-price flexibility. As a result, complementarity 
dominates over substitutability in the off-diagonal terms. 
 While the tendency of the cross-price flexibilities toward complementarity is 
consistent with the more usual notion in a direct demand system that goods tend to be 
substitutes for one another, a standardized measure of substitutability is more useful than 
the price flexibilities themselves: the Morishima elasticity of complementarity.32 It is the 
inverse demand system analogue of the Morishima elasticity of substitution. Table 5.6 
presents the estimated elasticities from the flexibilities obtained by the GIDS model. The 
Morishima elasticity of complementarity is defined as ** iijiij ff −=σ . It is the proportionate 
change in the j, i compensated demand price ratio due to a 1% increase in the ith quantity. 
_________________________ 
32In order to see why this is the case, consider the effect on the optimal quantity ratio, qi/qj induced by a 
percentage change in the price ratio, pi/pj. Suppose that this change is induced solely by changing the ith 
price. This will cause the compensated demands, including qi, to change in a particular way. On the other 
hand, this same percentage change in the price relative can be induced by changing only the jth price; but 
all the compensated demands, including xj, will generally adjust differently in response to this price 
change. Hence, in general, the percentage change in the ratio, qi/qj, depends upon how this price relative, 
pi/pj, is changed (Blackorby and Russel, 1989). 
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 Table 5.6 shows the proportionate change in domestic crawfish and other goods 
compensated demand price ratio due to a 1% increase in other goods quantity. For 
example, the imported/domestic crawfish value of 0.664 indicates that a 1% increase in 
the quantity of imported crawfish consumed results in a 0.664% increase in the ratio of 
the domestic crawfish demand price to the imported crawfish demand price, all other 
quantities and utility held constant. The catfish/domestic crawfish value is 0.588, 
indicating that a 1% increase in the quantity of catfish consumed results in a 0.588% 
increase in the ratio of the domestic crawfish demand price to the catfish demand price, 
all other quantities and utility held constant. The shrimp/domestic crawfish value is  
0.102, indicating that a 1% increase in the quantity of shrimp consumed results in a 
0.102% increase in the ratio of the domestic crawfish demand price to the shrimp demand 
price, all other quantities and utility held constant. The oysters/domestic crawfish value is 
1.109, indicating that a 1% increase in the quantity of oysters consumed results in a 
1.109% increase in the ratio of the domestic crawfish demand price to the oysters demand 
price, all other quantities and utility held constant. The elasticities of complementarity in 
Table 5.6 are all positive, reflecting both the tendency toward complementarity and the 
negativity of the own-price flexibilities. 
5.4.4. Estimation of Uncompensated Price Flexibility 
5.4.4.1. Own Uncompensated Price Flexibility 
 Uncompensated flexibilities are given in Table 5.7.1. The absolute values of own 
uncompensated flexibilities are greater than the absolute values of own compensated 
flexibilities because of negative values of scale flexibility and own compensated price 
flexibility. However, the absolute values of cross uncompensated flexibilities are 
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dependent on the sign of the value of cross compensated price flexibility. If the cross 
compensated price flexibility is positive, then the absolute value of cross uncompensated 
price flexibility is less than the absolute value of cross compensated price flexibility, 
implying the scale effect reduce the substitution effect. As this study discussed in Chapter 
III, uncompensated price flexibility is the summation of both compensated price 
flexibility and scale flexibility. As a result, the uncompensated price flexibility represents 
the effects of scale and substitution as one. Table 5.7.1 shows the own uncompensated 
price flexibilities of five fish. The own domestic crawfish uncompensated price flexibility 
is estimated to be -0.774, implying a 1% increase in quantity of domestic crawfish 
decreases the domestic crawfish price by 0.774%. The own imported crawfish 
uncompensated price flexibility is estimated to be -0.980, implying a 1% increase in 
quantity of imported crawfish decreases the imported crawfish price by 0.980%. The own 
catfish uncompensated price flexibility is estimated to be -0.784, implying a 1% increase 
in quantity of catfish decreases the domestic catfish price by 0.784%. The own shrimp 
uncompensated price flexibility is estimated to be -1.895, implying a 1% increase in 
quantity of shrimp decreases the domestic shrimp price by 1.895%. The own oysters 
uncompensated price flexibility is estimated to be -1.131, implying a 1% increase in 
quantity of oysters decreases the domestic oysters price by 1.131%. 
 As seen in Tables 5.5.1 and 5.7.1, own goods are shown to have negative effects 
on their own price no matter what price is measured: compensated or uncompensated 
demand price. However, due to negativities of own price flexibility and scale flexibility 
the absolute magnitude of own uncompensated price flexibility is measured to be greater 
than own compensated price flexibility. 
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5.4.4.2. Cross Uncompensated Price Flexibility 
The cross uncompensated price flexibilities for domestic crawfish are also shown 
in Table 5.7.1. The cross imported crawfish uncompensated price flexibility for domestic 
crawfish is estimated to be -0.384, implying that a 1% increase in quantity of imported 
crawfish decreases the domestic price by 0.384%. The cross catfish uncompensated price 
flexibility for domestic crawfish is estimated to be 0.840, implying that a 1% decrease in 
quantity of catfish increases the domestic crawfish price by 0.840%.  The cross shrimp 
uncompensated price flexibility for domestic crawfish is estimated to be -1.047, implying 
that a 1% increase in shrimp quantity decreases the domestic crawfish price by 1.047%. 
The cross oysters uncompensated price flexibility for domestic crawfish is estimated to 
be 0.125, implying that a 1% decrease in quantity of oysters increases the domestic 
crawfish price by 0.125%. As seen in Tables 5.5.1 and 5.7.1, even though the cross 
compensated price flexibility of shrimp is positive, the uncompensated flexibilities turned 
out to be negative due to negative scale flexibilities of shrimp. In light of this, consumer 
surplus, which is related to the uncompensated flexibility, miscalculates the consumer 
welfare effect of quantity. 
5.5. Welfare Measurements 
The empirical work of the previous section is motivated by an interest in crawfish 
imports. While the benefits of crawfish imports might come from the consumer side, by 
way of lower domestic prices, the costs come from losses to domestic producers. 
Therefore, the study is intended to measure both the benefits and costs of crawfish 
imports. A theory of welfare measurement as to changes in quantity space has been 
developed by Barten and Bettendorf (1989), and this current section is an empirical 
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counterpart to that work. The study evaluates the welfare effects of crawfish imports by 
calculating quantity-based compensating variations, consumer surplus and producer 
surplus. 
In order to measure consumer welfare, the study uses consumer surplus and 
compensating variation based on uncompensated price flexibility and compensated price 
flexibility estimated in the empirical models. Producer welfare is calculated using change 
in net revenue of domestic crawfish processors. In measuring the change in net revenue 
of domestic crawfish processors, the study uses price flexibility, cost flexibility of 
domestic crawfish production, and quantity elasticity for imports of crawfish. Basically, 
this study assumes that crawfish tail meat imports will affect both domestic price and 
domestic production. The cost flexibility is estimated using crawfish processor cost data 
from 1994 to 2002 reported by U.S. International Trade Commission in 2003. The cost 
flexibility is estimated to be 1.6, representing a 1% increase in output increases cost by 
1.6%, so that we see the domestic crawfish processors are not operating in economy of 
scale, which characterizes a production process in which an increase in the scale of the 
firm causes a decrease in the long run cost of each unit. 
The import elasticity for domestic production is estimated using crawfish imports 
and domestic production during the same period with the cost flexibilities. It is estimated 
to be -0.057, representing that a 1% increase in crawfish imports decreases domestic 
crawfish production by 0.057%. For welfare measurements, initial domestic price is 
assumed to be the average price of the recent three years and the initial quantity of each 
fishery good is assumed to be the average of the recent three years. 
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5.5.1. Crawfish Imports Effects 
 Table 5.8.1 shows welfare changes for consumers, producers, and society 
depending on change in crawfish imports. As the study indicated in the previous chapters, 
it is the income effect that separates consumer surplus from compensating variation, and 
income effect is determined by scale flexibility. The difference between consumer 
surplus and compensating variation comes from the difference between uncompensated 
and compensated price flexibilities. As we see in Tables 5.5.1 and 5.7.1, there is little 
difference between own compensated price flexibility and own uncompensated price 
flexibility of domestic crawfish, indicating a small scale flexibility which determines the 
income effect. As a result, the consumer surplus shows that it is a reasonable 
approximation for exact welfare measurement of consumer related to a change in 
crawfish imports. 
 As expected, an increase in crawfish imports increases consumer welfare because 
both cross compensated and uncompensated price flexibilities of imported crawfish are 
negative. The result of the study shows that a 10% increase in crawfish imports increases 
consumer surplus by $3,628,000. The other four nested models: DIRDS, DIAIDS, 
DICBS, and DINBR models show similar results. 
 As mentioned previously, however, an increase in crawfish imports negatively 
affects domestic crawfish producers’ income because of the negative price flexibility. 
Furthermore, in order to ease their loss along with decreasing prices, domestic crawfish 
processors should reduce volume of production. The empirical producer welfare change 
is calculated by using change in the net revenue of domestic crawfish processors. As 
Table 5.8.1 shows, an increase in crawfish imports decreases domestic crawfish 
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processors’ net revenue. For example, the result shows that a 10% increase in crawfish 
imports decreases domestic crawfish processor’s economic welfare by $755,000. Unlike 
with consumer welfare, the four other nested models displayed different results, 
respectively. 
 In terms of net social welfare, the results of the study show that an increase in 
crawfish imports improves net social welfare because gains in consumer welfare are 
greater than the loss to producers’. Table 5.8.1 shows that an increase in crawfish imports 
increases net social welfare. For example, a 10% increase in crawfish imports increases 
net social welfare by $2,872,000. The four other nested models also show similar results 
with the exception that the dollar values are greater than those estimated in GIDS model.
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      Table 5.5.1. Scale and Compensated Price Flexibilities: GIDS 
Scale   
Equation Flexibility 
Crawfish (D) Crawfish (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters R2/DW 
-1.240 -0.769 -0.378 ** 0.986 0.002 0.158 1. Crawfish (D) (0.899) (0.904) (0.126) (0.545) (0.001) (0.151) 0.94 / 1.79 
-2.550 *** -0.303** -0.967 -0.414 1.975 -0.291* 2. Crawfish (I) (0.680) (0.101) (2.844) (0.600) (1.091) (0.153) 0.89 / 1.60 
-1.946 *** 0.034 -0.018 -0.554 0.463 0.074 3. Catfish (0.472) (0.019) (0.026) (0.494) (0.320) (0.049) 0.68 / 2.58 
-2.120 *** 0.000 0.012 0.065 -0.102 0.025 4. Shrimp (0.098) (0.000) (0.007) (0.045) (0.091) (0.063) 0.84 / 2.28 
-1.731 0.024 -0.056 0.327 0.790 -1.085* 5. Oysters (0.890) (0.023) (0.029) (0.215) (1.974) (0.500) 0.57 / 2.07 
      Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
          * Indicates significance at 10% level. 
          ** Indicates significance at 5% level. 
          *** Indicates significance at 1% level. 
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     Table 5.5.2. Scale and Compensated Price Flexibilities: DIRDS 
Scale Equation 
Flexibility 
Domestic (D) Imports (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters R2/DW 
-97.908*** 0.555 -0.740 ** 1.241 -1.201 0.144 1. Domestic (D) (4.186) (0.308) (0.322) (0.730) (0.751) (0.147) 0.46 / 1.13 
-113.706*** -0.593 ** 0.724 * -0.473 0.857 -0.516*** 2. Imports (I) (3.805) (0.258) (0.334) (0.775) (0.751) (0.146) 0.87 / 1.13 
-1.997 *** 0.043 -0.021 1.057 *** -1.149 *** 0.069 ** 3. Catfish (0.340) (0.026) (0.034) (0.190) (0.195) (0.031) 0.67 / 1.60 
0.200 *** -0.006 0.005 -0.161 0.172 -0.010 4. Shrimp (0.048) (0.004) (0.005) (0.027) (0.030) (0.005) 0.79 / 1.44 
2.203 *** 0.022 -0.099 0.304 -0.325 0.098 5. Oysters (0.282) (0.023) (0.028) (0.139) (0.160) (0.084) 0.53 / 1.25 
     Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
        * Indicates significance at 10% level. 
        ** Indicates significance at 5% level. 
        *** Indicates significance at 1% level. 
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      Table 5.5.3. Scale and Compensated Price Flexibilities: DIAIDS 
Scale Equation 
Flexibility 
Domestic (D) Imports (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters R2/DW 
-13.979 *** -1.088 -0.024 -0.322 1.562 -0.130 1. Domestic (D) (3.938) (4.029) (0.238) (0.322) (1.157) (0.142) 0.38 / 1.49 
4.746 -0.019 -0.274 * -1.074 ** 1.244 0.123 2. Imports (I) (2.894) (0.191) (0.146) (0.424) (1.413) (0.252) 0.76 / 0.99 
-1.767*** -0.011 -0.047 ** 0.624 *** -0.373 *** -0.194*** 3. Catfish (0.430) (0.011) (0.018) (0.039) (0.026) (0.033) 0.87 / 0.97 
-0.895 *** 0.008 0.008 -0.052 *** 0.012 *** 0.025 4. Shrimp (0.239) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.090) 0.80 / 0.60 
-0.014 ** -0.020 0.024 -0.855 *** 0.796 0.055 5. Oysters (0.004) (0.022) (0.048) (0.146) (2.841) (0.008) 0.77 / 2.45 
     Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
        * Indicates significance at 10% level. 
        ** Indicates significance at 5% level. 
        *** Indicates significance at 1% level. 
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       Table 5.5.4. Scale and Compensated Price Flexibilities: DICBS 
Scale Equation 
Flexibility 
Domestic (D) Imports (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters R2/DW 
3.475** 0.027 -0.380 * -0.621 1.183 -0.210 1. Domestic (D) (1.436) (0.166) (0.178) (0.647) (0.783) (0.132) 0.31 / 1.85 
12.874 *** -0.304 * 0.329 0.163 -0.031 -0.157 2. Imports (I) (3.547) (0.143) (0.417) (0.740) (0.775) (0.152) 0.61 / 1.35 
-1.405 -0.022 0.007 -0.064 0.037 0.041 3. Catfish (1.098) (0.023) (0.032) (0.167) (0.177) (0.027) 0.34 / 1.91 
-1.044 0.006 0.000 0.005 -0.013 0.003 4. Shrimp (1.159) (0.004) (0.005) (0.025) (0.028) (0.004) 0.21 / 2.87 
-1.198 -0.032 -0.030 0.181 0.081 -0.199 ** 5. Oysters (1.641) (0.020) (0.029) (0.120) (0.133) (0.087) 0.27 / 1.86 
       Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
           * Indicates significance at 10% level. 
           ** Indicates significance at 5% level. 
           *** Indicates significance at 1% level. 
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       Table 5.5.5. Scale and Compensated Price Flexibilties: DINBR 
Scale Equation 
Flexibility 
Domestic (D) Imports (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters R2/DW 
27.055*** -1.240 -0.077 -0.367 1.802 -0.118 1. Domestic (D) (0.362) (1.771) (0.296) (0.337) (1.112) (0.139) 0.35 / 1.78 
57.668*** -0.062 -0.376 -1.000** 1.280 0.157 2. Imports (I) (0.383) (0.238) (0.258) (0.405) (1.506) (0.228) 0.68 / 2.11 
-0.508 ** -0.013 -0.044 ** 0.677 *** -0.434*** -0.186 *** 3. Catfish (0.182) (0.012) (0.018) (0.043) (0.031) (0.033) 0.87 / 1.44 
-0.437*** 0.009 0.008 -0.061 *** 0.020 *** 0.024 4. Shrimp (0.032) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.052) 0.96 / 1.79 
0.760 ** -0.018 0.030 -0.820 *** 0.764 0.045 *** 5. Oysters (0.299) (0.021) (0.044) (0.146) (1.625) (0.007) 0.76 / 2.15 
       Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
           * Indicates significance at 10% level. 
           ** Indicates significance at 5% level. 
           *** Indicates significance at 1% level. 
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                             Table 5.6. Morishima Easticities of Complementarity 
  Crawfish (D) Crawfish (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters 
Crawfish (D) 0.000 0.391 1.755 0.771 0.927 
Crawfish (I) 0.664 0.000 0.553 2.942 0.676 
Catfish 0.588 0.536 0.000 1.017 0.628 
Shrimp 0.102 0.114 0.167 0.000 0.127 
Oysters 1.109 1.029 1.412 1.875 0.000 
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                             Table 5.7.1. Uncompensated Price Flexibilities: GIDS 
  Domestic (D) Imports (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters 
Domestic (D) -0.774  -0.384  0.840  -1.047  0.125  
Imports (I) -0.313  -0.980  -0.716  -0.182  -0.359  
Catfish 0.026  -0.028  -0.784  -1.182  0.022  
Shrimp -0.009  0.001  -0.186  -1.895  -0.032  
Oysters 0.017  -0.065  0.122  -0.674  -1.131  
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                            Table 5.7.2. Uncompensated Price Flexibilities: DIRDS 
  Domestic (D) Imports (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters 
Domestic (D) 0.150  -1.245  -10.350  -83.982  -2.482  
Imports (I) -1.064  0.138  -13.935  -95.281  -3.566  
Catfish 0.035  -0.031  0.820  -2.837  0.015  
Shrimp -0.005  0.006  -0.137  0.341  -0.005  
Oysters 0.031  -0.088  0.565  1.537  0.157  
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                            Table 5.7.3. Uncompensated Price Flexibilities: DIAIDS 
  Domestic (D) Imports (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters 
Domestic (D) -1.146  -0.096  -1.976  -10.256  -0.505  
Imports (I) 0.001  -0.250  -0.512  5.256  0.251  
Catfish -0.019  -0.056  0.415  -1.867  -0.241  
Shrimp 0.004  0.003  -0.158  -0.745  0.001  
Oysters -0.020  0.024  -0.856  0.784  0.055  
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                            Table 5.7.4. Uncompensated Price Flexibilities: DICBS 
  Domestic (D) Imports (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters 
Domestic (D) 0.041  -0.362  -0.210  4.121  -0.117  
Imports (I) -0.251  0.396  1.687  10.854  0.188  
Catfish -0.028  0.000  -0.230  -1.151  0.003  
Shrimp 0.001  -0.006  -0.118  -0.896  -0.025  
Oysters -0.037  -0.036  0.039  -0.931  -0.232  
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                            Table 5.7.5. Uncompensated Price Flexibilities: DINBR 
  Domestic (D) Imports (I) Catfish Shrimp Oysters 
Domestic (D) -1.128  0.063  2.836  24.677  0.608  
Imports (I) 0.177  -0.079  5.827  50.038  1.704  
Catfish -0.015  -0.046  0.617  -0.864  -0.199  
Shrimp 0.007  0.006  -0.113  -0.350  0.013  
Oysters -0.015  0.034  -0.730  1.407  0.065  
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             Table 5.8.1. Estimated Welfare Measures in $1000 from Increase of Crawfish Imports: GIDS 
ΔCrawfish Imports Consumer Welfare Producer Welfare Net Social Welfare 
(Δ%) (Δton) CS CV PS CS+PS CV+PS 
1% 40  368  368  -76  292  292  
2% 79  735  735  -152  583  583  
3% 119  1101  1101  -227  873  873  
4% 158  1465  1465  -303  1162  1162  
5% 198  1829  1829  -379  1450  1450  
10% 396  3628  3629  -755  2872  2873  
20% 791  7137  7141  -1502  5635  5639  
30% 1187  10527  10536  -2239  8287  8296  
40% 1582  13798  13814  -2968  10830  10846  
50% 1978  16951  16976  -3688  13263  13287  
60% 2374  19985  20021  -4400  15585  15621  
70% 2769  22901  22949  -5102  17798  17847  
80% 3165  25697  25760  -5796  19901  19965  
90% 3560  28375  28455  -6481  21894  21974  
100% 3956  30934  31033  -7157  23777  23876  
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         Table 5.8.2. Estimated Welfare Measures in $1000 from Increase of Crawfish Imports: DIRDS 
ΔCrawfish Imports Consumer Welfare Producer Welfare Net Social Welfare 
(Δ%) (Δton) CS CV PS CS+PS CV+PS 
1% 40  367  368  -236  131  132  
2% 79  730  733  -471  258  262  
3% 119  1089  1096  -706  382  389  
4% 158  1444  1456  -941  503  515  
5% 198  1795  1815  -1176  619  639  
10% 396  3495  3573  -2345  1150  1228  
20% 791  6604  6917  -4661  1943  2255  
30% 1187  9329  10032  -6949  2380  3083  
40% 1582  11669  12918  -9208  2460  3710  
50% 1978  13624  15576  -11439  2184  4137  
60% 2374  15194  18005  -13642  1552  4363  
70% 2769  16379  20205  -15815  563  4390  
80% 3165  17179  22177  -17961  -782  4216  
90% 3560  17594  23919  -20077  -2483  3842  
100% 3956  17625  25434  -22166  -4541  3268  
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         Table 5.8.3. Estimated Welfare Measures in $1000 from Increase of Crawfish Imports: DIAIDS 
ΔCrawfish Imports Consumer Welfare Producer Welfare Net Social Welfare 
(Δ%) (Δton) CS CV PS CS+PS CV+PS 
1% 40  369  369  -22  346  346  
2% 79  737  737  -45  692  692  
3% 119  1105  1106  -67  1037  1038  
4% 158  1472  1474  -90  1383  1385  
5% 198  1840  1843  -112  1728  1731  
10% 396  3672  3683  -224  3449  3460  
20% 791  7315  7359  -445  6870  6914  
30% 1187  10927  11028  -664  10263  10364  
40% 1582  14511  14689  -881  13630  13808  
50% 1978  18064  18343  -1096  16968  17247  
60% 2374  21588  21989  -1308  20280  20681  
70% 2769  25082  25628  -1519  23563  24110  
80% 3165  28546  29260  -1727  26820  27533  
90% 3560  31981  32884  -1933  30048  30951  
100% 3956  35386  36501  -2137  33250  34365  
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         Table 5.8.4. Estimated Welfare Measures in $1000 from Increase of Crawfish Imports: DICBS 
ΔCrawfish Imports Consumer Welfare Producer Welfare Net Social Welfare 
(Δ%) (Δton) CS CV PS CS+PS CV+PS 
1% 40  368  368  -72  296  296  
2% 79  735  735  -143  592  592  
3% 119  1101  1101  -215  886  886  
4% 158  1466  1465  -287  1179  1179  
5% 198  1830  1829  -358  1471  1471  
10% 396  3631  3628  -714  2917  2914  
20% 791  7150  7139  -1420  5731  5719  
30% 1187  10558  10533  -2117  8441  8416  
40% 1582  13853  13809  -2806  11047  11003  
50% 1978  17037  16968  -3487  13550  13481  
60% 2374  20109  20010  -4160  15949  15850  
70% 2769  23070  22934  -4824  18245  18109  
80% 3165  25918  25741  -5480  20438  20260  
90% 3560  28655  28430  -6128  22526  22302  
100% 3956  31279  31002  -6768  24512  24234  
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         Table 5.8.5. Estimated Welfare Measures in $1000 from Increase of Crawfish Imports: DINBR 
ΔCrawfish Imports Consumer Welfare Producer Welfare Net Social Welfare 
(Δ%) (Δton) CS CV PS CS+PS CV+PS 
1% 40  369  369  7  376  376  
2% 79  737  737  14  751  751  
3% 119  1105  1105  21  1126  1126  
4% 158  1473  1473  28  1501  1501  
5% 198  1841  1841  35  1876  1875  
10% 396  3677  3675  69  3746  3744  
20% 791  7335  7326  137  7472  7463  
30% 1187  10974  10954  203  11177  11157  
40% 1582  14593  14557  268  14861  14825  
50% 1978  18193  18137  331  18525  18469  
60% 2374  21774  21693  393  22167  22086  
70% 2769  25335  25225  454  25789  25679  
80% 3165  28877  28734  513  29390  29247  
90% 3560  32400  32218  571  32970  32789  
100% 3956  35903  35679  627  36530  36306  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.1. Introduction 
 The crawfish industry in Louisiana has become an important portion of 
Louisiana’s economy. Historically, whenever local crawfish harvests exceeded what 
could be moved through market channels to restaurants and retail consumers, excess 
product found its way to processing plants to be peeled and sold as fresh or frozen tail 
meat. This marketing outlet served to moderate drastic price swings and provided 
regional economic benefits in terms of adding value and creating employment. After the 
mid-1990s, however, these enterprises met a new face from low-priced imported crawfish 
tail meat, resulting in over all price instability not only for frozen tail meat but also for 
fresh tail meat and whole live and boiled crawfish. In fact, the International Trade 
Commission in 2003 reported that the Chinese imported crawfish tail meat had 
suppressed domestic processed crawfish prices to a significant degree. Substantial 
volumes of low-priced crawfish tail meat imports displaced sales of the domestic like 
product and, unable to meet those low prices, domestic producers responded by selling 
more fresh meat in season, selling more whole live crawfish, or scaling back production. 
Domestic crawfish producers experienced falling production and sales volume, capacity 
utilization, and employment, along with rising per-unit costs. The domestic crawfish 
industry suffered serious financial declines as falling sales volumes and rising costs 
erased profit margins. Furthermore, the domestic crawfish price may decline on account 
of increases in the availability of other fishery products as substitutes. Over the last 
decade the amount of fish imported into the U.S. market has increased considerably. A 
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good example of this is the growth of shrimp imports and frozen catfish fillet imports. In 
2004, U.S. shrimp imports were valued at $4 billion, representing 230% increase from 
1989 when it was $1.7 billion. Thus, the domestic crawfish industry could be affected by 
other related fish imports. 
 In contrast, U.S. demand for crawfish has continued to grow since the mid-1990s. 
Demand growth is connected to a wider acceptance of crawfish as a food outside of 
Louisiana, and a growing national interest in Cajun cuisine. Some importers of crawfish 
stated that demand growth is due to the wider availability and lower prices associated 
with frozen Chinese crawfish tail meat. Increases in the consumption of crawfish leads 
one to conclude that domestic production capacity was not sufficient to supply domestic 
demand and this is why the volume of imports increased significantly. As a result, the 
market share of shipments of crawfish tail meat imports rose from 21 percent in 1994 to 
83 percent in 2005.  
 One contribution of this study is to estimate a recently developed inverse demand 
system and use it to measure the welfare for the domestic crawfish industry. Unlike 
single equation models, the system-wide approach does not exclude substitution 
possibilities and includes interactions that are potentially important for understanding fish 
consumption patterns and price determination. This study applies the estimated system by 
analyzing welfare measures of change in quantity caused by imports. 
6.2. Results 
 In order to measure the quantity effect on price, previous studies have developed 
inverse demand systems. These inverse demand systems have been developed using two 
primary approaches. The Rotterdam methodology determines the quantity effect on price 
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in terms of scale and substitution effects while the distance function approach provides 
more information about utility and consumer preference. Since this study is intended to 
determine quantity effect on price, the study used the Rotterdam approach in developing 
inverse demand systems. The GIDS model is better suited for the data used in this study 
than the other four nested models. By using inverse demand systems, the study 
determined the substitution effect and scale effect of changes in quantity caused by 
changes in imports of crawfish and other related fish on the domestic crawfish price. 
Furthermore, using compensating price flexibility as a measure of the substitution effect 
of quantity and scale flexibility as a measure of the income effect, the study was able to 
provide welfare analyses for domestic crawfish consumers and producers. As expected, 
the study showed a negative effect of crawfish imports on the domestic price and 
producers welfare while the lower price caused by imports made domestic crawfish 
consumers better off. Related to other fish products, not all of fish used in the study 
proved to be substitutes for crawfish. 
 Scale effects have all been estimated to be negative, implying an increase in 
aggregate fish supply causes fish prices to decline, as was expected. However, the 
estimated scale flexibilities are significantly different from -1. Furthermore, test statistics 
show that the underlying scale curves differ significantly from both linear and linear 
logarithmic forms. This result suggests the need for better specification of utility function 
which can be more effectively described through distance function methodology. 
 Own price flexibilities have all been estimated as negative, implying an increase 
in own fishery production decreases the own price. This is to be expected. The negative 
own price flexibility is theoretically consistent because of the negativity of the Antonelli 
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matrix. However, these price flexibilities estimated in the study are relatively lower than 
those of other studies. Among the five fish categories utilized in the study, the absolute 
value of own price flexibility for oysters is the largest, implying that domestic oyster 
price is more sensitive to change in the own good than for other fish. 
 Related to the cross price flexibility, this study confirmed the bias toward 
complementarity in the off-diagonal term of Antonelli matrix. However, as Barten and 
Bettendorf (1989) and Park, Thurman, and Easley (2004) showed, the small number of 
negative cross effects in this study does not agree with the notion that most types of fish 
are substitutes. Therefore, the Morishima elasticity of complementarity was proposed as a 
more adequate measure of interaction between commodities in their ability to satisfy 
needs than the coefficients of the Antonelli matrix. The study showed that elasticities of 
complementarity are primarily positive, implying both the tendency toward 
complementarity and the negativity of the own-quantity elasticities. 
The study shows that the scale effect for crawfish is relatively small, implying 
that the consumer surplus can be used as a welfare measurement. In this study, the own 
crawfish compensated and uncompensated price flexibilities are estimated to be -0.769 
and -0.774, respectively. As a result, the welfare effect does not show a difference 
between consumer surplus and compensating variation. However, the absolute values of 
cross uncompensated flexibility are different from that of cross compensated flexibility, 
depending on the sign of the cross compensated price flexibility. 
 This study was initially motivated to measure the effect of crawfish imports on 
the economic welfare of domestic crawfish industry. Estimating the price effect of 
quantity, such as price flexibility and scale flexibility obtained by using a family of 
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inverse demand systems, this objective was accomplished. As expected, the result of the 
study shows that the domestic crawfish consumer experiences welfare gains while the 
domestic crawfish producer is worse off with increases in crawfish imports. The gains to 
the domestic crawfish consumers are greater than the loss to domestic crawfish 
producers, implying that the overall welfare of the domestic crawfish industry will be 
improved with increases in crawfish imports. However, even though the gains to 
domestic crawfish consumers are greater than the losses to domestic crawfish producers, 
the economic loss to domestic crawfish producers is quite serious because the loss is 
imposed on a small number of domestic crawfish processors. Such negative effects of 
crawfish imports on the domestic crawfish producers may be to blame for decreasing the 
number of domestic crawfish processors. Harrison et al. (2003) reported that, in 1996, 
there were estimated 90 to 100 crawfish processors in Louisiana; today there are 
approximately 15. 
6.3. Implication 
 In evaluating the likely impact of crawfish and other related fish imports on the 
domestic crawfish industry, inverse demand systems provide a theoretically consistent 
method of analysis. In order to estimate flexibility as an indicator of the impact of 
imports on the domestic crawfish price, the generalized inverse demand system of 
Brown, Lee, and Seale was used with DIRDS, DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR. In terms of 
test statistics and economic theory, the GIDS model is better fitted for the actual data 
used in this study than any other models. The contribution of this study is to estimate 
recently developed inverse demand systems and use them to measure the welfare effect 
of increases in imports of crawfish and other related fish. As the study indicated, by using 
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such a system-wide approach the study can also detect substitutability and interactions 
that are potentially important for understanding fish consumption patterns and price 
relationships. In particulation, substitutability implies that the domestic crawfish price 
can also be affected negatively by substitutable fish which are detected by this study. 
Thus, it would be useful to develop a policy tool in light of the negative relationship 
between domestic crawfish price and substitutable fish imports. Up until now, domestic 
policy has focused on own crawfish imports. However, this study has shown that other 
related fish supply also have negative impacts on the domestic crawfish price. Even 
though substitutability is shown to vary depending on the model, imported crawfish is 
shown to be a substitute for domestic crawfish in each of the models, GIDS, DIRDS, 
DIAIDS, DICBS, and DINBR. Furthermore, the scale flexibility also implies the negative 
impact of increases in the aggregate fish imports on domestic crawfish price. This result 
may have implication regarding the impact of the antidumping and counter-vailing duty 
on crawfish tail meat imports and its effect on the domestic crawfish price. 
 Quantitative measurement of welfare is another product of this study. The price 
flexibilities and scale flexibilities estimated in the inverse demand systems can be used as 
a tool to quantitatively measure welfare change caused by increases in imports of 
crawfish and other related fish. The welfare effects of quantity changes are associated 
with the inverse demand system in which commodity prices are dependent on their 
quantities. In particular, quantity-based welfare measures are useful in situations where 
supply is inelastic in the short run and the producers are price takers. This study showed 
that, although the gains to domestic crawfish consumers are greater than the losses to 
domestic crawfish producers, the economic burden imposed on the domestic crawfish 
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producers is serious given that a small number of domestic crawfish processors bear the 
economic loss caused by increases in Chinese crawfish tail meat imports. In fact, this 
economic burden has reduced the number of domestic crawfish processors in Louisiana. 
 The findings in this study suggest that since increases in crawfish imports 
negatively affect domestic crawfish prices, and since producer losses are concentrated 
among a small number of domestic crawfish processors, the economic policy for 
preserving the domestic crawfish industry should be developed to reflect these results. 
6.4. Limitations 
 This study determined the economic impact of imports of crawfish and other 
related fish on the domestic crawfish industry. The systems-wide model approach gives 
theoretically consistent results but the main concern with the study come from the data 
quality. 
 Secondly, even though there may be a relationship between crawfish price and 
other fish and/or red meat this study did not include all of them because of the size 
limitations of the inverse demand system. The omission of relevant products in the 
system may distort consumer preference and utility related to seafood consumption. 
 Related to analysis of domestic crawfish producer welfare, the cost flexibilities 
and import elasticities will differ according to cost structure in the activation of 
individual domestic processors. For example, if marginal cost is lower than the imported 
price, the domestic industry will produce more with increased domestic demand, while 
individual processors with higher marginal costs will reduce their level of production. 
This implies that precise information regarding production functions and cost structure of 
domestic crawfish producers would be useful. 
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6.5. Future Research 
 The Trade Adjustment Assistance Program allows the Secretary of Agriculture to 
compensate certain growers for economic damages incurred when imports have 
materially reduced domestic prices. The imported good must, even if lightly processed, 
be a close substitute for the domestic product. Compensation may be warranted if imports 
have brought domestic prices between 80% of the five-year, 1998 – 2002 average price. 
According to the results of the study, the imported crawfish is shown to reduce domestic 
prices. Furthermore, the negative scale effect of domestic crawfish indicates that 
increases in aggregated fish supply also have negative impact on domestic crawfish price. 
As a result, increases in fish imports, including crawfish and other related fish used in the 
study, affect domestic crawfish producers as shown in the results of this study. However, 
this analysis does not provide information regarding the economic impact of imports of 
crawfish and other related fish on individual domestic crawfish processors. Furthermore, 
since domestic crawfish farmers and wild harvesters are also affected by imports, it 
would be useful to extend this research to measuring the economic impacts of imports on 
individual crawfish producers including crawfish farmers and wild harvesters.  
Related to government policy, since 1997 the government has imposed 
antidumping duties on Chinese imported crawfish tail meat. Since 2001, the Byrd 
Amendment has directed the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to distribute 
the monies collected to domestic crawfish processors that had petitioned or supported 
antidumping and countervailing duty actions. However, under current policy, many 
domestic crawfish producers complain that this policy does not work. In fact, this policy 
focuses only on Chinese imported crawfish tail meat. As shown in this study, imports, not 
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only of crawfish but also other related fish are closely related with the declining domestic 
crawfish price. As a result, to encourage the domestic crawfish industry it is essential to 
analyze production, cost structure, and current policy including, but not limited to: (1) 
declines in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and 
utilization of capacity; (2) negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, 
wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment; and (3) negative effects on the 
existing development and production efforts of the industry. 
 As previous research indicates, red meat can also substitute for crawfish as a 
protein source. Changes in the prices of chicken, beef, and pork can affect crawfish 
consumption. According to the USDA (2005), the prices for chicken, beef, and pork are 
forecast to be lower in 2006 and to fall even lower again in 2007. These forecasts for 
lower prices of the major livestock and poultry protein sources indicate strong 
competition for domestic and imported crawfish consumption. Furthermore, according to 
the U.S. International Trade Commission (2003), there are many other factors affecting 
fish consumption. For example, quality and availability are another important factors that 
influence purchasing decisions for crawfish. Survey results show that price is an 
important factor for most purchasers, but often come after quality in importance. These 
factors indicate that consumer decision making process should be researched. Additional 
knowledge related to qualitative data analysis will assist in achieving this goal. 
6.6. Conclusions 
 This research quantitatively determined the price and welfare effects of imports of 
crawfish. Inverse demand systems were used to estimate price and scale flexibilities as 
indicators of the effects of imports of crawfish on the domestic crawfish price. Among 
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the different types of inverse demand systems, the generalized inverse demand model 
was shown to be best fitted for the data used in the study. As expected, the own price 
flexibility and scale flexibility are shown to be negative, while cross price flexibilities 
show either substitutability or complementarity relationships. Consumer welfare is 
measured by consumer surplus and compensating variation calculated by uncompensated 
and compensated price flexibility, respectively. Even though consumer surplus 
theoretically overestimates the quantity effect on welfare, empirical results show that 
there is little difference between consumer surplus and compensating variation related to 
crawfish imports because of the small scale effect in crawfish. Producer welfare is 
measured using price and cost flexibility in the profit function. Even though the economic 
loss to domestic crawfish producers resulting from the increase in imports of crawfish is 
relatively small compared with the gains to the domestic crawfish consumer, the impact 
of imports of crawfish are significant to domestic crawfish producers given that the loss 
is borne by a small number of domestic crawfish producers. However, this study shows a 
net social welfare gain through increased crawfish imports. 
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APPENDIX I. DATA VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Variables Abbreviation
Crawfish Domestic Supply, 1000kg 
Crawfish Domestic Price, $/kg 
Crawfish Imports, 1000kg 
Crawfish Imports Price, $/kg 
Catfish Total Supply, 1000kg 
Catfish Domestic Price, $/kg 
Shrimp Total Supply, 1000kg 
Shrimp Domestic Price, $/kg 
Oysters Total Supply, 1000kg 
Oysters Domestic Price, $/kg 
Expenditure for Domestic Crawfish 
Expenditure for Imported Crawfish 
Expenditure for Catfish 
Expenditure for Shrimp 
Expenditure for Oysters 
Total Expenditure for Crawfish, Catfish, Shrimp, and Oysters 
Normalized Domestic Crawfish Price 
Normalized Imported Crawfish Price 
Normalized Domestic Catfish Price 
Normalized Domestic Shrimp Price 
Normalized Domestic Oysters Price 
Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply 
crds 
crdp 
crms
crmp
cats 
cadp
shts 
shdp
oyts 
oydp
wcd
wcm
wca
wsh
woy
w
ncrdp 
ncrmp
ncadp
nshdp
noydp
ncrds
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APPENDIX I. (Cont.) 
Variables Abbreviation
Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply 
Normalized Catfish Supply 
Normalized Shrimp Supply 
Normalized Oysters Supply 
Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply 
Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply 
Log Normalized Catfish Suppy 
Log Normalized Shrimp Supply 
Log Normalized Oysters Supply 
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply 
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply 
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Catfish Supply 
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Shrimp Supply 
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Oysters Supply 
Difference Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply 
Difference Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply 
Difference Log Normalized Catfish Supply 
Difference Log Normalized Shrimp Supply 
Difference Log Normalized Oysters Supply 
Normalized Expenditure for Domestic Crawfish 
Normalized Expenditure for Imported Crawfish 
Normalized Expenditure for Catfish 
ncrms
ncats 
nshts 
noyts 
lnncrdp 
lnncrmp
lnncadp 
lnnshdp 
lnnoydp
laglnncrdp 
laglnncrmp
laglnncadp 
laglnnshdp 
laglnnoydp 
dlnncrdp 
dlnncrmp
dlnncadp 
dlnnshdp 
dlnnoydp
nwcd
nwcm
nwca
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Variables Abbreviation
Normalized Expenditure for Shrimp 
Normalized Expenditure for Oysters 
One Year Lagged Normalized Expenditure for Domestic Crawfish 
One Year Lagged Normalized Expenditure for Imported Crawfish 
One Year Lagged Normalized Expenditure for Catfish 
One Year Lagged Normalized Expenditure for Shrimp 
One Year Lagged Normalized Expenditure for Oysters 
Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure for Domestic Crawfish 
Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure for Imported Crawfish 
Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure for Catfish 
Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure for Shrimp 
Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure for Oysters 
One Year Lagged Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure  
                 for Domestic Crawfish 
One Year Lagged Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure 
                 for Imported Crawfish 
One Year Lagged Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure 
                 for Catfish 
One Year Lagged Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure  
                 for Shrimp 
One Year Lagged Moving Average in Normalized Expenditure  
                 for Oysters 
DIAIDS Dependent Variable for Domestic Crawfish 
DIAIDS Dependent Variable for Imported Crawfish 
nwsh
nwoy
lagnwcd
lagnwcm
lagnwca 
lagnwsh
lagnwoy
bwcd
bwcm
bwca
bwsh
bwoy
lagbwcd
lagbwcm
lagbwca 
lagbwsh
lagbwoy
dbwcd
dbwcm
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Variables Abbreviation
DIAIDS Dependent Variable for Catfish 
DIAIDS Dependent Variable for Shrimp 
DIAIDS Dependent Variable for Oysters 
Log Domestic Crawfish Price 
Log Imported Crawfish Price 
Log Domestic Catfish Price 
Log Domestic Shrimp Price 
Log Domestic Oysters Price 
One Year Lagged Log Domestic Crawfish Price 
One Year Lagged Log Imported Crawfish Price 
One Year Lagged Log Domestic Catfish Price 
One Year Lagged Log Domestic Shrimp Price 
One Year Lagged Log Domestic Oysters Price 
Difference Log Domestic Crawfish Price 
Difference Log Imported Crawfish Price 
Difference Log Domestic Catfish Price 
Difference Log Domestic Shrimp Price 
Difference Log Domestic Oysters Price 
Divisia Price Index 
Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply 
Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Suppy 
Log Normalized Catfish Supply 
dbwca
dbwsh
dbwoy
lncrdp 
lncrmp
lncadp 
lnshdp 
lnoydp
laglncrdp 
laglncrmp
laglncadp 
laglnshdp 
laglnoydp 
dlncrdp 
dlncrmp
dlncadp 
dlnshdp 
dlnoydp
dlnP
lnncrds 
lnncrms
lnncats
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APPENDIX I. (Cont.) 
Variables Abbreviation 
Log Normalized Shrimp Supply 
Log Normalized Oysters Supply 
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply 
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply 
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Catfish Supply 
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Shrimp Supply 
One Year Lagged Log Normalized Oysters Supply 
Difference Log Normalized Domestic Crawfish Supply 
Difference Log Normalized Imported Crawfish Supply 
Difference Log Normalized Catfish Supply 
Difference Log Normalized Shrimp Supply 
Difference Log Normalized Oysters Supply 
Quantity Divisia Index 
Mixing Parameter 1θ  for Domestic Crawfish 
Mixing Parameter 1θ  for Imported Crawfish 
Mixing Parameter 1θ  for Catfish 
Mixing Parameter 1θ  for Shrimp 
Mixing Parameter 1θ  for Oysters 
Mixing Parameter 2θ  for Domestic Crawfish 
Mixing Parameter 2θ  for Imported Crawfish 
Mixing Parameter 2θ  for Catfish 
lnnshts 
lnnoyts 
laglnncrds 
laglnncrms
laglnncats 
laglnnshts 
laglnnoyts 
dlnncrds 
dlnncrms
dlnncats 
dlnnshts 
dlnnoyts 
dlnQ
bwcddlnQ
bwcmdlnQ
bwcadlnQ
bwshdlnQ
bwoydlnQ
bwcddlnncrdsQ
bwcmdlnncrmsQ
bwcadlnncatsQ
 157
APPENDIX I. (Cont.) 
Variables Abbreviation 
Mixing Parameter 2θ  for Shrimp 
Mixing Parameter 2θ  for Oysters 
GIDS and DIRDS Dependent Variable for Domestic Crawfish 
GIDS and DIRDS Dependent Variable for Imported Crawfish 
GIDS and DIRDS Dependent Variable for Catfish 
GIDS and DIRDS Dependent Variable for Shrimp 
GIDS and DIRDS Dependent Variable for Oysters 
DICBS Dependent Variable for Domestic Crawfish 
DICBS Dependent Variable for Imported Crawfish 
DICBS Dependent Variable for Catfish 
DICBS Dependent Variable for Shrimp 
DICBS Dependent Variable for Oysters 
DINBR Dependent Variable for Domestic Crawfish 
DINBR Dependent Variable for Imported Crawfish 
DINBR Dependent Variable for Catfish 
DINBR Dependent Variable for Shrimp 
DINBR Dependent Variable for Oysters 
bwshdlnnshtsQ
bwoydlnnoytsQ
bwcddlnncrdp
bwcmdlnncrmp
bwcadlnncadp
bwshdlnnshdp
bwoydlnnoydp
bwcddlncdP
bwcmdlncmP
bwcadlncaP
bwshdlnshP
bwoydlnoyP
dbwcddlnQ
dbwcmdlnQ
dbwcadlnQ
dbwshdlnQ
dbwoydlnQ
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APPENDIX II. DATA USED IN THIS ANALYSIS 
 
year crds crdp crms crmp cats cadp shts shdp oyts oydp 
1980 346  13.79  0  - 27844 2.00 253565 4.42  13797  3.72 
1981 278  12.50  0  - 31870 1.88 261871 4.53  17228  3.80 
1982 416  12.82  0  - 47763 1.62 252917 5.89  19706  3.85 
1983 761  11.80  0  - 64194 1.81 268118 6.44  18868  3.94 
1984 747  12.58  0  - 72765 2.04 292227 5.83  20620  4.15 
1985 974  11.24  0  - 90118 2.15 314610 5.17  24086  3.88 
1986 1768  10.84  0  - 100662 1.97 363006 5.78  22960  3.77 
1987 1991  7.76  0  - 130442 1.82 381674 6.00  21960  4.06 
1988 1841  9.25  0  - 136510 2.26 378637 5.97  19115  4.83 
1989 4367  9.54  3  2.85 158179 2.11 387585 5.61  14234  5.48 
1990 2087  8.66  9  7.26 165316 2.24 384121 5.60  11376  5.77 
1991 2296  7.58  33  7.44 179648 2.09 389943 6.08  9399  6.41 
1992 3948  8.02  193  7.00 208786 2.00 423290 5.90  10173  6.73 
1993 4500  7.18  281  6.95 210069 2.18 411865 6.32  13133  6.17 
1994 2546  5.60  714  5.55 200830 2.39 413022 7.83  11669  6.08 
1995 3670  5.20  1288  7.32 203804 2.40 410081 7.68  11289  6.51 
1996 1390  7.25  1267  3.98 215277 2.36 407938 7.27  12321  6.85 
1997 1641  7.80  1034  4.25 238540 2.26 433041 8.14  14491  6.93 
1998 1678  8.42  2818  3.89 256616 2.31 459966 8.02  14427  6.18 
1999 949  8.26  1762  3.79 272191 2.34 474996 7.85  14978  6.46 
2000 121  15.72  2884  4.73 272990 2.38 495886 8.97  16687  7.00 
2001 187  17.41  5859  8.19 279044 2.25 547514 7.66  14188  7.26 
2002 572  12.79  4147  7.68 290663 2.07 585838 6.74  17205  6.52 
2003 728  13.06  7101  8.66 302516 2.05 651535 6.45  19891  5.99 
2004 677  13.11  6639  7.39 290151 2.24 661732 6.24  20458  7.02 
2005 761  13.57  3956  5.07 286114 2.33 647767 6.25  18127  6.89 
Soucers:  National Marine Fisheries Service and USDA. 
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APPENDIX III. SAS CODE: GENERALIZED INVERSE DEMAND MODEL 
Variable Description 
wcd=crdp*crds; 
wcm=crmp*crms; 
wca=cadp*cats; 
wsh=shdp*shts; 
woy=oydp*oyts; 
 
w=wcd+wcm+wca+wsh+woy; 
 
ncrdp=(crdp*crds)/w; 
ncrmp=(crmp*crms)/w; 
ncadp=(cadp*cats)/w; 
nshdp=(shdp*shts)/w; 
noydp=(oydp*oyts)/w; 
 
ncrds=crds/1586.15; 
ncrms=crms/1538.00; 
ncats=cats/177871.54; 
nshts=shts/421259.42; 
noyts=oyts/16245.62; 
 
lnncrdp=log(ncrdp); 
lnncrmp=log(ncrmp); 
lnncadp=log(ncadp); 
lnnshdp=log(nshdp); 
lnnoydp=log(noydp); 
 
laglnncrdp=lag(lnncrdp); 
laglnncrmp=lag(lnncrmp); 
laglnncadp=lag(lnncadp); 
laglnnshdp=lag(lnnshdp); 
laglnnoydp=lag(lnnoydp); 
 
dlnncrdp=lnncrdp-laglnncrdp; 
dlnncrmp=lnncrmp-laglnncrmp; 
dlnncadp=lnncadp-laglnncadp; 
dlnnshdp=lnnshdp-laglnnshdp; 
dlnnoydp=lnnoydp-laglnnoydp; 
 
nwcd=ncrdp*ncrds; 
nwcm=ncrmp*ncrms; 
nwca=ncadp*ncats; 
nwsh=nshdp*nshts; 
nwoy=noydp*noyts; 
 
lagnwcd=lag(nwcd); 
lagnwcm=lag(nwcm); 
lagnwca=lag(nwca); 
lagnwsh=lag(nwsh); 
lagnwoy=lag(nwoy); 
 
bwcd=(nwcd+lagnwcd)/2; 
bwcm=(nwcm+lagnwcm)/2; 
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bwca=(nwca+lagnwca)/2; 
bwsh=(nwsh+lagnwsh)/2; 
bwoy=(nwoy+lagnwoy)/2; 
 
lagbwcd=lag(bwcd); 
lagbwcm=lag(bwcm); 
lagbwca=lag(bwca); 
lagbwsh=lag(bwsh); 
lagbwoy=lag(bwoy); 
 
dbwcd=bwcd-lagbwcd; 
dbwcm=bwcm-lagbwcm; 
dbwca=bwca-lagbwca; 
dbwsh=bwsh-lagbwsh; 
dbwoy=bwoy-lagbwoy; 
 
lncrdp=log(crdp); 
lncrmp=log(crmp); 
lncadp=log(cadp); 
lnshdp=log(shdp); 
lnoydp=log(oydp); 
 
laglncrdp=lag(lncrdp); 
laglncrmp=lag(lncrmp); 
laglncadp=lag(lncadp); 
laglnshdp=lag(lnshdp); 
laglnoydp=lag(lnoydp); 
 
dlncrdp=lncrdp-laglncrdp; 
dlncrmp=lncrmp-laglncrmp; 
dlncadp=lncadp-laglncadp; 
dlnshdp=lnshdp-laglnshdp; 
dlnoydp=lnoydp-laglnoydp; 
 
dlnP=bwcd*dlncrdp+bwcm*dlncrmp+bwca*dlncadp+bwsh*dlnshdp+bwoy*dlnoydp; 
 
lnncrds=log(ncrds); 
lnncrms=log(ncrms); 
lnncats=log(ncats); 
lnnshts=log(nshts); 
lnnoyts=log(noyts); 
 
laglnncrds=lag(lnncrds); 
laglnncrms=lag(lnncrms); 
laglnncats=lag(lnncats); 
laglnnshts=lag(lnnshts); 
laglnnoyts=lag(lnnoyts); 
 
dlnncrds=lnncrds-laglnncrds; 
dlnncrms=lnncrms-laglnncrms; 
dlnncats=lnncats-laglnncats; 
dlnnshts=lnnshts-laglnnshts; 
dlnnoyts=lnnoyts-laglnnoyts; 
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dlnQ=bwcd*dlnncrds+bwcm*dlnncrms+bwca*dlnncats+bwsh*dlnnshts+ 
     bwoy*dlnnoyts; 
 
bwcddlnQ=bwcd*dlnQ; 
bwcmdlnQ=bwcm*dlnQ; 
bwcadlnQ=bwca*dlnQ; 
bwshdlnQ=bwsh*dlnQ; 
bwoydlnQ=bwoy*dlnQ; 
 
bwcddlnncrdsQ=bwcd*(dlnncrds-dlnQ); 
bwcmdlnncrmsQ=bwcm*(dlnncrms-dlnQ); 
bwcadlnncatsQ=bwca*(dlnncats-dlnQ); 
bwshdlnnshtsQ=bwsh*(dlnnshts-dlnQ); 
bwoydlnnoytsQ=bwoy*(dlnnoyts-dlnQ); 
 
bwcddlnncrdp=bwcd*dlnncrdp; 
bwcmdlnncrmp=bwcm*dlnncrmp; 
bwcadlnncadp=bwca*dlnncadp; 
bwshdlnnshdp=bwsh*dlnnshdp; 
bwoydlnnoydp=bwoy*dlnnoydp; 
 
bwcddlncdP=bwcd*(dlncrdp-dlnP); 
bwcmdlncmP=bwcm*(dlncrmp-dlnP); 
bwcadlncaP=bwca*(dlncadp-dlnP); 
bwshdlnshP=bwsh*(dlnshdp-dlnP); 
bwoydlnoyP=bwoy*(dlnoydp-dlnP); 
 
dbwcddlnQ=dbwcd-bwcd*dlnQ; 
dbwcmdlnQ=dbwcm-bwcm*dlnQ; 
dbwcadlnQ=dbwca-bwca*dlnQ; 
dbwshdlnQ=dbwsh-bwsh*dlnQ; 
dbwoydlnQ=dbwoy-bwoy*dlnQ; 
 
 
Generalized Inverse Demand System (GIDS) 
 
proc syslin data=crawfish sur vardef=n out=ehatdat1; 
domestic:model bwcddlnncrdp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts 
                            dlnnoyts dlnQ bwcddlnQ bwcddlnncrdsQ/dw; 
imports:model  bwcmdlnncrmp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts 
                            dlnnoyts dlnQ bwcmdlnQ bwcmdlnncrmsQ/dw; 
catfish:model  bwcadlnncadp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts  
                            dlnnoyts dlnQ bwcadlnQ bwcadlnncatsQ/dw; 
shrimp:model   bwshdlnnshdp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts  
                            dlnnoyts dlnQ bwshdlnQ bwshdlnnshtsQ/dw; 
oysters:model  bwoydlnnoydp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts  
                            dlnnoyts dlnQ bwoydlnQ bwoydlnnoytsQ/dw; 
srestrict 
domestic.bwcddlnQ=imports.bwcmdlnQ=catfish.bwcadlnQ=shrimp.bwshdlnQ=oys
ters.bwoydlnQ, 
            
domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=imports.bwcmdlnncrmsQ=catfish.bwcadlnncatsQ=shri
mp.bwshdlnnshtsQ=oysters.bwoydlnnoytsQ, 
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domestic.dlnQ+imports.dlnQ+catfish.dlnQ+shrimp.dlnQ+oysters.dlnQ=-1, 
 
domestic.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrds+oys
ters.dlnncrds=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncrms+oys
ters.dlnncrms=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncats+imports.dlnncats+catfish.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnncats+oys
ters.dlnncats=0, 
 
domestic.dlnnshts+imports.dlnnshts+catfish.dlnnshts+shrimp.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnshts=0, 
 
domestic.dlnnoyts+imports.dlnnoyts+catfish.dlnnoyts+shrimp.dlnnoyts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
domestic.intercept+imports.intercept+catfish.intercept+shrimp.intercept
+oysters.intercept=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrds+domestic.dlnncrms+domestic.dlnncats+domestic.dlnnshts
+domestic.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
imports.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncats+imports.dlnnshts+imp
orts.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
catfish.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncats+catfish.dlnnshts+cat
fish.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
shrimp.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnnshts+shrimp.
dlnnoyts=0, 
 
oysters.dlnncrds+oysters.dlnncrms+oysters.dlnncats+oysters.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrms=imports.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrds, 
domestic.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrds, 
imports.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrms, imports.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrms, 
imports.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrms, 
catfish.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncats, catfish.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncats, 
shrimp.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnnshts; 
 
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=1; 
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=0; 
stest domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=1; 
stest domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=0; 
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=0, domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=0; 
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=1, domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=1; 
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=0, domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=1; 
stest domestic.bwcddlnQ=1, domestic.bwcddlnncrdsQ=0; 
output r=ehat; 
 
 
 163
APPENDIX III. (Cont.) 
 
 
data rhohat1; 
set ehatdat1; 
ehat1=lag(ehat); 
 
proc reg; 
rhohat1:model ehat=ehat1/noint; 
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APPENDIX IV. SAS CODE: 
DIFFERENTIAL INVERSE ROTTERDAM DEMAND MODEL  
 
 
proc syslin data=crawfish sur vardef=n out=ehatdat2; 
domestic:model bwcddlnncrdp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts  
                            dlnnoyts dlnQ/dw; 
imports:model  bwcmdlnncrmp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts  
                            dlnnoyts dlnQ/dw; 
catfish:model  bwcadlnncadp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts  
                            dlnnoyts dlnQ/dw; 
shrimp:model   bwshdlnnshdp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts  
                            dlnnoyts dlnQ/dw; 
oysters:model  bwoydlnnoydp=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts  
                            dlnnoyts dlnQ/dw; 
srestrict 
domestic.dlnQ+imports.dlnQ+catfish.dlnQ+shrimp.dlnQ+oysters.dlnQ=-1, 
 
domestic.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrds+oys
ters.dlnncrds=0, 
            
domestic.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncrms+oys
ters.dlnncrms=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncats+imports.dlnncats+catfish.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnncats+oys
ters.dlnncats=0, 
 
domestic.dlnnshts+imports.dlnnshts+catfish.dlnnshts+shrimp.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnshts=0, 
 
domestic.dlnnoyts+imports.dlnnoyts+catfish.dlnnoyts+shrimp.dlnnoyts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
domestic.intercept+imports.intercept+catfish.intercept+shrimp.intercept
+oysters.intercept=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrds+domestic.dlnncrms+domestic.dlnncats+domestic.dlnnshts
+domestic.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
imports.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncats+imports.dlnnshts+imp
orts.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
catfish.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncats+catfish.dlnnshts+cat
fish.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
shrimp.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnnshts+shrimp.
dlnnoyts=0, 
 
oysters.dlnncrds+oysters.dlnncrms+oysters.dlnncats+oysters.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0, 
domestic.dlnncrms=imports.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrds, 
domestic.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrds, 
imports.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrms, imports.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrms, 
imports.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrms, 
catfish.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncats, catfish.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncats, 
shrimp.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnnshts; 
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APPENDIX IV. (Cont.) 
 
 
output r=ehat; 
 
data rhohat2; 
set ehatdat2; 
ehat1=lag(ehat); 
 
proc reg; 
rhohat2:model ehat=ehat1/noint; 
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APPEMDIX V. SAS CODE: 
DIFFERENTIAL INVERSE ALMOST IDEAL DEMAND MODEL 
 
proc syslin data=crawfish sur vardef=n out=ehatdat3; 
domestic:model dbwcd=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                     dlnQ/dw; 
imports:model  dbwcm=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                     dlnQ/dw; 
catfish:model  dbwca=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                     dlnQ/dw; 
shrimp:model   dbwsh=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts 
                     dlnQ/dw; 
oysters:model  dbwoy=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                     dlnQ/dw; 
srestrict 
domestic.dlnQ+imports.dlnQ+catfish.dlnQ+shrimp.dlnQ+oysters.dlnQ=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrds+oys
ters.dlnncrds=0, 
            
domestic.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncrms+oys
ters.dlnncrms=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncats+imports.dlnncats+catfish.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnncats+oys
ters.dlnncats=0, 
 
domestic.dlnnshts+imports.dlnnshts+catfish.dlnnshts+shrimp.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnshts=0, 
 
domestic.dlnnoyts+imports.dlnnoyts+catfish.dlnnoyts+shrimp.dlnnoyts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
domestic.intercept+imports.intercept+catfish.intercept+shrimp.intercept
+oysters.intercept=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrds+domestic.dlnncrms+domestic.dlnncats+domestic.dlnnshts
+domestic.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
imports.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncats+imports.dlnnshts+imp
orts.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
catfish.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncats+catfish.dlnnshts+cat
fish.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
shrimp.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnnshts+shrimp.
dlnnoyts=0, 
 
oysters.dlnncrds+oysters.dlnncrms+oysters.dlnncats+oysters.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrms=imports.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrds, 
domestic.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrds, 
imports.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrms, imports.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrms, 
imports.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrms, 
catfish.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncats, catfish.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncats, 
shrimp.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnnshts; 
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APPENDIX V. (Cont.) 
 
 
output r=ehat; 
 
data rhohat3; 
set ehatdat3; 
ehat1=lag(ehat); 
 
proc reg; 
rhohat3:model ehat=ehat1/noint; 
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APPENDIX VI. SAS CODE: DIFFERENTIAL INVERSE CBS MODEL 
 
proc syslin data=crawfish sur vardef=n out=ehatdat4; 
domestic:model bwcddlncdP=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts 
                          dlnQ/dw; 
imports:model  bwcmdlncmP=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                          dlnQ/dw; 
catfish:model  bwcadlncaP=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts 
                          dlnQ/dw; 
shrimp:model   bwshdlnshP=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                          dlnQ/dw; 
oysters:model  bwoydlnoyP=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                          dlnQ/dw; 
srestrict 
domestic.dlnQ+imports.dlnQ+catfish.dlnQ+shrimp.dlnQ+oysters.dlnQ=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrds+oys
ters.dlnncrds=0, 
            
domestic.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncrms+oys
ters.dlnncrms=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncats+imports.dlnncats+catfish.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnncats+oys
ters.dlnncats=0, 
 
domestic.dlnnshts+imports.dlnnshts+catfish.dlnnshts+shrimp.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnshts=0, 
 
domestic.dlnnoyts+imports.dlnnoyts+catfish.dlnnoyts+shrimp.dlnnoyts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
domestic.intercept+imports.intercept+catfish.intercept+shrimp.intercept
+oysters.intercept=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrds+domestic.dlnncrms+domestic.dlnncats+domestic.dlnnshts
+domestic.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
imports.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncats+imports.dlnnshts+imp
orts.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
catfish.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncats+catfish.dlnnshts+cat
fish.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
shrimp.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnnshts+shrimp.
dlnnoyts=0, 
 
oysters.dlnncrds+oysters.dlnncrms+oysters.dlnncats+oysters.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrms=imports.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrds, 
domestic.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrds, 
imports.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrms, imports.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrms, 
imports.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrms, 
catfish.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncats, catfish.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncats, 
shrimp.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnnshts; 
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APPENDIX VI. (Cont.) 
 
 
output r=ehat; 
 
data rhohat4; 
set ehatdat4; 
ehat1=lag(ehat); 
 
proc reg; 
rhohat4:model ehat=ehat1/noint; 
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APPENDIX VII. SAS CODE: DIFFERENTIAL INVERSE NBR MODEL 
 
proc syslin data=crawfish sur vardef=n out=ehatdat5; 
domestic:model dbwcddlnQ=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                         dlnQ/dw; 
imports:model  dbwcmdlnQ=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                         dlnQ/dw; 
catfish:model  dbwcadlnQ=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                         dlnQ/dw; 
shrimp:model   dbwshdlnQ=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                         dlnQ/dw; 
oysters:model  dbwoydlnQ=dlnncrds dlnncrms dlnncats dlnnshts dlnnoyts  
                         dlnQ/dw; 
srestrict 
domestic.dlnQ+imports.dlnQ+catfish.dlnQ+shrimp.dlnQ+oysters.dlnQ=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrds+oys
ters.dlnncrds=0, 
            
domestic.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncrms+oys
ters.dlnncrms=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncats+imports.dlnncats+catfish.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnncats+oys
ters.dlnncats=0, 
 
domestic.dlnnshts+imports.dlnnshts+catfish.dlnnshts+shrimp.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnshts=0, 
 
domestic.dlnnoyts+imports.dlnnoyts+catfish.dlnnoyts+shrimp.dlnnoyts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
domestic.intercept+imports.intercept+catfish.intercept+shrimp.intercept
+oysters.intercept=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrds+domestic.dlnncrms+domestic.dlnncats+domestic.dlnnshts
+domestic.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
imports.dlnncrds+imports.dlnncrms+imports.dlnncats+imports.dlnnshts+imp
orts.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
catfish.dlnncrds+catfish.dlnncrms+catfish.dlnncats+catfish.dlnnshts+cat
fish.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
shrimp.dlnncrds+shrimp.dlnncrms+shrimp.dlnncats+shrimp.dlnnshts+shrimp.
dlnnoyts=0, 
 
oysters.dlnncrds+oysters.dlnncrms+oysters.dlnncats+oysters.dlnnshts+oys
ters.dlnnoyts=0, 
 
domestic.dlnncrms=imports.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrds, 
domestic.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrds, domestic.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrds, 
imports.dlnncats=catfish.dlnncrms, imports.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncrms, 
imports.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncrms, 
catfish.dlnnshts=shrimp.dlnncats, catfish.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnncats, 
   shrimp.dlnnoyts=oysters.dlnnshts; 
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APPENDIX VII. (Cont.) 
 
 
output r=ehat; 
 
data rhohat5; 
set ehatdat5; 
ehat1=lag(ehat); 
 
proc reg; 
rhohat5:model ehat=ehat1/noint; 
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